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PREFACE 
his report has been produced by a group of EU policy analysts based 
at research institutes in Brussels and Leuven. It was stimulated by 
the evident challenges of implementing the Lisbon Treaty in the area 
of external relations. It has been prepared with a view to presenting our 
findings to the second joint annual conference of Brussels-based think tanks 
on major European issues, to be held on 25 January 2011.  
At the time of writing, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
is in the course of being set up. Its formal start date was 1 December 2010, 
while its effective start date is understood to be 1 January 2011. At the same 
time there are intricate ongoing negotiations on both the budget and 
staffing of the EEAS and on the precise forms of external representation of 
the EU in international organisations and negotiations. Unfortunately, there 
are continued inter-institutional disagreements over the details here, 
alongside some signs of back-tracking by member states over an effective 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the external domain. Further, 
questions related to the budget and staffing seem likely to become issues in 
the next multi-annual budget framework after 2013, which will begin to be 
negotiated in 2011. All this is going to further divert energies from 
addressing the substantive issues for EU foreign policy. While we regret 
these continuing arguments and uncertainties, the present contribution 
provides at least a reference, as an independent view of how the Lisbon 
Treaty might be implemented and dynamically followed through, and 
against which actual developments can be monitored.  
Contributions by Ludvig Norman, Sven Biscop, Antonio Missiroli, 
Agnes Sebastyen, Anne van der Lingen, Sergio Carrera, Alejandro 
Eggenschwiler and Jean Pascal Zanders are gratefully acknowledged.   
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1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Abstract 
This report investigates two crucial factors that will in part determine 
whether the innovations and ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU as 
foreign policy actor will be realised: first, the status of the EU in the multitude of 
multilateral organisations and international agreements that deal with matters 
of EU competence, and, secondly, the structure of European diplomacy (i.e. the 
personnel strengths and costs of the 27 member state diplomacies alongside the 
new European External Action Service). The report has an original information 
content since so far there has been no systematic account available on either of 
these subjects. Going beyond this information function, the report also 
formulates recommendations for where the EU’s status in the international 
arena is inadequate; and forward-looking scenarios for the restructuring of 
European diplomacy, which is a task for the next decade or two. Our premise is 
that the EU should seek to build up a world-class diplomatic corps, capable of 
becoming a major actor in global affairs. There are interest groups in national 
foreign ministries that prefer to stick to the status quo, and seek to minimise the 
restructuring of European diplomacy. However, in our view as independent 
analysts, fundamental changes in the nature of global affairs mean that this 
conservatism is indefensible, and would only result in an increasingly obsolete, 
irrelevant and wasteful European diplomacy.  
1.1 Purpose 
The subject of this report, the institutional place of the EU in the 
international system, now becomes an urgent and inescapable part of the 
strategic challenge that Europe faces in the world. The status quo is not 
conducive to the EU’s interests. Without revision of the roles of the EU and 
its member states in the international system, they together will cease to be 
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the multilateral order’s best friend, but instead could become an obstacle to 
its reform and modernisation.  
Are we overdramatising the situation? We think not; the writing is on 
the wall. At the December 2009 Copenhagen climate change summit, the 
multiplicity of vocal European leaders saw themselves all sidelined at the 
top table. In September 2010, the EU’s attempt to get enhanced 
participation rights at the UN General Assembly was set back (perhaps 
only temporarily) by the lack of support mainly from developing countries. 
In October 2010 the EU member states yielded to the combined pressure of 
the US and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to cede seats and 
votes in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), failing which they likely 
would have been blamed for blocking reform.  
Of course everybody is aware that the world outside the EU is 
changing dramatically, with the huge shift in global power towards Asia 
and the BRICs, while the processes of globalisation reveal alarming 
systemic failures at the global policy level, such as in financial markets and 
climate change policy. The rise of the BRICs also poses questions about the 
nature of the normative principles (if any) in the newly emerging world 
‘constellation’, and whether the new multi-polarity will degenerate into 
new balance of power games leading to instability, or worse, conflict.  
The EU says in its official documents and countless speeches that it 
wants to work towards a more structured global multilateral order as a 
prime objective of its foreign policy. But for this it needs to engage in the 
upgrading, rationalisation and concentration of its external representation 
in a radical and comprehensive manner. When the weak effectiveness of 
EU foreign policy is raised in conversation with national diplomats, we 
hear bland remarks that there is no appetite for change in the status quo. 
On the contrary their top priority often seems to be a rearguard action to 
minimise the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.  
These postures are seemingly oblivious to two twin dramas: first, the 
need for the EU to get organised to face the new global challenges, and 
second, the budgetary case for restructuring European diplomacy in the 
light of acute macroeconomic needs to reduce wasteful expenditure at all 
levels. 
Actually, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the creation 
of the post of High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR) 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS) and granting of legal 
personality to the EU as a whole, make for a golden opportunity to review 
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the existing arrangements for the representation of the EU in the 
international system. This concerns the whole complex landscape: 
multilateral organisations, international agreements and the less formal but 
highly important summit diplomacy.  
The present report addresses the question of how the EU could 
rationalise and strengthen its collective diplomacy. It deals only with 
institutional arrangements, leaving aside the ultimately more important 
matters of substantive foreign and security policy. Institutions are of course 
not everything, but they still provide the necessary framework for action. 
The EU is well accustomed to debates between institutionalists and 
pragmatists. Both have their arguments, but this report sticks to its 
purpose, which is essentially the institutional question. 
1.2 Analytical and legal framework 
The insertion of the EU into the international system is already rather 
impressive, and a good basis for further improvements. Over the last few 
decades, the European Community – now the European Union (or EU) as 
its legal successor – forged a relationship with a great number of 
multilateral organisations and became a party, usually with the member 
states, to a huge number of international agreements: 249 multilateral 
treaties and 649 bilateral treaties are recorded in the European 
Commission’s data base of treaties. However this mass of relationships has 
developed in a dispersed and ad hoc manner, leaving problems of 
inconsistency and obsolescence with regard to the institutional and policy 
development of the EU.  
The EU has inherited from the European Community a variety of 
different types of status in multilateral organisations and treaty schemes: 
o the EU as member or contracting party,  
o the EU as ‘virtual’ member or ‘enhanced’ observer (i.e. full functional 
participant, except without vote or full formal status) and 
o the EU as ‘ordinary’ observer. 
At the same time the EU’s member states are generally full members, 
or contracting parties, and through the Council also have the role of 
mandate controller for the EU’s participation where this is significant.  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) for its 
part sets out several categories of EU competences: 
o exclusive competences, 
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o shared competences, of which there are several types, including 
‘parallel competences’, the ‘coordination’ of economic policies, etc. 
and 
o policies where the EU may undertake actions supplementary to the 
member states.  
In principle there should as a matter of institutional logic be 
consistency between these sets of categories. The practice is not totally 
devoid of logic, but should be more clearly ordered, and in many cases an 
upgrade of the EU’s status in the international sphere where the TFEU 
confers competence appears justified by the level of its competences. To 
devise operational guidelines for this is however a complex task, since it 
involves three distinct but overlapping categories of issues: 
1. Questions of the status of the EU in existing international 
organisations, and in particular whether its present status (as 
member, or observer, etc.) is in line with actual EU competences as 
they have developed over recent years in domains such as the 
internal market (which almost invariably has external aspects), 
common policies (e.g. transport), economic and monetary union, and 
common foreign and security policy.  
The Lisbon Treaty has clarified and in some cases upgraded EU 
competences, but is largely silent on these external institutional questions, 
no doubt because these are not for the EU alone to decide, and on many 
details the EU must act in close cooperation with its member states and is 
also dependent on the willingness of third states to upgrade its 
international actor status. As a first approximation one may envisage the 
following guidelines: 
o In cases of exclusive competences, the EU would be the preeminent 
actor, subject to mandate-controlling activity by the member states, 
which might also (but not necessarily) be members. 
o In cases of shared competences, the norm would be a hybrid regime 
with the EU as well as the member states as full members, or with the 
EU as ‘virtual’ member where the organisation is engaged more in 
dialogue and coordination rather than legally binding matters.  
o In cases where the EU has some but only weak competences, it would 
be an ordinary observer. 
Where the EU has achieved full status in agreements or agencies of 
the UN system, it has relied for legal basis in the agreements or statutes of 
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the organisations concerned on recognition of a category called the 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO), or Regional 
Integration Organisation (RIO), to which relevant competences have been 
delegated. The EU has on these grounds been admitted to the FAO, the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission and 70 other agreements as full member 
or contracting party. However, the insertion of such REIO or RIO clause is 
not a prerogative of the EU and has to be agreed with the contracting 
parties or member states. In several cases there has been insufficient 
support for proposals to pass (examples are given below). 
2. Questions of who represents the EU in international organisations, 
negotiations and fora, for which the Lisbon Treaty is more explicit, 
but not without leaving some unsettled questions which need to be 
sorted out without delay.  
The Lisbon Treaty gives clear responsibility to the HR to represent 
the EU in foreign and security policy (TEU, 27.2), and to the Commission 
for other domains of EU competence with the exception of the monetary 
union (TEU 17.1), and also an elaborate procedure for the Council to decide 
which of them should lead the negotiations, or be head of the negotiating 
team (TFEU 218.3). The EU Delegations are now in principle well placed 
institutionally to represent the EU in the main centres of multilateral 
diplomacy (New York, Geneva, Vienna, etc.) precisely because of their 
capacity to represent the entire EU – and not just the Commission, as in the 
pre-Lisbon era – in international organisations, although there are still in 
some cases frictions over bringing in the new system. There also remain 
uncertainties over how the interests of member states should be 
represented in the case of shared competence, especially the so-called 
‘parallel competences’.  These uncertainties should best be ended quickly 
through an inter-institutional understanding (as appears now to be 
happening over the ‘mercury’ case, discussed in detail in section 6.1.10), 
and if not, by rulings of the Court of Justice, to settle institutional and 
procedural questions which still occupy all too much time at the expense of 
substantive issues.   
3. Questions of reform of the multilateral system, which have become a 
matter of increasing urgency and importance with the rise of new 
powers which claim a corresponding increase in their presences in 
major international organisations, and which leads to consequent 
pressures for the so-called ‘advanced’ countries – meaning mainly 
Europe – to make room for them. This underrepresentation of new 
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powers also coincides with the underrepresentation of the EU itself (a 
new power of a different kind), and so connects with the sensitive 
issue internal to the EU on the relative position of the member states 
and the EU itself in these organisations.   
Overall the status quo in relation to all three questions is far from 
satisfactory. In many instances – especially regarding shared competences – 
the EU’s status lagged behind the development of the EU’s competences 
even before the Lisbon Treaty, and now all the more so with the Treaty’s 
innovations in the foreign and security policy and the area of freedom, 
security and justice. There are unresolved tensions between the EU 
institutions and member states over who represents the EU in negotiations 
in certain types of situations. While the pressures for reform in the 
multilateral system mount, the EU and member states have difficulty in 
forming consistent positions for the EU to advance while the member states 
have to give ground. The general strategy may be thought of as 
shepherding the role of the EU in a considerable number of cases 
incrementally to a step up in the multilateral organisations, taking into 
account the realities of EU competences. But everything cannot be done at 
once. Some selected cases are urgent, while others are clearly only 
conceivable politically in the longer run. We now summarise a number of 
important cases.  
1.3 Upgrading the EU in international relations  
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has seen the law of unintended 
consequences at work, with the Lisbon Treaty interacting with the rules of 
procedure of the UNGA to downgrade the EU’s presence. This is because 
the HR and President of the European Council are tasked with representing 
the EU in UNGA debates, rather than the member states representing the 
rotating Council Presidency, and since the EU is not a member of the UN 
but only one of many ‘ordinary’ observers, it can only intervene after the 
192 UN member states have had their say. This led the EU to propose in 
September 2010 a Resolution, invoking its status as a RIO, for upgrading its 
participation to that of ‘enhanced’ observer at the Assembly and its 
subsidiary working groups and UN conferences. This proposal suffered a 
setback when a majority voted to defer rather than immediately pass the 
Resolution, and this will have to be overcome as soon as possible with the 
aid of much more thorough diplomatic lobbying by the EU and its member 
states. 
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Paradoxically, current arrangements provided in the Lisbon Treaty 
for the representation of EU positions in the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
are today more satisfactory, since a combination of EU and UNSC 
procedures make it possible for the HR to intervene on behalf of the EU 
where it has a common position to express. The HR began to make such 
presentations in 2010. At the same time debate over structural reform of the 
membership of the UNSC, which has been ongoing for decades without 
resolution, has become intense again with pressures for increased 
representation of new powers. This debate is highly sensitive for France 
and the UK as existing permanent members, Germany as a would-be 
permanent member, and others who would like a still wider membership, 
in addition to which there is the logical long-run question of the status 
there of the EU itself. The future of this debate is hard to predict given the 
number of contradictory positions inside and outside the EU.  
Elsewhere in the UN system of agencies and programmes there are a 
number of instances where the reality of EU competences in relation to the 
activities in question, including financial contributions, could justify full 
member status as a REIO or RIO. Examples of organisations where upgrade 
of the EU to full member is overdue include the ICAO in civil aviation, the 
IMO in maritime affairs, the ILO in labour market and social policy and the 
WIPO for intellectual property.  
The WTO and FAO provide examples of how the EU and member 
states can work together when both are members of organisations. The 
FAO case is especially pertinent with other cases in mind, since this 
organisation deals with a wide range of issues which for the EU are a mix 
of exclusive, shared and national competences. But even here there is room 
for more efficient and cost-effective coordination between the EU and the 
member states, reducing the number of meetings at which all member 
states observe negotiations conducted by the Commission on mandates 
decided in Brussels; in some such instances there could be a thinning out of 
expensive overrepresentation by member states’ diplomats especially at the 
WTO, and where a single EU notetaker could suffice.  
In several UN programmes and conferences (UNDP, UNCTAD, 
OHCHR, UNHRC), the EU is a mere observer, despite being an important 
financial contributor and having major policy interests. Lack of full 
member status leads also to exclusion from Executive Boards or Steering 
Groups, where the most important policy shaping may take place. At the 
UN climate change convention (UNFCCC), the EU has full status alongside 
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the member states, but the multiplicity of voices at summit level (especially 
at Copenhagen in December 2009) has been widely criticised for its 
consequent loss of effectiveness.    
Three European or Euro-Atlantic organisations (Council of Europe, 
OECD and OSCE) are given special mention in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 
220 TFEU), which calls for the EU to develop ‘all appropriate forms of 
cooperation’ without saying what these should consist of.1 In all three cases 
the EU is only observer. The case of the Council of Europe (CoE) is even 
more special, since the Lisbon Treaty provides for the EU to accede to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and negotiations are 
under way for this. If one accepts the premise that the EU should in 
principle enter fully into the governance structures of organisations that 
entail legally binding obligations for EU policies, an upgrading of the EU’s 
status at the CoE becomes a matter for consideration. For the OECD the 
nature of its business is more dialogue and debate, with fewer legally 
binding commitments. In this case the current status as ‘enhanced observer’ 
may suffice, although a case could be made – especially in light of the 
composition of the G-20 – in favour of full EU membership . The OSCE is 
still a different matter: although it is the custodian of fundamental 
principles and values, such as those laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, the 
organisation is essentially political in nature and not legal. Moreover, the 
operationality of the OSCE suffers from its 56 member state composition, 
which makes its working sessions resemble a mini-UN without the UNSC. 
The OSCE needs reform to become more effective, for example to create a 
steering group to facilitate more rapid decision-making. Failing this, there 
could be less formal initiatives bypassing the OSCE, such as the Medvedev-
Merkel proposal for an EU-Russia security dialogue between the HR and 
the Russian foreign minister, which could be made into a trialogue with the 
US.  
At the IMF and World Bank there are the triple problems of 
overrepresentation of the member states, non-representation of the EU 
itself and political obsolescence of the constituency systems of the 
Executive Boards. The situation reached a crisis point at the IMF in 
September 2010, where the US implicitly allied with the BRICs to pressure 
                                                     
1 The UN and its specialised agencies are also covered by this article in the same 
way. 
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the member states into reducing their over-representation, and EU member 
states agreed to certain concessions at the G20 finance ministers meeting in 
Korea in October. Since monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the 
EU for those member states that have the euro as their currency, the logical 
solution would be for the eurozone member states to agree to share a 
common seat and constituency of the Executive Board. The IMF agreement 
foresees a limited revision of quotas and seats on the Executive Board to 
become operational in 2012, and for further review eight years later in 2020. 
Assuming the eurozone recovers from its present crisis, 2020 would be a 
suitable date to switch to a single seat for the monetary union.In the case of 
the World Bank, the EU should at least have a seat as observer, and 
preferably enhanced observer, on the Executive Board.   
The G7/8/20 are acting effectively as steering groups for 
international economic policies. Here the EU is adequately represented 
through the Presidents of the Commission and of the European Council, or 
excessively so, with two places in addition to the presence of the larger 
member states. At some stage it should be possible for the EU to be 
represented by just one President.  
The EU and NATO have extensive cooperative arrangements, but 
their operationality is limited. Mutual observer status at the level of the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
would be a possible short-run development, given the official desire to 
develop an EU-NATO ‘strategic partnership’ and (in the words of 
President Van Rompuy) to “break down the walls between our two 
organisations”.  
Given the importance of the EU’s shared competences which spill 
over into international affairs it is inevitable that the EU’s diplomacy is 
going to retain a hybrid character indefinitely, even with this substantial 
restructuring. A federal regime, with the EU to gain exclusive competence 
for most external relations, is not on the horizon. Instead, the essence of the 
hybrid system (motor) is to have two sources of power, with the EU and its 
member states working together. However hybrid engineering is complex, 
and the EU and member states have to work constantly at eliminating 
unnecessary procedural complications and expensive duplicative presences 
at many international fora.   
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1.4 The costs of non-Europe … and the restructuring of European 
diplomacy2 
The EEAS is now formally established. This involves a merger of relevant 
parts of the Council Secretariat and Commission in a new body, and the 
upgrading of the 136 former Commission Delegations into EU Delegations, 
which are now responsible for all EU competences – political, economic, 
foreign and security. The EEAS is initially endowed with a total staff at 
home and abroad of 3,720, and with (proposed) budget expenditure of €476 
million in 2011.  
By comparison, the 27 member states have 3,164 embassies, missions 
and consulates worldwide, employing 93,912 staff, costing €7,529 million. 
Whereas the EEAS budget is €1 per capita of the population, for the 27 
member states diplomacies the average cost is €15 per capita. The EEAS 
will have one staff member per 134,677 of the population, whereas the 27 
member states average 1 staff member per 5,335 of the population.  
These figures suggest huge scope for economies of scale if the EEAS 
is able to take on functions that in some cases are currently duplicated 27 
times. There are possibilities for this in arranging common political and 
economic reporting, in establishing common consular services for issuing at 
least short-term Schengen visas, and in arranging for mini-diplomatic 
missions to be co-located with the EU Delegations to save in infrastructural 
costs. In addition there are many international meetings where the EU does 
not have to be represented by 27+1 delegations (for example technical 
meetings at the WTO, as remarked above). 
But there are more fundamental reasons justifying a radical 
restructuring of European diplomacy. The very nature of national and 
European interests has been changing. Apart from simple commercial 
competition within the EU and between member states, the weight of 
‘pure’ national interests of individual member states in foreign affairs that 
are different to those of other member states, or which can be advanced 
without winning support at the EU level, has surely been declining as a 
function of the twin dynamics of European integration and globalisation. 
                                                     
2 The statistics presented in this section should only be regarded as rough 
indications. Every effort has been made to extract from comparable data in 
correspondence with national MFAs and Permanent Representations in Brussels, 
but there are doubtless cases where this is not completely assured.  
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At the global level there is an ongoing radical transformation of the very 
nature of international diplomacy, with the rise of horizontal networking 
activity with policy shaping by horizontal alliances of official parties and 
non-state interest groups, alongside limited achievements (and some 
manifest failures) of top-down summitry. The EU is a leading practitioner 
of this horizontal networking activity at home, and can aspire to 
developing these capabilities at the international level, but this has to be 
based on building up EU-level diplomatic capabilities in many technically 
complex fields, which cannot be done extensively also at member state 
level without hugely costly duplication.     
We therefore present four scenarios for restructuring European 
diplomacy:3 
1. Minimalist budget-neutrality. This imposes a zero growth constraint of 
the budget of the EEAS, and amounts to denial of the purpose of the 
Lisbon Treaty to build up the role of the EU as global foreign policy 
actor. It has to be included in our scenarios since it is the closest to 
what the member states currently appear to be trying to do.   
2. Common sense budget-neutrality. Involves the transfer of around 380 
national diplomats to augment the EEAS in the period 2011 to 2013, 
without being replaced at home.  
3. Moderate restructuring – with some net budget savings. The EEAS staff 
would be doubled up to the year 2020 (increased from 3,720 to 7,440), 
alongside a 10% (or 9,492) reduction in the staff of the member states’ 
diplomacies, yielding a net budget savings of €283 million for EU and 
member states’ budgets together, i.e. a sizeable amount compared to 
the initial budget of the EEAS. About one-third of the 3,720 posts are 
for administrative grade diplomats, which makes about 120 extra 
posts per year over 10 years (note that the 2011 budget request is for 
an extra 100 such posts, so the scenario extends roughly this rate of 
expansion). 
4. Substantial restructuring – with larger net budget savings. Under this 
scenario, the EEAS staff would be tripled (increased by 7,440 to 
11,160) but here the time horizon might be until 2030, thus continuing 
a steady rate of staff expansion, alongside a 25% (or 23,729) reduction 
                                                     
3 Data used in these scenarios on MFA costs are detailed in section 5.2 below and in 
annexed tables.  
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of the member states’ diplomacies, yielding a net saving of €948 
million for the EU and member states’ budgets together. This would 
raise the staff strength of the EEAS roughly to the level of the top 
three member states’ diplomacies.  
Various member states are now already making cuts in their foreign 
ministry budgets in this range of 10 to 25%, and in the cases we can observe 
(Austria, France, Poland, Slovenia and the UK) these cuts are being 
implemented over short to medium-term time horizons. This means that 
net budget savings in the scenarios 3 and 4 would be front-loaded in the 
next five years, in keeping with current budgetary imperatives. Moreover 
the countries cited do not include the most acute current budget crisis cases 
(Greece, Ireland and Portugal), which may be making deeper cuts. But 
these scenarios deal only with the cost side of a cost-benefit analysis. The 
benefit side is impossible to quantify but even more important, since this is 
about transforming European diplomacy’s performance into ‘punching its 
real weight’. To contribute to this the ‘substantial restructuring’ scenario 
would seem more plausible than the ‘moderate restructuring’. Regrettably, 
there is no sign that the are taking an integrated view of their overall 
budget and policy priorities (national and EU combined), by profiting from 
economies of scale in strengthening EU diplomacy alongside a slimming 
down of wasteful national diplomacy. 
1.5 The new diplomacy  
Way above the minutiae of arguments over who exactly should represent 
the EU in various fora is the challenge for the EU as a whole, as for all the 
world’s major powers, to adapt their diplomacy to the new and fast-
moving realities of global governance. A leading academic reference from 
the other side of the Atlantic sees the achievements and potential of the EU 
in this context more clearly than most Europeans do.4 This is a world of 
“disaggregated sovereignty”, characterised by “a tightly woven fabric of 
international agreements, organisations and institutions that shape states’ 
                                                     
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004. The author has since in 2009 become head of the policy planning staff 
of the US State Department. In the quoted lines, the author is also citing Abram 
and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995  
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relations with each one another and penetrate deeply into their internal 
economics and politics”. In this situation the new sovereignty may be 
defined as “the capacity to participate in international institutions of all 
types”. The new sovereignty (and new diplomacy) is about status and 
membership, thus “connection to the rest of the world and the political 
ability to be an actor within it”. The EU is in several respects uniquely well 
placed to connect with this world of ever-more complex international 
regulatory structures: it is already contracting party to hundreds of 
international agreements, it pleads for a stronger international law based 
on world order, and has worked out institutionally more thoroughly than 
anyone else out how internally to implement supranational law at the 
national level. All the internal regulatory departments of the Commission 
are already engaged in the international dimension of their sectoral 
policies. The Lisbon Treaty enhances the EU’s legal capacity to participate 
in international institutions of all types. The creation of the new External 
Action Service, led by a High Representative who is also Vice-President of 
the Commission, provides the perfect opportunity for the EU to succeed in 
the new diplomacy combining traditional foreign and security policy 
matters and the rising mass of global regulatory activity. The new EU 
Delegations are empowered to represent the EU across this entire 
landscape. This model for a new European diplomacy requires two further 
prerequisites to become a reality: a sustained, systematic and well 
organised push to progressively enhance the EU’s status in organisations 
where this lags behind its actual competences, and the steady build-up of a 
world-class diplomatic service with competence in both traditional foreign 
policy matters and extensive sectoral regulatory policies. The present 
report is devoted to setting out the details of these two prerequisites.    
The extent and complexity of the outstanding issues, for short- to 
longer-term time horizons, warrant a White Paper to be drawn up by the 
HR and Commission, proposing a comprehensive and strategic approach 
both for the short-run and the medium-term future through to 2020. The 
experiences of the second half of 2010, in the UNGA and the IMF in 
particular, demonstrate the need for a strategic approach, which when 
adopted will also require the combined diplomacies of the EU and the 
member states to work for its acceptance by the rest of the world 
community.  
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2. WHY SHOULD THE EU BE STRONGLY 
REPRESENTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARENA? 
n a nutshell, the response to the question posed above is because the 
world is changing profoundly, and the EU and its member states have 
to do so as well in order to remain relevant in world affairs.  
The institutional provisions in the Lisbon Treaty to strengthen EU foreign 
policy (the HR, EEAS, etc.) were overdue. The structures of European 
diplomacy have become grossly obsolescent, ineffective at the world level 
and wasteful of precious talent and budgetary resources. The existing 
structure of European diplomacy is chronically out of line with major 
structural changes in international affairs that have already occurred and 
are gathering increasing momentum: globalisation and the rise of new 
great powers, the changing nature of diplomacy with declining relative 
weight of bilateral inter-state affairs and the increasing demands to work 
out mechanisms of global governance. The EU has some chance, if it 
organises itself properly, to have a significant say in global affairs; the 
member states acting individually and with different discourses have little 
or no chance of being effective at the level of strategic significance.  
Expression of doubt can be heard these days in the informal talk of 
some foreign services of the member states whether the provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty should be followed through strongly. Some would minimise 
its effectiveness. But for these ‘conservatives’ the writing is on the wall. At 
Copenhagen in December 2009, President Obama went alone to try and 
negotiate with China, India and Brazil, since there were too many 
European leaders to take along with him. In Washington in September 
2010, the United States forced the EU member states into defensive 
I
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concessions over their representation on the IMF Executive Board, while 
the European Central Bank (ECB) has only the limited status of observer. 
Either the member states agree to follow through Lisbon with a major 
restructuring of European diplomacy, or they consign themselves (as 
independent US commentators are saying with brutal clarity) to irrelevance 
in global affairs, and a very expensive irrelevance at that.   
While we turn to matters of administrative organisation of European 
and national foreign services below (in section 4), some fundamentals are 
first discussed. The organisation of the new European diplomacy should 
reflect how the realities of ‘national interests’ and ‘European interests’ and 
their interdependence have been evolving. Several types of ‘national 
interests’ can be observed in practice:  
1. Where the member states have ‘pure national interests’ that are matters 
neither of intra-MS competition nor of EU common policy, for example the 
promotion of Hispanic culture in Latin America, or the extension of Italian 
citizenship more widely to the Italian diaspora. 
2. Where the member states have interests in competition with each other. 
Here ordinary commercial competition evidently remains, although the 
integration of European corporate structures blurs this, and common 
concern for the EU’s economic competition with other world powers rises 
in importance. 
3. Where the member states have regional priorities that differ, but where 
they are obliged to blend these into the priorities of the EU as a whole in 
order to pursue them effectively. The North versus South divide is an 
obvious and major example, but one where the result has been the 
formulation of common policies for both, since individual member states 
need the resources of the EU as a whole to back their interests. The attempt 
by President Sarkozy in 2008 to transform the EU’s Mediterranean policy 
into the preserve of its Mediterranean member states was a spectacular 
illustration of the failed pursuit of ‘national interests’ outside the EU 
framework.   
4. Where the member states have thematic priorities that differ, but where they 
are compelled to negotiate together common positions, without which they 
cannot have effective policies. Here the major example is over the weights 
to be given to political values versus commercial or security interests. 
Experience reveals cases of cracks in common positions, for example where 
some member states are seen to be keener than others to shift a common 
EU position away from political priorities in favour of commercial interests. 
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Such differences in national preferences may be visible, but the member 
states are still compelled to resolve them, failing which no one gets good 
results in the long run. 
5. A further category is where the member states may have different 
propensities or political wills to engage in the use of military force. Iraq was a 
case in point, and leaves its imprint on attitudes now in the UK and others 
who joined the US, versus those who did not. The choice to go to war or not 
may remain a basic prerogative of the member states, yet this major 
example of divergent choices over whether to go to war is hardly viewed 
by anyone as having been a rewarding experience.  
6. Where the member states simply find themselves united with common 
interests, thus seeing the merging of the national with the common 
European interest.       
The crucial justification for restructuring European diplomacy is the 
changing relative weights of these categories. While ‘pure’ national 
interests (i.e. those that have no interconnection with common EU interests 
or processes) still exist, they have a declining share in the foreign policy 
agenda. There is now a substantial category where divergent national 
preferences have to be negotiated into the big package of common EU 
initiatives. Competing commercial interests continue to exist, but pale by 
comparison with the external competition for the EU as a whole, while 
European integration and globalisation both work to shape up of common 
interests. Against these inexorable trends the current predominance of 
national foreign services of the member states lags behind realities. 
Another approach is to review the several interpretations of how the 
global system (order or disorder) is actually evolving, and how the EU’s 
interests and potential as a global actor may relate to these. We highlight 
four such interpretations.5 
1. At the level of high principles, the EU places itself in the liberal 
institutionalist school of international relations. The Lisbon Treaty provides the 
official view at length, with a long list of normative objectives, without 
using the word “power” once (see Box 1).  
                                                     
5 For an extensive exposition, see David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), 
Governing Globalisation – Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002. 
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Box 1. Lisbon Treaty – Objectives of the EU’s external policy  
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, 
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, 
the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.  
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share 
the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral 
solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United 
Nations. 
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, 
in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence 
and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, 
with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of 
Paris, including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating 
poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, 
including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the 
quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural 
resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-
made disasters; and 
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance. 
Source: Article 21, TEU. 
 
18 | WHY SHOULD THE EU BE STRONGLY REPRESENTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA? 
 
International cooperation or governance is both rational as well as ethically 
preferable to systems that lead to conflict. This means taming great powers 
with international norms and multilateral processes, and going beyond the 
primacy of interstate relations towards the domestication of international 
affairs. The EU and its member states have come to understand this, and 
have become leading practitioners both in their own regional integration 
and in global affairs through supporting the advance of international law. 
However, to be able to promote this worldview effectively, the EU has to be 
fully represented and participating in the relevant fora. The message is all 
the more powerful where there is consistency in the discourses of the EU 
and its member states, avoiding the twin hazards of cacophony or boring 
repetition.6 
2. A simpler approach is that of functionalism, well known to students of 
European integration, but applying equally to international relations. 
Functionalist theory is about those functions that national governments are 
not, or no longer, equipped to handle, and which require structured 
international cooperation to assure the efficient supply of global public 
goods. At the practical level this fits well with the plethora of regulatory 
mechanisms (for products, financial markets, environmental standards) 
that have to be applied at the global level for effectiveness, and where the 
EU has a key role in developing such standards and implementing them in 
its member states. This has led to a dense two-way traffic in regulatory 
business between the EU and international standard-setting bodies; the EU 
serving as the transmission mechanism for ensuring effective 
implementation of global standards at the level of member state; in other 
cases providing the model for international standards. These processes 
require that the EU be fully represented at the level of the international 
bodies or agreements in question.  
3. Opposing these views is the realist school, which is all about power 
and its necessity in order to defend `national` security and political and 
economic independence. Moderate realists recognise the useful role of 
various international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO and 
                                                     
6 As Pascal Lamy remarked at last year’s Brussels Forum, 28 March 2010: “It does 
not make sense if one European takes the floor on one topic, and then another 
European takes the floor on the same topic. Nobody listens, because either it is the 
same and gets boring, or it is not the same and would not influence the result at the 
end of the day. That’s how groups work”.  
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UN Security Council, and from an American perspective these were 
usefully fashioned according to its design and interests as post-war global 
hegemon. While President Obama seems to favour strengthening 
multilateralism, the new rising powers all seem strongly driven by realist 
urges. The BRICs grouping is all about their securing greater power in the 
world, either formally through bigger voting weights in the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) or more generally through asserting a higher 
profile in international affairs. The EU’s closest neighbour among the global 
powers, Russia, vaunts explicitly the rebuilding of its great power status. 
The EU may want to work towards a liberal institutionalised 
multilateralism, but with American ambivalence and the rise of the BRICs 
it faces an uphill struggle. For this the EU has to be powerful in its own 
way, with a full status and effective organisation of its diplomacy at EU 
and member states levels in the major international organisations and 
processes.   
4. Cosmopolitanism is the last and most recent paradigm that we need to 
discuss. It shares with liberal institutionalism the need for an extensive set 
of multilateral institutions and bodies of international law to govern the 
globalising world.7 However it is a less state-centric concept, and distinct in 
emphasising the increasing role of non-state actors and transnational 
networks, involving both civil society and corporate interests, which work 
towards the definition of international rules and standards. It recognises 
the diverse sources of rule-making, political authority and power, with a 
complex patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions and diverse forms of 
public-private partnership. The cosmopolitan brand of international 
relations plays strongly into the potential comparative advantages of the 
EU as external actor, where the domestic and international are overlapping 
categories, and where EU and international rule-making activity are 
integrated with each other.  
This short review of paradigms leads to several conclusions. 
Contemporary globalising trends see a blur of domestic and international 
policy matters with the rise of global regulatory policies (as opposed to 
classic foreign policy). This plays in favour of the EU’s potential 
comparative advantage as an international actor, with important roles for 
                                                     
7 David Held, “Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Deficits”, in Held and 
McGrew, op. cit.  
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both the new institutional appointments in the foreign policy domain (HR 
and President of the European Council), and the Commission in the 
regulatory fields of its competence. But the overarching concern is that the 
newly emerging multi-polarity looks ominously dangerous at present for 
the future of the world, given the weak interest shown so far by the new 
great powers in building up a normatively founded multilateralism. If the 
EU’s overarching objective is to mitigate these risks with a stronger 
multilateral order, it has first of all to get itself properly organised for this 
purpose both in its internal organisation and in its representation in the 
international system such as it exists. To have any chance of exercising a 
systemic influence, the EU will have to organise the coherence of its actions 
across the multiple sectors of foreign policy, from classic foreign affairs to 
soft security, humanitarian assistance, economic policy, trade, monetary 
stance, development, etc. This in turn requires strategic coherence in its 
external representation.        
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3. LEGAL BASIS IN THE LISBON TREATY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
he question explored in this chapter is how far the effectiveness of 
the external representation of the EU might be strengthened in line 
with, and building upon, the institutional advances of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
Legal personality of the EU. Article 47 (TEU) confers upon the 
European Union legal personality, and Article 1 (TEU) says that the EU 
replaces and succeeds the European Community. Official language 
communicated by the EU institutions to international organisations with 
which it has official relations specified the following:  
Therefore the EU will exercise all the rights and assume all the 
obligations of the European Community, including its status 
in the Organisation, whilst continuing to exercise existing 
rights and assume obligations of the EU. In particular the EU 
will succeed to all agreements concluded and all 
commitments made by the European Community with your 
Organisation and to all agreements and commitments 
adopted within your Organisation and binding upon the 
European Community.  
But do these Articles 1 and 47 do more than maintain the status quo, 
which is all the above text suggests? Certainly the granting of legal 
personality to the EU as a whole is enhancing its ‘capacity to enter into 
relations with other states’ across the board now for all its competences, 
including the political, foreign and security domains. While agreements in 
the latter field were already possible, and actually were concluded, before 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, all legal uncertainties in this 
respect are now removed. The granting of legal personality may therefore 
T 
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be used to strengthen proposals to enhance the status of the EU in various 
economic and non-economic organisations alike, but has no automatic 
effect of this kind. This connects with an important category of 
international actors established in various international agreements, 
namely ‘regional integration organisations’, to which we turn below and of 
which the EU is the prime example.  
Competences of the EU. Articles 3-6 (TFEU) lists the EU’s 
competences of several types: 
• Article 3, Exclusive EU competences, for trade, competition and 
monetary policies, and for conservation of marine biological 
resources;  
• Article 4, Competences shared between the EU and member states:  
o First, in ‘core’ shared competence domains: internal market, energy, 
cohesion (economic, social and territorial), transport, agriculture, 
fisheries, freedom-justice-security, environment, consumer 
protection, and aspects of social and public health (Article 4.2); 
o and with a secondary category of ‘parallel competences’ for research 
and development policies where the member states have more 
substantial competences (Article 4.3-4); 
• Article 5, Policies requiring coordination between the EU and the 
member states, as for economic and employment policies (which are 
a loose sub-category of the shared competences); 
• Article 6, Policies where the EU may engage in actions 
supplementary to the predominant member states’ competences, as 
for industry, culture, tourism, education, civil protection, and public 
health; and  
• To this list must be added, according to Article 2.4 (TFEU), the shared 
– or effectively parallel – competence to define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy, including the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union. 
In Table 1 below, this classification is combined with the placing of 
selected international organisations and agreements within these 
categories. This should in principle provide some guidance on questions of 
representation of the EU and member states as between the various models, 
which we discuss in detail below. 
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Table 1. Competences of the European Union according to the ‘Lisbon Treaty’, and participation of the EU institutions in 
related international organisations and conventions 
Competences Organisations, Conventions Status of EU & MS 
Foreign, security and defense 
policies (including general 
political affairs) 
UN General Assembly 
UN Security Council 
OSCE 
NATO 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Council of Europe 
G7/8/20 
 EU  observer; MS members 
2 permanent MS + 2-3 rotating 
  EU  observer, MS members 
24 MS  
MS 
 EU  observer, MS members 
 EU  participant, some MS 
1. Exclusive (Article 3)    
a. Customs union World Customs Org. (WCO) Member 
b. Competition policy World Intellectual Property Org. (WIPO) Observer 
c. Monetary policy (for 
eurozone) 
IMF 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
OECD 
ECB part observer, MS members 
ECB on Board, some MS  
 EU enhanced observer, MS 
members 
d. Fisheries policy and 
marine biological 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas 
UN Conference on Highly Migratory Fish  
Multiple regional fisheries organisations: 
Mediterranean, NE Atlantic, NW Atlantic, SE 
Atlantic, Antarctic, Western and Central Pacific 
Organisations for some species: Tuna, Salmon 
 EU  & MS members 
 
 EU  & MS members 
 EU  Member & some MS 
 
 
 EU , no MS 
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e. Trade policy  WTO 
UN Comm.on Internat.Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
 EU  & MS members 
 EU  observer, some MS members 
2. Shared  (Article 4)    
a. Internal market International Standards Organization (ISO) 
Codex Alimentarius Commission 
 EU  cooperation, MS members 
 EU & MS members 
b. Social policy International Labour Organization (ILO)  EU  observer, MS members 
c. Cohesion (regional)   
d. Agriculture and 
Forestry 
FAO 
International Fund for Agricultural Develop. 
Multiple product organisations: Olive oil, Sugar, 
Cocoa, Coffee, Jute, Tropical Timber, Rubber, 
Grains, New varieties of plants  
 EU  & MS members 
 EU  observer, MS members 
 EU  & some MS members  
e. Environment UN Environmental Programme  
UN FCCC (climate change) 
Kyoto Protocol  
UN Conference on Environmt. and Develop. 
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea 
International Seabed Authority 
Protection Marine Environmt. of N. Atlantic 
Protection of the Danube River 
 EU  observer, some MS members 
 EU  & MS contracting parties 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
EU & 12 MS members 
EU & 6 MS members 
f. Consumer protect. - - 
g. Transport International Civil Aviation Organis. (ICAO) 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
Eurocontrol 
EU observer, MS members  
EU observer, MS members 
EU & 21 MS members 
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h. Trans-Eur. Networks - - 
i. Energy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 
Energy Charter Treaty 
EU observer, MS members 
EU participates; 17 MS members 
EU and MS members 
j. Freedom, security and 
justice 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
European Convention of Human Rights 
UN High Commission for Refugees 
Geneva Convention on Status of Refugees 
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic of Drugs 
UN Convention Against Transnational Crime 
-  
EU observer; MS state parties  
MS, and in future EU, parties 
EU observer; MS members 
MS parties, EU plans to accede  
EU & MS contracting parties EU & 
MS contracting parties 
k. Public health, safety - - 
l. Research, Technology, 
Space 
International Telecommunicatns. Union (ITU)  
UNCOPUOS (Peaceful Use of Outer Space) 
International Fusion Energy Org. (IETR) 
Science and Technical Center in Ukraine 
EU sector memb.; MS members 
EU observer;  MS members 
EAEC member, no MS 
EAEC & EU member, no MS  
m. Development and 
humanitarian aid 
World Bank 
World Food Programme (WFP) 
UNDP 
UNCTAD 
 
MS members 
EU & many MS donors 
EU observer; MS members 
EU observer; MS members 
 
 
3. Coordination  (Article 5)    
a. Economic policies EBRD 
OECD 
EU & MS members 
EU enhanced observer; MS members 
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b. Employment policies ILO EU observer; MS members 
c. Social policies ILO EU observer; MS members 
4. Supplementary 
(Article 6) 
  
a. Human health World Health Organization (WHO) 
UN Population Fund (UNFPA) 
EU observer; MS members 
EU observer; MS members 
b. Industry UN Industrial Development Org. (UNIDO) 
Multiple Organisations for commodities: Nickel, 
Copper, Lead and Zinc 
Partnership; most MS members 
EU & some MS members 
c. Culture UNESCO EU observer; MS members 
d. Tourism UN World Tourism Organization Most MS members 
e. Education, training, 
youth, sport 
UNESCO 
UNICEF 
EU observer; MS members 
EU observer; MS members 
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The procedure to negotiate international agreements. Article 218 
(TFEU) establishes the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of 
international agreements by the Union. In line with the institutional 
balance outlined above, Article 218 TFEU refers only to the HR and the 
Commission, with their respective roles allocated according to matters of 
CFSP or non-CFSP content respectively. 
Precisely because some agreements, mainly framework agreements 
(association or partnership and cooperation), may cover both CFSP and 
non-CFSP areas, Article 218.3 establishes a procedure for the Council to 
take decisions, on the basis of a recommendation by the HR or 
Commission, “depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, 
nominating the Union negotiator, or the head of the Union’s negotiating 
team”. The team would be some combination of the HR and of the 
Commission. 
MS are not part of this negotiating team. Nevertheless, if the Council 
so decides, they may be part of a special committee, with a consultative role 
(“a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be 
conducted” – Article 218.4). In practice this task is generally given to the 
pre-existing Council working parties or regional working groups.  
The most complex situations arise where the EU and the member 
states have shared competences, and where the rules are uncertain on how 
to negotiate on behalf of the member states regarding those areas of shared 
competences where the Union has not taken action so far. 
When preparing the recommendation under Article 218.3, the 
Commission and/or HR will have to analyse in detail if the areas intended 
to be covered by the agreement are falling into Union competence, either 
because they are under exclusive EU competence or because the Union has 
already adopted legally binding acts in those areas; in case the Union has 
not (yet) exercised the shared competence at issue, member states are still 
entitled to adopt certain measures, including at the international level. This 
must be reflected in a representation of the member states, next to the 
Union itself. Accordingly, the Commission and/or the HR will have to 
analyse to which extent the Union has exercised its competence in the 
shared competence areas intended to be covered by the agreement to be 
negotiated (taking into account Protocol 25 to the Treaties).  
In respect of those issues that fall outside the Union competence, the 
member states are entitled to negotiate themselves. They may, however, 
also choose to mandate the Commission and/or HR to negotiate on their 
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behalf, or to mandate some other actor, most likely the rotating Presidency 
(but other burden-sharing arrangements are possible) to do this. The fact 
that the Commission and/or HR may be mandated to negotiate on behalf 
of the member states does not mean that the Union has exercised its 
competence and taken over the area from member states, within the 
meaning of Article 2.2 (TFEU). Member states will continue to have the 
capacity to adopt legally binding acts at national level until the Union 
adopts legally binding acts in this area. Nevertheless, member states are 
required by the Treaties to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks 
and refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives (Article 4(3) TEU). The ‘unicity’ of representation in the 
negotiation may be a key element here. 
A different situation arises when the conclusion of an international 
agreement is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter 
their scope. In this case, Article 3.2 (TFEU) provides that the Union shall 
have exclusive competence for the conclusion of such international 
agreement. 
Some cases have recently been under dispute between the Council 
and the Commission, and may have to be resolved in the Court of Justice, 
e.g. the UNEP mercury case (discussed in detail in section 6.1.10). The 
question here was precisely to determine if the conclusion of an 
international agreement by the Union is necessary for the exercise of its 
internal competence, or if this may affect common rules, or alter their scope 
within the meaning of Article 3.2. Somewhat related, there is some 
discussion as to whether member states can act collectively, but outside the 
Union, in the areas of shared competences not yet exercised by the Union, 
or whether such a collective exercise necessarily entails the exercise by the 
Union of its shared competences. 
In order to be more efficient in its external representation, it will be 
important that there be reached practical arrangements or an inter-
institutional understanding to clear up who negotiates international 
agreements in these cases that concern matters of shared Union 
competences, but where the member states have still the capacity to adopt 
legally binding acts (because the Union has not yet exercised its 
competence). The need for an inter-institutional understanding is high, in 
particular because in areas of shared competences, and a fortiori parallel 
competences, the exercise by the Union of its competence shall not result in 
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member states being prevented from exercising theirs. In this case, the 
Union representation will be hybrid, in the sense that the negotiations on 
behalf of the Union will need to be complemented with negotiations on 
behalf of the member states. It would obviously be good if there were a 
clear guide indicating which shared competences are those where the EU 
has not yet exercised its competence. In practice decisions are taken on a 
case-by-case basis, typically after complex exchanges in the Council 
between the legal services of the Commission and the Council over 
whether the existing legal acts of the Union are such that they largely cover 
the field or not. 
Box 2. Lisbon Treaty – Legal competences in external affairs 
Article 1 (TEU). “…The Union shall be founded on the present Treaty and on 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union …. Those two Treaties 
shall have the same legal value. The Union shall replace and succeed the 
European Community.”  
Article 15.6 (TEU). “… The President of the European Council shall, at his level 
and in his capacity ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning foreign and security policy. Without prejudice to the powers of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.” 
Article 17.1 (TEU). “The Commission shall promote the general interest of the 
Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application 
of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. 
…With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases 
provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union's external 
representation…”  
Article 24.1 (TEU). “The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and 
security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to 
the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy that might lead to a common defence.”  
Article 27.1 (TEU). “The High Representative …, who shall chair the Foreign 
Affairs Council, shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation 
of the common foreign and security policy, and shall ensure implementation of 
the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.” 
Article 27.2 (TEU). “The High Representative shall represent the Union for 
matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct 
political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the 
Union’s position in international organisations ad at international conferences.”  
Article 47 (TEU). “The Union shall have legal personality.” 
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Article 218.3 (TFEU). “The Commission, or the High Representative where the 
agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign 
and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council which shall 
adopt a decision, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, 
nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team.”    
Article 220 (TFEU). “The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of 
cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, 
the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Union 
shall also maintain such relations as are appropriate with other international 
organisations.”  
“The High Representative … and the Commission shall be instructed to 
implement this Article.”  
Protocol No 25 (TFEU) – On the exercise of shared competence. “With 
reference to Article 2 of the TFEU on shared competence, when the Union has 
taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only 
covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does 
not cover the whole area.” 
 
Who should represent the EU? The question here of who ‘represents’ 
the EU is to be distinguished legally and institutionally from the question 
who ‘negotiates’ for it (as in the section above), the former involving many 
dialogue processes which do not result in the conclusion of international 
agreements. Three possible ‘representatives’ are identified in the Treaties. 
The HR is given clear responsibility for representing the EU in all matters 
that relate exclusively or principally to foreign and security policy (Articles 
17.1 and 18.2 TEU). The Commission is given a comprehensive role in 
ensuring the Union’s external representation in all matters except foreign 
and security policy (Article 17.1 TEU) or when otherwise specified (in 
particular Article 221 TFEU on the role EU delegations). The new 
permanent Presidency of the European Council shall represent the EU at 
his level, i.e. at summit meetings, for matters concerning the CFSP (Article 
15.6 TEU).  
The rotating Council Presidency is no longer mentioned in the Lisbon 
Treaty with regard to external relations. From this it might be supposed 
that the rotating Council Presidency’s external representative role is now 
ended. The Belgian Presidency of the second half of 2010 systematically 
supported this view, making clear wherever it felt obliged to step in during 
the transitional period before the EEAS was fully operational that it did so 
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on behalf of the High Representative. However this view is being contested 
by various member states, first of all by the UK which opposes any moves 
that might enhance the EU’s apparent role as a foreign policy actor, and 
secondly by the Hungarian and Polish permanent representations in 
Brussels who are seeking to enhance their forthcoming presidential roles in 
the first and second halves of 2011 respectively. These arguments are also 
being played out in a disorderly manner in the several centres of 
multilateral diplomacy (New York, Geneva, Vienna, Paris), where various 
ambassadors try to organise alliances in favour of this or that formula for 
who speaks on behalf of whom, and over details of protocol (nameplates 
and seating arrangements). The room for argument is provided by the 
complexity of the EU’s legal basis for ‘shared competences’, as explained in 
the preceding section on negotiating procedures.  
The advocates of a reaffirmed role for the rotating Council Presidency 
rely on the argument that wherever there are remaining national 
responsibilities in a field of shared competence, the EU and its member 
states should together be represented by the rotating Council Presidency. 
This led recently in the preparations for the December 2010 climate change 
conference in Cancùn to a situation in which the Council Legal Service had 
in COREPER to correct assertions of the forthcoming Hungarian 
Presidency’s with the remark that it would be illegal to claim for the 
rotating Presidency a general role to represent the EU on all matters of 
shared competence. The waste of energies over these secondary procedural 
matters is flagrant, and even more serious is the sight of various member 
states trying to obstruct implementation of obvious intentions of the 
Treaties with arcane legalisms. The member states are indeed able to 
designate any one of their number or the Commission to represent them on 
matters of member states’ competence, but it is high time for a sense of 
proportionality to prevail, and for the member states to be willing to 
mandate the Commission and the Delegations to represent them as well as 
the EU itself when there is a manifest need for a demonstrably unified 
position. Moreover, the fact that the Commission or another EU 
representative is the spokesperson does not affect the rules on the actual 
policy-making, which provides for a decisive role for the Council, albeit on 
proposals of the HR or Commission. 
Status of regional organisations in international law. Where the EU 
(or EC before it) has actually achieved full membership or contracting party 
status in multilateral organisations or conventions of international law, this 
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has often, especially in the UN system, occurred through acceptance of the 
category ‘Regional Economic Integration Organisations’ (REIO) for full 
status, or virtually full status alongside member states. This has been used 
in the cases of the WTO, the FAO, various fisheries and maritime 
organisations and the Kyoto Protocol; and the EU’s full membership has 
also been accepted in other economic organisations outside the UN family 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty and EBRD. The Commission’s Treaties 
data base in fact records no less than 72 agreements where the EU’s full 
participation is justified by reference to a REIO clause (see Annex B). 
Objective indicators of regional economic integration can be readily 
identified, such as custom union, or economic and monetary union. 
However the texts use only generic language, as for example in the case of 
the FAO where member states (of the EU) “have transferred competences 
over a range of matters within the purview of the organisation” (see Box 3).   
On the other hand, in the more political foreign and security policy 
fields, there has been until recently no comparable concept, and the EU has 
been left as observer even where its competences are of major importance 
for the organisations concerned, such as in the Council of Europe, OSCE 
and the UN General Assembly. This is easily explained historically, since 
the EEC and the EC spent their first decades endowed mainly with 
economic competences. However with the Lisbon Treaty this situation is 
now anomalous, with justice and home affairs competences of the EU now 
firmly embedded legally alongside the former Community competences, 
with foreign and security policy having become a distinct EU competence, 
and with the Union as a whole now endowed with single legal personality. 
However in 2006 there was an innovation in the context of human rights 
conventions, when the UN Convention for Persons with Disabilities 
recognised the category of ‘Regional Integration Organisations’ (RIO), 
enabling the EU to accede in a manner that better reflects its multifaceted 
competence well beyond the purely economic sphere. This case uses the 
same language for the qualifying criterion as for the REIOs, where 
“member states have transferred competence in matters governed by the 
present Convention”. The most striking anomalies where the RIO principle 
could be used to justify full EU membership are seen in those cases singled 
out in the Lisbon Treaty for establishing ‘appropriate’ forms of cooperation 
(UN and its specialised agencies, Council of Europe, OECD, OSCE), and 
where the HR and the Commission are instructed to implement this. These 
are all (with the exception of some UN agencies) cases where the EU is only 
an observer, whereas in terms of political realities it is a major participant. 
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It may be argued that there may at times or even often be little difference 
between an enhanced observer or virtual member status compared to full 
membership. While this is surely valid for many ‘soft-dialogue’ meetings 
where no decisions are taken, these categories of second-class status can 
amount to practical disadvantages, for example when real policy 
orientations have to be agreed, or when the leadership of an organisation 
needs to form a steering group with restricted membership.    
The statutes of organisations admitting the REIO and RIO categories 
also set out precise rules for how the EU and member states may vote. The 
general model is a hybrid one, in which either the EU alone or the member 
states may vote, but not both, and where the EU votes, it carries the 
number of votes of all the member states taken together (see Box 3 for 
details). It is usually to be complemented by a declaration on behalf of the 
EU and its member states in which the division of competence is clarified.  
Box 3. Treaty texts referring to the EC/EU as a Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation (REIO) or Regional Integration Organisation (RIO)  
FAO, Amendments to the Constitution and the General Rules of the 
Organisation to allow for Membership by Regional Economic Integration 
Organisations (27 November 1991) 
Article 11 (extracts) 
3. The Conference may by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, provided 
that a majority of the Member Nations of the Organization is present, decide 
to admit as a Member of the Organization any Regional Economic 
Integration Organization meeting the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of this 
Article, which has submitted an application for membership and a 
declaration made in a formal instrument that it will accept the obligations of 
the Constitution as in force at the time of admission.  
4. To be eligible to apply for membership of the Organization under 
paragraph 3 of this Article, a Regional Economic Integration Organization 
must be constituted by Sovereign States, a majority of which are Member 
nations of the Organization, and to which its member states have transferred 
competence over a range of matters within the purview of the Organization, 
including the authority to make decisions binding on its member states in 
respect of those matters.  
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International Coffee Agreement (11 December 2001) 
Article 4. Membership of the Organization (extracts),  
3. Any reference in this Agreement to a Government shall be construed as 
including a reference to the European Community, or any intergovernmental 
organisation having comparable responsibilities in respect of the negotiation, 
conclusion and application of international agreements, in particular commodity 
agreements. 
4. Such intergovernmental organisation shall not itself have any votes but in the 
case of a vote on matters within its competence it shall be entitled to cast 
collectively the votes of its member states. In such cases, the member states of 
such intergovernmental organisation shall not be entitled to exercise their 
individual voting rights. 
5. Such intergovernmental organisation shall not be eligible for election to the 
Executive Board under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 17 but may 
participate in the discussions of the Executive Board on matters within its 
competence. In the case of a vote on matters within its competence, and 
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20, the votes which its 
member states are entitled to cast in the Executive Board may be cast collectively 
by any one of those member states. 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (13 December 2006) 
Article 44 - Regional integration organizations 
1. "Regional integration organization" shall mean an organisation constituted by 
sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred 
competence in respect of matters governed by the present Convention. Such 
organisations shall declare, in their instruments of formal confirmation or 
accession, the extent of their competence with respect to matters governed by 
the present Convention. Subsequently, they shall inform the depositary of any 
substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
2. References to "States Parties" in the present Convention shall apply to such 
organisations within the limits of their competence. …. 
4. Regional integration organizations, in matters within their competence, may 
exercise their right to vote in the Conference of States Parties, with a number of 
votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to the present 
Convention. Such an organisation shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its 
member States exercises its right, and vice versa. 
Could the RIO model be used more widely in political organisations 
such as the UN General Assembly and its various agencies? It is in fact 
invoked in the draft Resolution submitted in September 2010 to the UNGA 
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(but not yet accepted) to enhance the EU’s participation rights (see further 
section 6.1.1 below). The difficulty here is that in the wider domain of 
political affairs, the objective test of competence may be harder to establish 
than in the economic domain, or at least that the contours of the core EU 
competences may be far less obvious in the absence of a hard core of 
exclusive competences in these domains. Most member states of the UN 
either do not want to open a floodgate for a large number of currently 
observer organisations of the UNGA whose objective qualifications may be 
very thin, or may wish to secure higher status for those organisations of 
which they are members (for example ASEAN, the African Union, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab 
League, etc.). Yet, as the current experience of the EU in the UNGA is 
showing, other interested parties may block the claims of the EU if their 
own aspirations are not met. However the principle of eligibility of other 
RIO cases should be welcomed since comparable regional integration 
movements in other continents would be positive for the world order.   
Documentary data bases. What is lacking so far is a systematic 
review of the status quo and the presentation of a coherent rationale for the 
progressive strengthening of the EU’s external presence in line with its 
competences. This is what the present project aims to do. Fortunately there 
are excellent documentary data bases facilitating the task of analysts:  
• Treaties Office Data Base of the European Commission.8 This lists no less 
than 649 bilateral treaties and 249 multilateral treaties entered into by 
the European Communities/Commission, summarising in 2 pages 
each the contents of the Treaty and the precise status of the European 
Communities/Commission, and whether these are instances of 
exclusive competence or mixed agreements. This also supplies 
electronic links to the full texts of the treaties. It also lists the 37 
international organisations where the EU has been a contracting party 
(excluding the UN agencies where it is only in most cases an 
observer).  
• Inventory of the European Community Participation at the United Nations.9 
This specifies the present status and competencies of the European 
                                                     
8 Accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do 
9 Working Document of European Commission, DG External Relations (Relex). 
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Communities/Commission in 85 UN institutions, conferences, 
conventions, agencies and related organisations.  
• Agreements Database of the Council of the European Union.10 This offers 
information on the ratification status of the EU agreements with third 
countries and international organisations, and gives access to the full 
text as published in the Official Journal.  
                                                     
10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/accords/default.aspx?lang=EN&cmsid 
=297 
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4. HYBRID COMBINATIONS OF THE EU & 
MEMBER STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS  
4.1  Categories  
The huge set of international treaties, conventions and semi-
institutionalised fora which the EC (now the EU) has acceded to or has 
some stake in sees in practice several models of formal representation and 
informal relationships, generally of a hybrid character involving both the 
EU and its member states.  
A first distinction must be made between the cases of formal legal 
status and power structures within organisations (the vertical 
relationships), versus less legally formalised but cooperative relationships 
between autonomous organisations (the horizontal relationships). The 
vertical and horizontal can be either complementary or alternatives, as 
examples below will show.   
Vertical relationships. More precisely, in the vertical governance 
structure of international organisations and conventions of international 
law, the contracting parties of the international agreements become 
members (or shareholders, or contracting parties) of the legal entity or act. 
The vertical power structure is two-way: the contracting parties govern the 
organisation or convention, while accepting to implement various legally 
binding obligations.     
There are several graduations of status seen in practice in the 
presence of the EU and member states in international organisations and 
conventions: 
• MS may all be members contracting parties, or only some may be 
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members, or they may be absent except as controllers of the mandate 
of the EU (actually the Council controls the mandate of the EU in all 
international negotiations); or 
• The EU may be full member or contracting party, or ordinary 
observer, or enhanced observer (virtual member) or absent.  
Many but not all of the combinations arise in practice, which we will 
illustrate below. The cases where the member states act alone in their 
sovereignty and the EU is completely absent become now a rarity. The 
reverse case where the EU is the principal party and the member states are 
absent is mainly limited to technical bodies. This in turn means that the 
larger part of the EU’s international relations consists of hybrid cases, 
where both the EU institutions and the member states are present in 
various combinations, often with complex and potentially burdensome 
arrangements for their coordination, both in respect of negotiations 
concerning specific agreements and in respect of the day-to-day 
representation of the Union and its member states. We will review these 
different types below, since any attempt to reform the system will have to 
work painstakingly through this complex political and legal landscape. 
Horizontal relationships. Horizontal relationships are to be 
understood as cooperative arrangements between autonomous partner 
organisations, including both joint actions and softer processes of 
information exchange and policy dialogue, which may become important 
even where the partners may have no vertical status in each other’s 
organisation (this is highly relevant for the EU in several instances, as we 
shall see).   
Important relationships of this type have emerged in the case of 
several international organisations where the EU’s operational 
relationships are substantial, but where it either has no ‘vertical’ status at 
all (NATO, World Bank) or has only some observer status (IMF, UNDP, 
Council of Europe). Typically these relationships see periodic meetings 
between the leadership of the Commission (together in some cases with the 
Council Presidency, and now post-Lisbon the HR), and the 
President/Managing Director/Secretary General of the partner 
organisation, supported by meetings of senior officials. The high-level 
meetings may produce Memoranda of Understanding framing the way for 
operational coordination.  
These arrangements are far easier to develop, avoiding the tricky 
legal and political problems that arise with questions of formal status. 
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These are also meetings where the EU institution(s) deal alone with the 
partner organisation, avoiding the problems of meetings unduly burdened 
with large numbers of member states’ representatives.  
A question that follows is whether these relatively informal 
horizontal cooperative arrangements can work effectively in the absence of 
formal ‘vertical’ relationships, or whether they should best be 
complementary. In this respect there is the important distinction between 
those relationships where the EU and another organisation are 
collaborating over operations only in 3rd countries (World Bank, UNDP), 
versus those where the ‘other’ organisation is intervening in the EU itself or 
its member states (IMF, Council of Europe). The case for the EU coming 
into the vertical governance structures of the partner organisations would 
be stronger in the latter case.  
4.2 Guidelines for representation of the EU and member states 
Given the huge mass of multilateral agreements and relationships that the 
EU has entered into, and the variety in the combinations of presence of the 
EU and the member states, there have to be some basic principles to order 
the system. For this purpose, the first reference should be the EU’s legal 
order and the Articles of the Lisbon Treaty defining the gradation of EU 
competences (as set out in section 2 above) and their application by specific 
sector, although the measure of the real competences of the EU is often a far 
more complex affair than these treaty articles seem to imply. At least these 
provisions can give some structure to the EU’s overall strategy. When it 
comes to negotiating the inclusion or revision of the EU’s place in various 
organisations, there will always be the organisations’s own statutes that 
may be more of less easily adapted to the EU’s needs and requests. Most of 
these statutes in relatively old organisations reflect the simple old world of 
sovereign states, which is why reform to accommodate the EU as a special 
case is often difficult and requires careful preparation and solid support 
from the member states in securing the needed diplomatic consensus or 
adequate majority votes.       
The guiding principles could be the following: 
• In cases of exclusive competences, the EU would be the pre-eminent 
actor with full membership of the organisation, or contracting party, 
while the member states may also (but not necessarily) be present as 
members, but usually without an independent role. Here the EU 
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representative would be the Commission, since there are no exclusive 
competences in the foreign and security policy field.  
• In cases of shared competences, and in respect of the foreign and 
security policy, the norm would be for the EU and the member states 
both to be members or contracting parties to international 
agreements. But the shared competences come in many gradations in 
their legal character and the relative weights of functional 
responsibilities of the EU and the member states.  
Where the organisation takes operational decisions affecting the 
Union, or involves legal obligations that fall at least partly into EU 
competences, or profits from significant EU funding, the case is 
strongest for full parallel membership of the EU and the member states.   
For organisations dealing with relatively soft processes of 
coordination, the requirements for adequate representation of the EU 
can be less demanding than where there are legally binding 
obligations, or financial implications. For these organisations the status 
of ‘virtual member’ or ‘enhanced observer’ for the EU may be 
adequate, alongside ‘full’ membership by the member states, as long as 
there are full rights for the EU to intervene in debate and present EU 
common positions and proposals. This avoids complicated formal 
matters of budgetary contributions, which may be of trivial 
importance, and of voting rights.  
• In cases where the EU has some but only weak competences, it would 
be an ordinary observer.   
A first screening of international organisations and conventions 
according to the categories of EU competences (exclusive, shared, 
supplementary, etc.) is presented in Table 1. From this it can be seen that 
the list of the EU’s shared competences is extremely long, which is why the 
organisation of the hybrid presences of the EU and its  member states is a 
substantial question.      
4.3 Overview of the status quo and looking ahead  
We now sketch the application of these principles, summarising the main 
features of the status quo and identifying cases where the status quo has 
become unsatisfactory, and where a plausible change in the model of 
representation can be identified.   
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We start with the two polar and simplest categories, where in the first 
case the member states are members or contracting parties and the EU is 
absent, and in the second case, the EU is a member or contracting party and 
the member states are absent. 
MS present, EU absent. The cases where the member states operate 
without any EU presence is now becoming quite rare. This is because of the 
huge growth of EU regulatory competences in internal market and justice 
and home affairs in the past two decades, which have become matters of 
shared competences. It is striking to note here the key words ‘internal’ and 
‘home’ affairs, i.e. not external affairs. What has turned out in practice is 
that these enhanced domestic competences of the EU have spilled over into 
its foreign policy obligations, or the need for consistency between its 
domestic and international regulatory policies. In the past, these hardly 
counted as foreign policy matters at all.    
Still there are a few very important cases where the EU has no 
institutional status, including the UNSC, NATO and the World Bank. 
However, the EU’s activity in these fields has spawned the development of 
limited horizontal relationships, which are described in detail below. In the 
UNSC, the EU begins to have some limited right to speak, which may now 
develop usefully, but this has still a weak and precarious legal and political 
basis. EU-NATO relations have become quite intense over the last decade, 
starting from zero, and the relationship is now described as a strategic 
partnership; this could well be enhanced now by reciprocal observer status 
(at the North Atlantic Council and EU Political and Security Committee). 
The World Bank situation is a big anomaly, since the EU is now a bigger 
aid donor than any of its member states and its operational partnerships 
with the Bank in the European and African regions are important, yet it has 
not even observer status on the executive board (only on its ministerial 
policy committee).     
EU pre-eminent. At the other end of the spectrum are the cases where 
the EU has exclusive competences and therefore a pre-eminent position in 
the relevant organisations and legal conventions. The major case in point is 
in the trade policy field, concerning the WTO and WCO (World Customs 
Organization). For the WTO in particular, the EU (Commission) is sole 
negotiator, operating under mandate from the member states. While these 
mandates are basically negotiated in Brussels, the member states 
nonetheless maintain expensive watching missions in Geneva, with 
officials from all 27 lined up behind and listening to what the Commission 
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says and reporting back home. A single note-taker from the Council 
Secretariat could suffice and save a lot of money. Also in this category of 
exclusive competences and roles for the EU are the many international 
commodity agreements that are adjuncts to trade policy.  
It is not so common for the member states to withdraw from 
organisations or conventions to cede the place entirely to the EU, since 
inertia or reluctance to give ground is a strong trait. It is also not self-
evident for them to do so, as in many instances some of the activities of the 
international organisation still concern areas where they have some 
residual competence. However, when the exclusivity is established, cases 
do arise where the EU’s entry into an agreement leads to an ‘instruction’ for 
one or more member states to withdraw formally. A case in point was the 
(admittedly quite esoteric) Convention for Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission to which the EC acceded in 2006, with Spain having to 
withdraw.  
The other major exclusive competence of the EU is for monetary 
policy in the eurozone. Here the outstanding anomaly is the eurozone’s 
inadequate representation on the Executive Board of the IMF, where the 
ECB has only a limited observer status. As detailed below, this anomaly 
combined with the over-representation of the member states to reach in 
October 2010 a political crisis point, with the member states being 
confronted effectively by both the BRICs and the US. The logical future 
should see a single eurozone seat or constituency. The member states have 
acknowledged this only for the long-term future; the recent G20 agreement 
on IMF reform announces 2020 as the next review, which could be a good 
target date for establishing a single eurozone seat. Another important 
monetary organisation, the central bankers club at the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), has successfully accommodated both 
enlargements to include new economic powers and a full role for the ECB.   
MS and EU together. The most complex situations arise for the large 
category of policies that are shared competencies for the EU, where both 
the EU and the member states have significant presences. Here the EU 
presence spans a wide spectrum from the ‘simple observer’ alongside many 
others (e.g. 67 in number at the UNGA), to the ‘enhanced observer’ or 
‘virtual member’, and to the full member or contracting party alongside the 
member states. In general the EU strategy can work steadily towards an 
upgrading of its presence along this spectrum where the importance of its 
competences justify this, and member states may come to economise in 
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their representation where this becomes disproportionately expensive or 
cumbersome. We highlight here three cases or types that are detailed 
below. 
The UNGA is now the flagship case of where the EU languishes with 
an inadequate observer status, its representatives having much to 
contribute on many items of the huge agenda that the Assembly regularly 
treats. Pre-Lisbon, the rotating Council Presidency could intervene for the 
EU, but as a sovereign state it could do this with full status. Post-Lisbon, it 
is for the HR (Catherine Ashton) or President of the European Council 
(Herman van Rompuy) to represent the EU, but procedurally neither of 
them can properly do this with the EU’s status of ordinary observer, with 
the result that the representation by the rotating Presidency is still a 
fallback option in those circumstances where the arcane rules of the UN 
otherwise preclude effective participation of the EU. The EU therefore 
tabled in September 2010 a draft resolution to enhance its rights for 
participation in most functional respects, but without the formal status of a 
member state. As explained below, this proposal has so far failed to pass. If 
adopted the Resolution would extend these rights to the EU’s presence in 
the UNGA’s Committees, Working Groups and UN Conferences, and so 
the proposal is of extensive significance. It seems likely that this proposal 
will be re-tabled in the next few months, and may with more thorough 
explanation and diplomatic lobbying be passed. If it fails again, this will be 
the signal for a tougher and more strategic approach, drawing attention to 
the EU’s major role as financial contributor to the UN and its agencies and 
programmes, and demanding a quid pro quo if the over-representation of 
member states elsewhere (e.g. at the IMF) is to be reduced. 
Three European or Euro-Atlantic institutions were singled out in the 
Lisbon Treaty for ‘appropriate forms of cooperation’, without it being 
stipulated precisely what that should mean: OECD, OSCE and Council of 
Europe. In the case of organisations engaged in relatively soft diplomacy 
the EU already has (OECD), or quite easily can develop (OSCE), the 
position of ‘virtual member’, i.e. full functional rights to participate, 
without however a vote or ‘member state’ status. The arrangements for EU 
representation in international organisations is generally being revised now 
in line with the Lisbon Treaty provisions. While arrangements will differ 
between organisations, the case of the OECD (for details, see Box 6 in 
section 6.2.1 below) may be viewed as a template for the relatively simple 
situation where the status of the EU within the organisation does not 
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change, but the coordination and speaking arrangements do. These 
arrangements are currently deemed transitional since they retain a residual 
and temporary role for the rotating Council Presidency to assist the EU 
delegation pending its reinforcement. On the other hand, the case for 
upgrading the EU’s status at the Council of Europe to full member, rather 
than just observer, is now precipitated by accession of the EU to the 
Convention of Human Rights. Since the EU will be now subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights as all member states of 
the Council of Europe, it should be entitled fully to enter into the 
governance of the Council of Europe, inter alia as member of the 
Committee of Ministers.  
In the case of organisations and conventions where significant EU 
shared competences are involved there is a solid case for parallel full 
membership by the EU and the member states. The modalities of 
organising this have been worked out in quite a number of cases. The 
leading example has been that of the FAO, where the EU has very 
substantial agricultural competences, but which are not exclusive of 
member states’ policies. The EU’s role in the FAO is defined in a complex 
governance structure. According to the individual agenda item at any 
meeting the EU side indicates whether it is a matter of member states’ or 
EU competence, and this determines who speaks, and when there is voting 
whether the member states can vote individually and the EU does not vote, 
or the EU casts a single vote with a weight of 27, and the member states do 
not vote. On paper the FAO model looks well developed for the situation, 
yet one hears complaints that it involves excessively heavy procedures and 
sees insufficient discipline on the side of the member states in observing 
these rules. These issues warrant a more thorough investigation to see how 
working practices can be improved.   
There are other more recent organisations where both the EU and the 
member states are contracting parties and/or full members (EBRD, Energy 
Charter Treaty, Energy Community Treaty, etc.), and where no changes are 
needed in the EU’s institutional position.   
On the other hand there are several older organisations where the EU 
has substantial competences that have not followed the FAO or these other 
models. These include for example the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) where 
regularisation of the EU’s status from observer to full member is long 
overdue, and where lack of support from various member states is to 
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blame. In these and other examples the EU can invoke the Regional 
Integration Organisation (RIO) criterion with a view to requesting an 
upgrade from ‘virtual’ to full member.   
There can also be increasing recourse to informal core group 
processes within organisations, such as the ‘Friends of the UN Secretary 
General’, or ‘Green Room meetings’ at the WTO. However for this it is 
important that the EU has full status (as at the WTO), whereas in other 
organisations where the EU is only observer (UNGA, OSCE, OECD) the 
Secretary General may find it awkward to invite the EU to such restricted 
meetings.   
One instance of the member states giving way to sole EU 
membership, with the member states to remain only as observers, has been 
seen in the Northern Dimension programme when it was restructured in 
2007 after its initial decade of experience. This model might be applied in 
other cases to lighten the costs of large meetings and enhance efficiency.  
The exceptionally important case of the G20, which has become a 
prime forum for global economic affairs, may prove to be too unwieldy to 
be an effective forum for negotiation. Many different formats can be 
imagined for handling global issues in more restricted fora, in which case 
the EU will be under pressure to represent itself alone, without even the 
larger member states. This would require, however, that the member states 
would be willing to be represented by the EU (HR or the Commission) also 
on matters of national competence. For example there could be a 
remodeled G8 (with US, EU, Japan, the BRICs and South Africa), or a 
quadrilateral forum (US, EU, China, India) or a trilateral (US, EU, China, or 
US, EU, Russia). There are already many bilateral summits for ‘strategic 
partnerships’ where the presidents of the European Council and 
Commission represent the EU alone without the presence of the member 
states. The ‘Copenhagen moment’ at the December 2009 climate change 
summit should have served as part of a learning process for the EU and its 
member states to understand together when it is vital for the EU to be 
represented with a truly single voice, or to find itself side-lined.  
Constituency arrangements. Finally, an issue running through many 
organisations is the obsolescence of the constituency arrangements in the 
executive boards or steering groups, where the large member states have 
their own executive directors and votes, whereas the smaller member states 
are grouped in constituencies with a single executive director, with voting 
weights also increasingly out of line with global realities. Aside from the 
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question of voting power, many constituency arrangements are obsolete 
with regard to the enlargement of the EU and dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, as in the IMF Executive Board where Canada represents Ireland, 
and Belgium represents Belarus. Also in the UN system (starting with the 
UNSC, but also at the UNDP and other agencies), there are executive board 
arrangements with regional groups reflecting still the Cold War division of 
Europe, with a so-called ‘Western Europe and other States’ group and an 
Eastern Europe group covering the former Soviet bloc. On the other hand 
the EBRD offers an up-to-date model: the constituencies for smaller 
member states are separately grouped into EU and non-EU states, and the 
EU itself (represented by the Commission and the European Investment 
Bank) has full shareholder and Executive Board status alongside the 
member states. In principle the constituencies for smaller member states 
should now be grouped for EU member states, or in the IMF case for 
eurozone and non-eurozone member states, but the issues involved in such 
reforms inevitably get tied up with wider global issues going far beyond 
the EU’s internal concerns. Still, when these wider reforms become 
possible, the EU should factor in its concerns. 
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5. RESTRUCTURING OF EUROPEAN 
DIPLOMATIC SERVICES 
5.1 Setting up the European External Action Service (EEAS)  
One of the key innovations of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the external 
representation of the Union, where new positions and structures, as well as 
the legal personality of the EU, have the potential to lead to a qualitative 
upgrading of the EU’s foreign policy role. The Treaty sees several actors 
representing the EU. The President of the European Council represents the 
EU internationally ‘at his level’, for instance at summits, and provides the 
strategic guidelines for foreign policy. The President of the Commission 
and individual Commissioners continue to represent the EU externally on 
all matters of EU competence except activity under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), with the Commission thus remaining 
responsible for activity under the old European Community competences.  
However the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, 
Catherine Ashton, holds the central position. She heads the EEAS, chairs 
the Foreign Affairs Council and also serves as Vice-President of the 
Commission. Given the intensity of these multiple obligations, the post has 
evidently to be supported by deputies at the political as well as technical 
level. Three Commissioners can represent her in matters pertaining to their 
portfolios (Stefan Fule for the EU Neighbourhood, Andris Piebalgs for 
Development, Kristalina Georgieva for International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response), while for CFSP matters the HR 
can delegate to the foreign minister of the rotating Council Presidency, or 
its other Troika or Trio (following) Presidencies.  
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The rotating Council Presidency is no longer mentioned in the Lisbon 
Treaty as playing a role in the EU’s foreign policy. However it remains 
important in chairing other formations of the Council that decide 
negotiating mandates for external issues in areas of EU competence other 
than foreign and security policy. It is not yet clear how far the rotating 
Presidency is ‘out’ of external affairs activity. The Spanish Presidency of the 
first half of 2010 clearly did not consider itself ‘out’, but this was a 
transitional period, whereas the Belgian Presidency in the second half of 
2010 sought to minimise its role in external affairs, beyond standing in for 
the HR when asked to do so, or when unavoidable for formal reasons (e.g. 
at the UNGA). The very large network of Council Working Groups will in 
the CFSP field be chaired by members of the EEAS. The Belgian rotating 
Council Presidency has continued to chair these working groups while 
declaring that this was “on behalf of the High Representative”, pending the 
full operational establishment of the EEAS. The Belgian Presidency 
prioritised getting the new Lisbon structures in place, including the 
withdrawal of the rotating Presidency from external representation except 
for temporary transitional arrangements. However the two next Hungarian 
and Polish Presidencies are taking a more assertive attitude to the functions 
of the rotating Presidency, and are effectively looking for grey areas in EU 
institutional rules that may provide ways to re-introduce its role. Some 
other member states, notably the UK, are taking every opportunity to resist 
any upgrade in the EU’s external role, including even very small pragmatic 
steps of protocol, like having the EU representation of the Commission and 
Council Presidency at the Cancún climate change sitting behind a single 
‘EU’ nameplate (see section 6.1.11). 
Throughout 2010, the institutions and the member states have spent 
much energy on the complex negotiations to create the new European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which became operational on 1 December 
2010. The long-term potential of the EEAS is very positive for EU 
integration: by pooling national and EU officials, tools and resources for EU 
foreign policy and by bridging what has so far been a political and 
institutional gap between supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions, the EEAS could help create a ‘foreign policy culture’ which 
could contribute to addressing some of the shortcomings of EU 
performance in international affairs. In the short term, however, prospects 
are far more uncertain and will depend also on the extent to which the 
member states will invest, with people and resources, in a more common 
and coordinated foreign policy. Indeed, its form and functioning will be 
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reviewed within one year of its establishment, in time also for the 
negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework from 2013.  
The deal reached in July 2010, followed by the finishing touches 
agreed upon during the autumn entails the creation of the EEAS as an 
autonomous structure from the Council and the Commission, in which 
most of the staff dealing with foreign policy and external relations will 
merge. From the Council Secretariat, 411 staff members are to be 
transferred from its Directorate General for External Relations, the Policy 
Unit, and most of its CSDP and crisis management structures; from the 
Commission 1,114 staff members are to be transferred from its Directorate 
General for External Relations (DG Relex) and part of the Directorate 
General for Development. However Commission staff responsible for 
managing financial instruments, in EuropAid, DG Development and 
ECHO, will not be transferred. Some 100 new posts should be created by 
2011, making a total 1,643 staff, of which 1,145 will be of administrative 
(AD) grade, although this seems now subject to doubt as a result of various 
inter-institutional arguments. In addition there will be 2,077 staff of other 
categories, mainly locally employed staff taken over from the former 
Commission delegations, making a total establishment of 3,720. A budget 
of €476 million is proposed by the HR for 2011 for staff, administrative and 
infrastructure, i.e. excluding the EU’s operational expenditures, which are 
of a much higher magnitude (€12 billion).  
At the staff level (see the provisional organigramme in Figure 1), the 
HR will have one deputy in the person of the Executive Secretary-General 
(French diplomat, Pierre Vimont), who in turn will have two Deputies 
(former head of Solana’s Policy Planning staff, Helga Schmidt, and Head of 
Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament, Maciej Popowski), 
respectively in charge of political and inter-institutional affairs. Together 
with the Chief Operating Officer (former Commission Director General for 
Trade, David O’Sullivan), these four posts plus the HR will form the 
‘corporate board’ of the EEAS, to use the official terminology. Below the 
corporate board, the EEAS is organised in directorates-general, five of 
which focus on geographical areas, one is responsible for multilateral and 
thematic issues, and one for administrative, staffing and budgetary matters. 
Further units deal with Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, 
Crisis Management and Planning, and the EU military staff.  
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For representation abroad, the Heads of the 136 EU Delegations, 
substituting those of the Commission, are accountable to the HR, and take 
over the coordinating role on the ground, which had so far been carried out 
by the embassy of the member state holding the rotating Presidency – 
potentially a far-reaching change. In principle the Delegations should 
develop a key role in articulating EU policies towards third countries, 
linking not only to the EEAS in Brussels but also to Commission 
directorates general responsible for sectoral policies with important 
external aspects (e.g. agriculture, aid, trade, transport, energy migration). 
This coordination role will be especially important in the centres of 
multilateral diplomacy (New York, Geneva, Vienna, etc.). As is detailed in 
the next section there is a large agenda for the possible expansion of the 
responsibilities of the Delegations compared to those of the member states, 
starting for example with rationalisation and reduced duplication of 
information gathering and reporting.    
The system of Special or Personal Representatives of the HR for 
various regions or conflict situations is currently being reviewed, and likely 
to be slimmed down, partly in view of the enhanced status of the EU 
delegations, where the Heads of Delegation could take on the roles of 
Special Representatives. 
There are evident tensions between the member states and the EU 
institutions over the EU’s place in international affairs in terms of 
competition for resources and influence between the national foreign 
ministries of themember states, the new EEAS and Commission. At the 
time of writing (December 2010), there are disturbing signs of backsliding 
over full development of the EEAS and the post-Lisbon regime, as 
illustrated above by uncertainty over the build-up of staffing and the re-
invention of the rotating Council Presidency in certain external 
representational functions.  
5.2 The costs of non-Europe and the restructuring of European 
diplomacy 
At the outset the EEAS’s total staff of 3,720 is small compared to the 
diplomacies of three largest diplomatic services of the member states, 
which are in the region of 12 to 13,000, and comparable to the staffing of the 
medium-sized member states such as Belgium and the Netherlands (Table 
2 and Annex N). 
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Table 2. Staff and financial resources of European diplomatic services 
 27 MS EU  
1.  Number of missions  
(embassies & consulates) 
3,164 136 
2. Total staff (at home and abroad) 93,912 3,720 
‐ Own nationals 55,441 1,643 
‐ Locally employed 38,471 2,077 
‐ Total staff per head of population 1 per 5,335 1 per 134,677 
3.  Budgetary costs €7,529 mil. €476 mil. 
‐ Costs per head of population €15 €1 
   
p.m. Aid expenditures  
(development, humanitarian, etc.) 
€53,736 mil. €12,092 mil. 
Total staff, external relations and aid, home and 
abroad, own nationals and locally employed 
(est.) 108,149 5,778 
Total cost of diplomacy and aid administration (est.) €9,647 
mil. 
€649 mil. 
Notes: Data for member states are for 2009; for the EU the figures are as proposed at the end 
of 2010 for 2011. Staff figures under 2. (with details in Annex N) include MFA and EEAS 
personnel at home and in foreign missions, but exclude aid administrations, which however 
are separate from MFAs only in some member states (e.g. UK DFID, Swedish SIDA). Where 
aid administrators are embedded in MFAs and foreign missions, we have sought data on 
their number, and in most cases it was possible to excluded them from line 2 above (and 
Annex N), which aims at representing core diplomatic activity. However this was not 
possible in all cases, and the EEAS figures include aid staff in the Delegations. Exclusion of 
aid administrators was also statistically appropriate, as in some cases aid agencies combine 
administration and operations without it being easily possible to separate the two, the 
German GTZ being a large-scale case of this practice. Budgetary costs in line 3 (and Annex O 
for detail) cover staff and other administrative and infrastructural expenditures of MFAs 
and EEAS at home and in foreign missions, but exclude operational expenditures on aid and 
major cultural programmes and agencies. The Commission employs 1,484 staff in Brussels 
on aid activity (in AIDCO, ECHO, that part of DG Development not being transferred to the 
EEAS) and 574 in DG Trade, which are not included in the EEAS data above. Every effort 
has been made to extract comparable data from national MFAs or their permanent 
representations in Brussels. But not all member states have responded to our requests 
completely and the statistics should only be read as giving broad indications. For detailed 
data see Annexes N, O, P.   
 
 The numbers of administrative grade diplomats is of course much 
smaller, and the EEAS is planned to start with 1,145 ‘AD’ grade diplomats, 
i.e. excluding technical and secretarial staff and local agents (this suggests 
as rule of thumb one in three staff as AD diplomats). The 27 member states 
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together employ almost 94,000 staff in their foreign services, which 
includes both their own nationals and local agents, the latter account for a 
little under half of the total. The total staff for the 27 member states is over 
three times higher than for the US (27,882). The Commission employs 
additionally 2,058 in ‘external DGs’ that are not transferred to the EEAS 
(DG Trade, AIDCO, ECHO, and the part of DG Development not 
transferred), making a total for EEAS plus the Commission of 5,778 
persons. These figures do not include international sections of many other 
Commission DGs or home government departments of the member states 
(such as finance, transport, etc.). 
The administrative budget of the EEAS of €476 million amounts to 
just under €1 per capita of the population. The total administrative 
expenditures of the MFAs of the 27 member states amounts to €7,523 
million, or about €15 per capita of the population; the largest member states 
achieve some economies of scale spending less than this average, whereas 
the smaller but high-income member states are spending on average over 
€30 per capita. The EEAS represents 1 staff person per 134,677 heads of the 
EU population, whereas the member states’ diplomacies average 1 staff per 
5,335 of the population.  
These figures are suggestive of the potential scope for major 
economies of scale in restructuring European diplomacy, with expansion of 
the role of the EEAS and economising in national diplomacies, wherever 
the common service at EU level could replace duplication at the level of the 
27 or achieve a greater  impact. Of course this depends on which 
diplomatic functions can effectively be performed by the EEAS/EU on 
behalf of all member states, to which we return in a moment. 
Four scenarios are now described below in order to provide some 
quantitative parameters for cost-benefit analysis of the possible 
restructuring of European diplomacy. The first two develop the idea of 
‘budget neutrality’, which has been endorsed by the member states in the 
Council (but are not presented in Table 3 since they are close to the status 
quo).   
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Table 3. Scenarios for restructuring European diplomacy 
 Staff numbers Costs, € million 
 EEAS MS Total EEAS MS Total 
Initial situation,  
January 2011 3,720 93,912 97,632 476 7,529 8,005 
Moderate restructuring 
MS -10%, EEAS x2 +3,720 -9,391 -5,671 +476 -753 -277 
= 7,440 85,521  91,961 952 6,776 7,728 
Substantial restructuring 
MS -25%, EEAS x3 +7,440 -23,478 -16,038 +952 -1,882 -930 
= 11,160 70,434 81,594 1,428 5,647 7,075 
Notes: In ‘moderate restructuring’ the EEAS is doubled in staff and costs by 2020, 
while member states’ diplomacies are cut by 10%.  In ‘substantial restructuring’ the 
EEAS is tripled in size by 2030, and member states’ diplomacies are cut by 25%. 
However some member states are currently proceeding with 10-25% cuts much 
faster, in 3 to 5 years. Therefore the annual profile of net budgetary economies 
would be front-loaded in keeping with the current national macroeconomic 
budgetary imperatives. As a simplifying assumption the cost estimates suppose a 
linear relationship between changes in staff and total costs including overheads; in 
reality the total cost changes could be either bigger or smaller than the staff 
changes, depending for example on factors such as whether small diplomatic 
missions are closed down or only reduced. Given the front-loading of the national 
budget economies compared to the longer time profile for expansion of the EEAS, 
one could in principle make a discounted cash flow (DCF) calculation which 
would give a higher present day value of the net budget economies embodied in 
the scenarios. This is not done here, to avoid unwarranted impressions of accuracy. 
The narrative implied by the scenarios is clear enough.    
 
a. ‘Minimalist budget-neutrality’. This imposes a zero-growth 
constraint on the budget of the EEAS. This would exclude the possibility 
that the EEAS really develops its capacity, and so amounts to denial of the 
purpose of the Lisbon Treaty to build up the role of the EU as global 
foreign policy actor. It is included in our scenarios since it is the closest to 
what the member states currently appear to be trying to do, although we 
consider it to be without merit. This ultra-conservative scenario would 
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represent little more than a partial takeover of the EEAS by the member 
states with no other change in the structure of European diplomacy.  
However the Foreign Affairs Council defined its position on budget 
neutrality in less than precise terms in a Declaration on 15 October 2010, 
attached to the amendment to the EU budget for establishing the EEAS in 
the following terms:  
The Council recalls the great importance that the establishment 
of the EEAS should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency 
aiming towards budget neutrality. The concept of budget 
neutrality should be seen in the context of resources within the 
EU budget, including when deciding on new premises. It 
expects a report on an efficiency savings/redeployment plan in 
2011 outlining concrete steps to be taken in the short- as well as 
medium-term to progress towards budget neutrality and 
should be subject to regular review.  
This declaration at least introduces the word ‘towards’ budget 
neutrality, which allows for some growth at least in the short-run. However 
it fails to endorse any long-run build-up of the EEAS. It also ignores the 
issue of an integrated rationalisation and development of EU and member 
states’ diplomacies. On the other hand the vague reference to the resources 
of the EU budget seems to leave open the possibility that a growth of the 
EEAS might be offset by economies elsewhere in the EU budget, which 
should not be difficult since the EEAS costs only one-third of 1% of the 
budget total.   
b. ‘Common sense budget-neutrality’. A simple and more plausible 
version of this ‘budget neutrality’ would be to proceed with the expansion 
of the EEAS with the national diplomats due to be transferred in 2011 to 
2013 to occupy one-third of the diplomatic staff of the EEAS (about 370 
persons in total), without however their being replaced at home. However 
it seems that there is little evidence of explicit non-replacement polices 
being pursued so far.    
c. ‘Moderate restructuring’. This scenario would see the EEAS 
progressively strengthened over the next decade, with a doubling of its 
staff numbers by 2020, raising the total from 3,720 to 7,440, alongside a 
trimming of foreign services of member states by 10%, or about 9,391 staff. 
(Table  3). If this were implemented at an even pace throughout the decade 
it would mean adding around 120 administrative grade diplomats per year 
to the EEAS, together with proportionate increases in other staff. The initial 
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2011 EEAS budget requests 100 new administrative grade posts, and so the 
present scenario could see a roughly constant expansion at this rate, giving 
time for the new service to consolidate itself, build up staff strength and 
infrastructure at a manageable pace. As regards the trimming of national 
foreign offices, it is supposed (in a highly simplified calculation) that all 
costs are reduced proportionately with staff numbers, which might then 
yield a useful net budget savings for the EU and national budgets 
combined of about €276 million. It is possible that the savings would be 
greater if the economies in member states’ embassies had a large number of 
closures of mini-embassies, i.e. embassies of small member states 
accredited to small 3rd countries. Many of these embassies have no more 
than one or two diplomats, yet have to bear full overhead costs of secure 
offices and communications, residences suitable for diplomatic hospitality 
and support staff.11 
d. ‘Substantial restructuring’. Given the sharpness of current needs 
for budgetary economies and at the same time for the EU to face up 
effectively to new global challenges, this scenario sees the EEAS further 
build up at a continuing rate of about 100 diplomats per year in the period 
2020 to 2030, resulting in a tripling of the initial staff strength of the EEAS. 
Alongside this the budgets of the foreign services of member states would 
be cut by 25% (Table 4). The EEAS would be brought up to a total staff 
strength of 11,160, which is comparable to the size of the staff currently 
employed by three largest diplomatic services of the member states 
(France, Germany and the UK). This staff increase of 7,440 for the EEAS 
would occur alongside a reduction of 23,747 staff in national diplomatic 
representations, and could yield a net budgetary savings of about €929 
million or more, since economies in mini-embassies would be even more 
marked than in the previous scenario.  
The figures of 10-25% savings is not entirely arbitrary, since they 
correspond to cuts in national MFA budgets currently being undertaken by 
many member states. For example Poland is cutting its bureaucracy 10% 
across the board over two years, whereas the UK announced in October 
                                                     
11 One of the authors discussed the role of the mini-embassy of a medium-to-small 
member state with its ambassador, who was the one and only diplomat in the 
mission. He advised that it was very difficult for him to do ’real’ diplomatic work, 
since much of his time was taken up by administrative burdens, including 
checking the accounts of the consular section.  
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2010 spending cuts with a 24% real resource savings for the foreign office 
over a five-year period. France is making cuts of 5%, or 700 personnel, for 
2011 alone. Ireland is making a cut of 13.5% for 2011. Austria is making cuts 
of 10%, and Slovenia of 20% in the next two years. Other member states 
with very severe budget problems can be expected to make substantial 
cuts. It is notable that these cuts are being implemented much faster (within 
five years or less) than the projected expansion of the EEAS. 
To summarise, if one supposes a five-year time horizon for the 10 to 
25% national budget savings, but a 10- to 20- year time horizon for the 
build-up of the EEAS at a rate of around 120 administrative grade 
diplomats per year, then the net savings per annum in years 1 to 5 would be 
as follows: 
• ‘Moderate restructuring’: €103 million net savings per annum (+€47 
million for EEAS, -€150 million for the member states) and 
• ‘Substantial restructuring’: €329 million net savings per annum (+€47 
million  for EEAS, -€376 million for the member states). 
If one looks only at the EU budget, the annual cost increase of the 
gradual build-up of the strength of the EEAS would be €47 million, i.e. a 
trivial 0.04% of the total EU budget. While there is now a serious political 
debate in the Council over whether the aggregate EU budget should be 
frozen in real terms over the next multi-year financial period, it would not 
be serious to propose that all detailed lines within the budget should be 
frozen in rigid, static gridlock.  
It should be emphasised that the above budgetary scenarios are only 
suggesting very rough hypotheses and numbers. A real budget simulation 
would require a very much bigger investment in research (beyond what 
our resources allow) into the statistics and financial accounts of the external 
services of the member states. Yet the scenarios offer a relevant general 
narrative. There is a huge amount of wasteful duplication going on in the 
diplomacies of the member states, and the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty 
invite consideration of how to follow through with serious measures to 
achieve both economies and greater collective effectiveness. This would be 
a further episode in the series known in EU circles as ‘the costs of non-
Europe’. 
Given the prominence being attributed now in the EU institutions to 
political objectives with the 2020 time horizon, one or other of these 
scenarios might be inserted into the next revisions of the EU’s policy 
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statements focused on this date. But what seems to be lacking so far is any 
inclination on the part of the member states to combine national restrictions 
with a strengthening of the EEAS, with an integrated approach seeking to 
obtain greater benefits for the EU and member states together, alongside 
net cost reductions. The scenarios for building up the strength of the EEAS 
could be justified with the following ten rationales. 
Coordination and leadership. The Lisbon Treaty should bring more 
coherence and harmonisation in the EU representation in third countries, 
with the Delegations now representing the ‘European Union’, not only the 
‘European Commission’ as before. The Heads of Delegation are now 
required to take on the functions that were up until now undertaken by the 
rotating Council Presidency, including speaking in the name of the EU in 
third countries, convening and chairing on-the-spot coordination meetings 
with the member states’ embassies. Delegations servicing clusters of 
international organisations (New York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna, Nairobi) 
will need particularly substantial reinforcement, as has been illustrated by 
the very large temporary reinforcements seen at the embassies of the 
former rotating Council Presidencies in New York for coordination 
purposes during their six-month terms (smaller member states have sent 
reinforcements of 40 to 60 extra diplomats to New York).      
Changing profile of strategic diplomacy. Recent years have seen a 
remarkable expansion of summit level diplomacy, notably with the G20. At 
the same time the limits of summit diplomacy have been in evidence, 
certainly in the case of climate change negotiations (failure at Copenhagen 
to negotiate a global post-Kyoto regime), and the same could be said of 
trade negotiations (failure of Doha round). This leads into the need for a 
different mode of ‘horizontal’ global diplomacy in order to achieve global 
objectives, in which the EU for its part has to enter into complex 
negotiations with a large number of important partner states, working 
often alongside and in sympathy with non-state actors (NGOs, business 
interests, etc.).12 The EEAS and the Commission are in principle well 
                                                     
12 For a well-documented account of this new model of diplomacy, see Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, op. cit.  This author draws attention to abundant examples of how the 
EU has been showing the way in its internal diplomacy and systemic development, 
but also remarks: “We might thus expect the European Union to support the 
creation of global government networks. In fact, however, it is the United States 
that has led the way in supporting these networks at the global level” (p. 265).     
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positioned to develop this mode of diplomacy, assuming representational 
questions are sorted out and staffing is brought up to strength. By contrast 
this is not the kind of diplomacy that the member states, or almost all of 
them, can be equipped for – to do it at member state level would be hugely 
expensive as well as confusing for the third parties.     
Political intelligence. At the present time, in the most important 
world capital cities there are 27 + 1 political counselors or entire political 
sections of EU diplomatic missions compiling ‘exclusive’ reports on the 
same subjects to their home capitals, for example on such topics as the 
implications of the recent US Congressional elections, the next Russian 
presidency or reform of the Chinese Communist Party. EC Delegations 
have up until now often had only weak political sections, or none at all in 
Delegations concerned essentially with development aid. With the injection 
of one-third of its staff numbers from member states, the EEAS will now be 
better placed to take up the task of political reporting as a common service 
for all member states as well as the EU institutions. A key prerequisite of 
effective political reporting is excellent knowledge of local languages. The 
recent enlargements of the EU has already brought in a valuable 
strengthening of Russian language competence in the EU institutions. The 
EEAS should also be able to draw now on a corps of diplomats coming 
from the member states skilled in the major non-European languages 
(Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Farsi, etc.). It will be up to the EEAS also to 
organise increasingly effective cooperative arrangements in important 
foreign capitals to make common use of specific research efforts or 
intelligence sources of member states’ embassies. It is not necessary to 
propose a black or white scenario here. The larger member states have 
teams of several diplomats engaged in political reporting in important 
capitals, and these teams could be slimmed down alongside a beefing up of 
the EU Delegations.   
Economic intelligence. Similarly the classic embassy has an economic 
section which is concerned with three basic tasks: i) reporting on economic 
trends, ii) reporting on aspects of trade policy and iii) assisting in support 
of ‘national’ commercial interests. Of these the first two are largely tasks 
that can be entrusted to the EU delegations, with little value added in 
having this done 27+1 times, as soon as the EU Delegations are staffed up 
to do this work effectively.   
Support for CFSP operations and humanitarian intervention. During 
the Solana period as High Representative, the EU became the actor of 
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choice for many soft and not-so-soft security missions, including several 
with mixed civilian and military components (Balkans, Middle East, East 
Europe, Central Africa, etc.). There are still major challenges to build up 
these capabilities both in terms of hardware (e.g. for heavy lift aircraft and 
helicopters) and trained corps of civilian personnel for soft security and 
rule of law missions. However the political profile and values of the EU 
make this dimension of its foreign and security policy particularly in need 
of reinforcement to the point that the EU’s actions can gain in visibility and 
credibility.  
Administration of aid programmes. The Commission has taken steps 
in recent years to decentralise to a high degree the administration of its aid 
programmes to its delegations (and these staff are counted in statistics of 
the EEAS). However the overall staffing of the EU’s aid programmes are 
modest compared to the member states that have large aid programmes. 
The EU’s total ODA effort currently amounts to €12 billion per year, 
compared to around €9 billion each for Germany, France and the UK, with 
the Netherlands (€5 billion) and Sweden (€3.5 billion) also important 
donors. The Commission employs 1,484 staff on aid programmes in 
Brussels, compared to about 2,300 in France or the UK. The Commission 
thus employs about one-third less staff for programmes which are about 
one- third larger: or, the Commission has one staff per €8 million of aid 
expenditures, whereas France and the UK have one staff for about €4 
million of aid expenditures.  
Common consular services. The provision of common consular 
services is now becoming an issue with respect to the processing of visa 
applications for two reasons. First, there are many countries where the 
member states are far from fully represented and where solutions have to 
be found. There is a first example in Moldova of a common visa application 
centre, located in the Hungarian embassy, which is used by 12 Schengen 
area states (see Annex J for details). The provision of facilities of this type is 
badly needed in many countries, especially those in the European 
neighbourhood, Central Asia and smaller states in other continents. Ad hoc 
cooperative systems are emerging elsewhere (e.g. Spain, Belgium and the 
Netherlands share a common visa service centre in Kiev, where routine 
administrative work is outsourced to a private company). The Visegrad 
countries have established a common consulate in South Africa. The second 
reason has to do with the fact that the rules for issuing short-term visas are 
now an exclusive EU competence for the Schengen area, and visitors 
62 | HYBRID COMBINATIONS OF THE EU & MEMBER STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
receiving a Schengen visa are free to travel throughout the Schengen area. 
In this situation, the decision of the individual member state to issue a visa 
is in any case now a matter of common interest. It would be natural for 
work of this type to become part of the common services administered by 
EU Delegations, and this could have a valuable image-enhancing effect for 
the EU (the Gonzalez Commission for ‘project Europe 2030’ advocated this 
under the heading, “Create a unified visa policy and a European consular 
service within the EEAS”).13 The Lisbon Treaty also provides that the EU 
should look after its citizens worldwide, which suggests the need for a 
further category of ‘consular’ services, for example to organise common 
relief efforts to evacuate EU citizens in the event of natural disasters (e.g. 
the 2005 Asian tsunami) or political emergencies.  
Role of bilateral embassies. The other side of the coin is the evolution 
of the functions of the huge network of 3,184 bilateral embassies, missions 
and consular offices maintained by the member states. What has been 
happening to the nature of the services that all these embassies really 
perform, beyond flying the flag? What in particular do the hundreds of 
bilateral embassies in the matrix of the 27 member states within the EU 
now do? The main answer heard from member states’ diplomats in these 
postings is that they have to work on the coordination of positions in EU 
negotiations. But how far can this be justified as an efficient value-adding 
service? At the top level Heads of State or Government, foreign and finance 
ministers are meeting every month, in sessions that are usually prepared by 
COREPER or multiple other meetings in Brussels, including bilateral 
connections between staff of the permanent representations, who also are 
the only people who can also keep track of what is happening in the 
institutions. At the more technical level the specialised knowledge required 
to advance negotiations or shape coalitions is very demanding (e.g. the 
details of regulations for financial markets, or genetically modified foods, 
etc.), which will not normally be part of the in-depth knowledge of 
diplomats posted in bilateral embassies. Also to be taken into account is the 
huge displacement of inter-state negotiations to the Permanent 
Representations of the member states in Brussels and the multiplicity of 
working meetings of the EU and its member states at all levels.  
                                                     
13 Project Europe 2020 – Challenges and opportunities, report to the European Council 
by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, May 2010. 
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More fundamentally, the very nature of European integration has 
overtaken the functions of traditional diplomacy, given the huge expansion 
of personal mobility, communications, cross-country networks and 
European dimensions to most businesses except the very local and small 
scale. The intra-European bilateral embassies occupy many fine 
chancelleries and residences dating back to the Concert of Europe of a 
century or two ago, and their staffing seems to belong also to an earlier era. 
To take just one example, in Rome most member states maintain three 
embassies and missions – to Italy, the Vatican and the UN agencies, all with 
their separate ambassadors, staffs and buildings. Can the scale of these 
embassies be justified to taxpayers in these days of extreme budgetary 
austerity? Sweden here leads the way and, notwithstanding the healthy 
state of its public finances, has decided to close its embassy to Belgium and 
merge it into its Permanent Representation to the EU. 
Low-cost solutions in the rest of the world. For diplomatic missions 
in the rest of the world too, the time has surely come to develop ways to 
exploit the infrastructure of EU Delegations to offer low-cost solutions to 
the needs for representation for smaller member states in smaller third 
countries. For example one can imagine the EU Delegations acting as 
‘House of Europe’ centres for mini-diplomatic missions of the smaller 
member states that might occupy just one or two offices, profiting from 
common security and other infrastructural elements. With serious 
development of common services for political and economic intelligence 
and consular (visa) services, many of today’s embassies could be reduced 
to such mini-embassies embedded in such ‘House(s) of Europe’, or simply 
closed. Or there could be more recourse to the accreditation of roving 
ambassadors resident at home (a technique used by several small member 
states), and there could be worked out arrangements for such roving 
ambassadors to benefit from some kinds of support by the EU Delegations. 
Arranging visits by politicians and high officials is a highly time-
consuming task, and one can also imagine arrangements whereby groups 
of member states without embassies could share a diplomat embedded in 
the EU Delegation to support such services. 
Slovenia (and maybe other small member states) has already 
expressed interest in the idea of mini-diplomatic representations to be co-
located in EU Delegations, but Brussels has so far been preoccupied with 
basic priorities of getting the EEAS started. The issue could be taken up in 
the course of the next year. 
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Political legitimacy. As regards the democratic legitimacy of such a 
restructuring operation, repeated Eurobarometer opinion polls have shown 
that EU citizens place a more effective foreign and security policy at the top 
of their wishes for the enhanced tasks of the EU. This suggests that public 
opinion, while little informed about the precise mechanisms of EU 
institutions and policies, has a clear intuition that the EU could and should 
become a more effective global actor.  
 | 65 
 
 
6. STATUS QUO & PERSPECTIVES FOR 
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS, CONVENTIONS, 
AGREEMENTS & SUMMITRY  
his chapter gives an extensive but hardly exhaustive account of the 
status quo for three groups: first, global multilateral organisations 
and conventions; second, European and Euro-Atlantic multilateral 
organisations; and third, less formally institutionalised summitry and other 
priority diplomatic activities. Where appropriate, we comment on the 
adequacy or otherwise of the status quo. 
  
6.1 Global multilateral organisations and conventions 
6.1.1 UN General Assembly 
The EU has the status at the UNGA of one of the 67 ‘permanent observers’, 
allowed to speak but only after the 192 member states have had their say, 
although it has sometimes been given a preferential place in seating and 
speaking arrangements over other observers. The issue of full membership 
for the EU has been discussed in the past as part of the much wider debate 
about reform of the UN, and especially of the UN Security Council.14 The 
                                                     
14 For detailed accounts of UN and UNSC reform, see Natalino Ronzitti, “The 
reform of the UN Security Council”, Documenti IAI 10/13 July 2010, Rome; and 
Nicoletta Pirozzi, “The EU’s Contribution to the Effectiveness of the UN Security 
 
T
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main reservation expressed over an EU upgrade has been over who else 
would seek to exploit a precedent granted to the EU. The 67 observers 
include most of the world’s official regional or thematic multilateral 
organisations. Among them the Holy See has secured a prior place with a 
specific Resolution in 2004 defining its rights as a ‘non-member State 
observer’. 
The case for upgrading the status of the EU in the UNGA is robust, 
both in principle and for some functional reasons. The EU has substantial 
state-like institutional features, extensive political, economic and legal 
powers, and since Lisbon, international legal personality. It takes a position 
on, or has operational responsibilities for, a very large number of UN 
activities. No other international entity is comparable. An established 
concept in several international organisations is the Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation (REIO), permitting such entities to accede to full 
membership alongside sovereign states. This has been used to legitimise 
the EC’s accession to the FAO and several other multilateral organisations. 
There is now a precedent case of a Regional Integration Organisation (RIO) 
clause for one recent UN Convention, i.e. dropping the word ‘economic’ 
and making for an opening towards other political or other non-economic 
organisations.  
There is a particular consequence of the Lisbon Treaty that makes the 
case for upgrading the EU’s position urgent. Over the past years the 
positions taken by the EU on many UNGA matters have often become texts 
of choice for numerous other UN member states to support. So far these EU 
positions have always been presented by the rotating Council Presidency 
state, with a widespread interest in the Assembly for these positions to be 
tabled early in the contributions of the 192 member states. This task now 
falls to the EU Delegation. But here there is the practical problem under 
present rules of procedure that the EU (whichever of the possible 
representatives just listed) cannot intervene until as many of the 192 UN 
member states as want to have intervened, which means that the 
Assembly’s work will be made less efficient and the EU’s influence 
reduced.   
                                                                                                                                       
Council: Representation, Coordination and Outreach”, Documenti IAI 10/14, July 
2010, Rome.  
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As a result the EU took the initiative to propose in September 2010 a 
Resolution of the UNGA (see Annex L for the full text), invoking its 
regional integration organisation (RIO) status and proposing a 
comprehensive upgrade of its representative’s rights at the UNGA, as 
follows:  
... the representatives of the European Union shall be entitled to 
participate effectively in the sessions and work of the General 
Assembly (including in the general debate) and its Committees 
and Working Groups, in international meetings and 
conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly, as 
well as in United Nations conferences. For this purpose, the 
representatives of the European Union shall have the right to 
speak in a timely manner, as is the established practice for 
representatives of major groups, the right of reply, the right to 
circulate documents, the right to make proposals and submit 
amendments, the right to raise points of order, and seating 
arrangements which are adequate for the exercise of these 
rights.    
The draft resolution was tabled at the 64th session of the UNGA on 13 
September 2010, where however it encountered objections from various 
Latin American, Caribbean, African and Arab states who were concerned 
about how other regional groups would be treated after this precedent. 
Urgent attempts were made to adjust the text accordingly (as in Annex L), 
but the next day a vote was taken to postpone the agenda item, which was 
passed by 76 votes to 71, with 26 abstentions. This means that the issue will 
have to be tabled again at the 65th session, now underway, with the 
outcome at present uncertain. The EU believes that no country is against its 
requests, and that only fuller consultations are needed. Still this episode 
has seen a serious diplomatic miscalculation on the part of the EU in New 
York.  
If the resolution is finally passed in the near future, this should be a 
sound basis for many years of progressive deepening of the EU’s role in the 
UN system, both within the UNGA and its subordinate bodies, and as a 
precedent that could be adopted also in other UN agencies..  
Comment: The EU’s failure to win support in September 2010 is a setback, 
hopefully only a temporary one. A lesson from this experience is the need to 
organise diplomatic lobbying more thoroughly with all UN member states, to 
which the member states should actively contribute as well as the EEAS.  
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6.1.2 UN Security Council 
Until 1963, only 11 members sat on the UNSC. In December of that year, 
two measures were adopted. The overall number of UNSC members was 
raised to 15, and a geographical distribution of seats for the 10 non-
permanent members was adopted: five for Asia and Africa, two for Latin 
America, two for the ‘West European and Others’ group (WEOG) and one 
for ‘East European states’ (EUREST) containing the old Soviet bloc.15 This 
division of Europe remains still as a vestige of the cold war, with EU 
member states now largely present in both of the latter groups, with the 
result that the EU may now be represented by up to 3 non-permanent seats, 
in addition to France and the UK as permanent members.  
In recent decades, debate over reform of the membership of the 
UNSC has been a continuous process, with persistent claims for 
enlargement, but consistent failure to reach consensus.16 In relation to the 
status quo of 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members, there has been 
a durable G4 bloc seeking permanent membership status (Germany, Japan, 
Brazil and India), which has gained substantial support, including from 
France and UK. However this has been opposed by a different G7 bloc, 
which advocates the expansion of non-permanent membership (Italy, 
Spain, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Pakistan). Secretary General Kofi 
Annan made a proposal in 2005 with two options, both increasing total 
membership to 24, with different mixes of types of membership.  
The competing interests of large EU member states in this process 
(Germany, Italy, Spain) has led to some debate over whether an EU 
presence could be part of the solution. The former German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer when in office suggested that an EU seat would be 
an acceptable alternative to Germany’s accession if France and UK agreed 
to withdraw, which they do not. For their part the rest of the world is 
increasingly concerned about the over-representation of the EU in the 
                                                     
15 Resolution 1991-XVIII, adopted on 19 December 1963. 
16 See Ronzitti, op. cit., Pirozzi, op. cit., and David Hannay, “Effectiveness and 
Ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in the Last Twenty Years: A European 
Perspective”, Documenti IAI 09/28, November 2009, Rome. 
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UNSC, with five of the 15 seats (2 permanent and usually 3 rotating) 
tending to be occupied by EU member states.17  
While in the long-run there is a case for the EU to replace France and 
UK, for the time being the way is open to make full use of the provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty in Article 34 (TEU), which requires member states who 
are members of the UNSC to defend the positions and interests of the EU, 
and in particular states: 
When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on 
the UNSC agenda, those member states which sit on the UNSC 
shall request that the High Representative be invited to present 
the Union’s position.  
More generally the EU or member states sitting at the UNSC can as 
and when it has an agreed position on a specific item on the UNSC’s 
agenda, request permission of the Presidency of the UNSC to intervene in 
its open debates, which has been the regular practice since the beginning of 
2010. This makes use of Rule 39 of the UNSC’s Provisional Rules of 
Procedure, which states: 
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or 
other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to 
supply it with information or to give other assistance in 
examining matters within its competence. 
On 4 May 2010 HR Catherine Ashton made her first statement to the 
UNSC on the subject of cooperation between the EU and UN in the area of 
peace and security. Another recent example of the EU’s partial presence in 
the UNSC’s activity has been in the case of the Iran sanction issue. The 
sanctions agreed on 9 June 2010 (UNSC 1929) were agreed by the so-called 
E3+3 (France, Germany, UK, + China, Russia, US), ‘with the support of the 
High Representative of the European Union’. The HR was moreover 
mandated by the E3+3 to continue dialogue with the Iranian counterpart 
with a view to finding a solution (see Annex K). 
                                                     
17 “This level of over-representation … is likely to become increasingly 
unacceptable to other countries over time, especially as the Lisbon Treaty takes 
effect and the EU defines a stronger CFSP”, according to John Van Oudenaren in 
“Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in the Last Twenty 
Years: A US Perspective”, Documenti IAI 09/30, November 2009, Rome.    
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Ideas for partial reform of the UNSC could involve the merger of the 
two WEOG and EUREST groups into a single European group with a 
reduction of the number of seats from 3 to 2 (and with the ‘other’ non-
European states to join the groups for the American or Asian continents). In 
the new European group there could be a seat for the EU itself. In October 
2010 Portugal made a proposal upon its new accession to the UNSC as a 
non-permanent member for two years, writing to the HR to propose that its 
delegation at the table of the UNSC could include a representative of the 
EU, presumably either the HR or the Head of Delegation in New York. This 
interesting proposal awaits a response. 
Comment: Arrangements provided in the Lisbon Treaty for the 
representation of EU positions in the UN Security Council offer opportunities for 
the time being for the HR/VP to intervene on behalf of the EU where common 
positions are adopted. While a comprehensive reform of the UNSC remains a huge 
political challenge, intermediate solutions may be envisaged to encourage coherence 
among EU member states and reinforce the role of the EU itself at the UN. 
6.1.3 International Monetary Fund  
The IMF is a special case for the EU with its work blending a major 
‘exclusive’ monetary policy competence for the eurozone with a ‘shared’ 
competence (with the requirement for coordination) for economic policy at 
the EU and member state levels.  
Membership of the IMF for the eurozone and European Central Bank 
can be justified on legal and functional grounds.18 Article VIII of the IMF 
Agreement sets out obligations of member states regarding current and 
capital payments regimes and reserve asset policies. These obligations can 
no longer be fulfilled entirely or at all by the member states of the 
eurozone. Article IV provides for official consultations on monetary 
policies, which necessarily involve the ECB in consultations over any single 
eurozone state. The IMF statutes allow for member states that have formed 
monetary unions to pool their representation on the Board. But if the 
monetary union’s representative were to be additional to the member 
                                                     
18 For a thorough review see Der-Chin Horng, “The ECB’s Membership in the IMF: 
Legal Approaches to Constitutional Challenges”, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 
6, November 2005.  
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states, this would require a special agreement of the Board or Governing 
Council.      
At present, neither the Commission,  the rotating Council Presidency 
nor the eurozone finance ministers’ group has any formal representation on 
the Executive Board of the IMF, but the ECB is an observer for agenda 
items of relevance to it. However the Commission participates as observer 
in  the meetings of the IMF’s and World Bank’s ‘Joint Ministerial 
Committee of the Board of Governors on the Transfer of Real Resources to 
Developing Countries’ (‘Development Committee’). 
There are two outstanding related issues concerning the Executive 
Board: first the constituency system for smaller states and voting weights, 
and second the presence of the EU/eurozone. At present there are obsolete 
groupings of EU and non-EU states in various constituencies, with Spain 
grouped with several Latin American states, and with Belgium and the 
Netherlands grouped with mixed collections of Balkan and East European 
states (see Annexes D and F). The Commission proposed to the Council in 
1998 and again in 2006 reform of this anomaly with groupings of EU 
member states together, but member states in the Council have proved 
conservative, refusing such reforms. However, in 2006, the European 
Council did pronounce itself in favour of a single eurozone/EU seat or 
constituency “in the long-term”. Several years ago France and Germany 
seriously considered merging their representation on the Executive Board, 
which could have provided the core for a eurozone constituency, but the 
idea was dropped. In the event of a eurozone constituency, it would be 
natural for the positions of director to be occupied by the ECB and for the 
alternate director to be filled by a eurozone ministry of finance, probably 
that of the chair of the eurozone group, or the Commission.   
The EU member states have been under increasing pressure in the 
G20 to accept a diminution of their voting weights and seats. As Table 4 
illustrates, the EU 27 have a weight double that of the US, and over three 
times bigger than the BRICs taken together, whereas the EU’s economic 
weight is already less than that of the BRICs and relatively declining fast, 
and by 2020 may have dropped to half that of the BRICs. The G20 agreed in 
principle at Pittsburg in June 2009 to make an adjustment of voting weights 
to transfer 5% of the total in favour of emerging and developing economies 
by the November 2010 G20 summit meeting in Seoul, which would mean 
catching up with what the World Bank did earlier in 2010 (see also Table 4).  
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Table 4.Voting weights in the IMF and World Bank, and GDP shares 
 IMF, voting 
weights on 
board, % 
World Bank, voting 
weights on board, % 
GDP, % of world, 
est. 2010 at p.p.p. 
year Pre-2010 2010 2010 2015 2020 
EU 27 32.0 28.5 26.3 20.8 18.7 16.6 
US 16.7 16.4 15.8 20.2 18.3 16.4 
Brazil 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.9 2.8 2.7 
Russia 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.9 
India 1.9 2.8 2.9 5.2 6.1 7.0 
China 3.6 2.8 4.4 13.3 16.9 20.6 
BRICs total 9.6 10.5 12.3 24.4 28.8 33.2 
Note: For the World Bank, the old and new numbers relate to before and after the 
revisions made in 2010. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2010, for 2010 and 2015. For 
2020 the trend changes over the period 2000 to 2015 is extrapolated for the five 
further years.  
 
These issues came to a boil in September 2010 when ongoing 
discussions over revising the Executive Board’s structure before the 
November G20 Summit in Seoul reached an impasse. The US declared that 
it would not agree to renew the mandate of the Board unless its 
membership would be reduced from 24 to 20, with European states 
expected to account for the reduction. The default situation threatened by 
the US if no agreement were reached was that the Board would be 
automatically reduced to 20 members with withdrawal of the smallest 
voting shares. As the Brazilian executive director has pointed out, this 
would mean evicting Argentina, Brazil, India and an African 
constituency.19 The US thus chose to play its cards for Europe to bear the 
obvious diplomatic costs of such a scenario, in implicit alliance with the 
BRICs. Meanwhile the EU argues in favour of a broad revision of IMF 
governance issues, including de-monopolisation of the position of the 
managing director by Europe on condition that the US agrees to the same 
for the World Bank, reduction of the voting majority threshold to eliminate 
                                                     
19 P. Noguira Batista, “Europe must make way for a modern IMF”, Financial Times, 
24 September 2010. 
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the effective veto power of the US, as well as downward revision of 
European voting weights.  
Confronted with this US position, the EU member states agreed to 
negotiate, and this produced the outcome at the G20 finance minister’s 
ministerial on 23 October 2010, whose institutional aspects are reproduced 
in Box 4. 
The EU member states agreed to cede two seats on the Executive 
Board. While the details remained to be fully-worked out, it seems that the 
‘two seats’ are to be made up by four advanced European states ceding 
each a fraction of their seats by agreeing to a rotation with others. Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland are expected to cede half their seats, and 
Spain one-third of its seat by agreeing to a three-way rotation (with Mexico 
Box 4. G-20 Communiqué of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on 
IMF reform, 23 October 2010 [extract] 
We have reached agreement on an ambitious set of proposals to reform the 
IMF’s quota and governance that will help deliver a more effective, credible and 
legitimate IMF and enable the IMF to play its role in supporting the operation of 
the international monetary and financial system. These proposals will deliver on 
the objectives agreed in Pittsburgh and go even further in a number of areas. 
Key elements include: 
• shifts in quota shares to dynamic EMDCs and to underrepresented 
countries of over 6%, while protecting the voting share of the poorest, which we 
commit to work to complete by the Annual Meetings in 2012. 
• a doubling of quotas, with a corresponding roll-back of the NAB 
preserving relative shares, when the quota increase becomes effective. 
• continuing the dynamic process aimed at enhancing the voice and 
representation of EMDCs, including the poorest, through a comprehensive 
review of the formula by January 2013 to better reflect the economic weights; 
and through completion of the next regular review of quotas by January 2014. 
• greater representation for EMDCs at the Executive Board through 2 fewer 
advanced European chairs, and the possibility of a second alternate for all multi-
country constituencies, and 
• moving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the Fund’s 
membership to maintain the Board size at 24 chairs, and following the 
completion of the 14th General Review, a review of the Board’s composition 
every 8 years. 
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and Venezuela).20 In addition it is understood that there will be a wider 
revision of the constituency system, which should present the opportunity 
for a rationalisation in the direction of EU and/or eurozone constituencies. 
However some contrary tendencies seem to be in play, with Spain to rotate 
with non-European states and France bidding to lead a new constituency 
with a mix of other EU and non-EU European states, in which case 
Germany and the UK may do the same. Details of the redistribution of 
voting weights are not yet fully available. However 6.4% of voting weights 
will be redistributed to underrepresented member states in total, with 
China due to see its weight increase from 3.65% to 6.39%.  
There is EU coordination on the spot in Washington, but with a 
double problem of proper articulation of the EU/eurozone position, first, 
when the EU Council Presidency is not a Board member, and secondly now 
after Lisbon when the EU (in this case the Commission, or ECOFIN Council 
Presidency, or eurozone presidency) should take over this role from the 
rotating Presidency, but does not have even observer status on the Board.  
In addition the Commission, ECB and IMF have continuous 
‘horizontal’ working relations at all levels, from Managing 
Director/President/Commissioner to lower staff levels, and there is 
extensive and growing operational coordination between the IMF and the 
EU over many joint financing operations, both for aiding third countries 
(e.g. in Eastern Europe) and now over the Greek crisis and the trillion 
dollar joint EU-IMF package of measures worked out in response. These 
working relations are said to be smooth and constructive.  
Comment: The system of IMF governance is under sustained pressure for 
reform, including a revision of voting weights and seats in the Executive Board to 
cut the overrepresentation of the EU member states in favour mainly of the BRICs. 
In October 2010, the US joined in ratcheting up this pressure, forcing EU member 
states to make concessions. However the status of the EU and ECB is still 
unsatisfactory, with only partial observer status for the ECB and none for the EU 
or eurozone (finance ministry) leadership. For the longer-term the European 
Council has acknowledged the case for a single EU/eurozone seat or constituency. 
The case for a single eurozone seat is imperative if the EU is to punch its weight in 
                                                     
20 Press reports suggest that Belgium, Switzerland and Spain are reconciled to their 
concessions, whereas the Netherlands is withholding its agreement.   
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international monetary affairs, without which the member states condemn 
themselves to continuing divisions and failure to deliver effective messages.   
6.1.4  World Bank 
The EU is not represented on the Board of the World Bank even as observer 
(but see above regarding the Development Committee), notwithstanding its 
major role in development aid and policies, with similar anomalies as in the 
IMF over constituencies and voting weights, although the World Bank has 
been able to implement some revision of voting weights in 2010. Although 
the Board rarely votes, the issue is of high political sensitivity (for example 
when the US voted against proposed projects in Tibet, China withdrew the 
projects in question). The Development Commissioner participates as 
Observer in the World Bank Development Committee.  
The constituency system in the Executive Board suffers, as in the case 
of the IMF, with politically obsolete groupings of countries, and could be 
reformed by minimally grouping EU member states together. In addition 
the EU should itself become at least a permanent observer. The case for a 
single EU seat is less compelling than in the case of the IMF for the 
eurozone, but the double pressure to reduce member states’ representation 
and enhance that of the EU will continue to mount.   
There are on-the-spot coordination meetings of the EU member 
states’ Executive Directors in Washington (every week), with resulting EU 
positions expressed so far by the Executive Director from the rotating 
Council Presidency. It remains to be clarified who will represent the EU 
now post-Lisbon. In principle it should be the EU Delegation, but this is at 
present impossible, given the absence even of observer status.  
On the other hand there is a lot of structured operational cooperation 
between the World Bank and the Commission, with several memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs) signed to frame various regional cooperation 
programmes. Operational partnerships go way beyond these procedural 
MoUs, and concern World Bank operations in some new member states 
(Romania), the non-EU states in the Balkans and the countries of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. In all these cases the World Bank seeks 
explicitly to support EU strategies, or more generally ‘Europeanising’ 
actions. For example in the Romanian case the World Bank’s projects to 
advance Romania’s efforts to meet the EU’s strategic 2020 objectives are 
being financed out of EU Structural Funds.  
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Comment: The status quo is unsatisfactory in the Executive Board, with 
obsolete constituency groupings and without proper representation of the EU. In 
the short-run the constituency system should be revised and the EU should enter 
as a permanent observer; a single EU seat would be logical at some future point, 
depending on how political pressures from third countries develop.    
6.1.5 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), IFAD and WFP 
Initially the EEC was an observer at the FAO, until the organisation 
adopted a REIO clause to its Constitution, allowing the EEC to accede in 
1991 as full member. For this the EEC made a declaration of its exclusive 
and shared competences in the FAO domain. At each FAO meeting the EU 
or member states have to indicate who has competence and who shall 
exercise the right to vote with respect to each agenda item; this depends on 
a heavy procedure for decisions by the relevant Council working group in 
Brussels. When the EU votes on matters of its competence it has the 
number of votes of all member states together. In cases of exclusive 
competence the Commission expresses the EU position, in accordance with 
a mandate of text agreed at the relevant Council Working Party. In cases of 
shared competence, the EU position has in the past been expressed by the 
rotating Council Presidency, with both the member states and the 
Commission being allowed to speak in support of the common position. 
The FAO model is quite sophisticated and well specified, but criticisms are 
heard over its complicated procedures and the lack of discipline on the part 
of representatives of the member states in respecting these procedures.   
But the post-Lisbon situation is uncertain, with the Commission 
saying that it should now be the sole spokesperson on exclusive and shared 
competences, while member states’ diplomats are arguing that Lisbon 
changes nothing, and that the role of the rotating Council Presidency 
should remain. After long discussions a ‘transitional’ arrangement has been 
used in the second half of 2010, under which the EU is a single team sitting 
behind the EU nameplate, with the Commission speaking on exclusive 
competences and a Belgian diplomat speaking on shared competences (but 
on behalf of all 27, not the Presidency, nor Belgium). This transitional 
arrangement has been necessary in any case as a means of compensating 
for the understaffing of the EU Delegation in Rome, which should be 
corrected in 2011. This ‘team’ arrangement has nothing to do with the 
‘team’ mentioned in Article 218.3, and has no sound legal basis. 
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Also in Rome, along with the FAO, are two other UN agencies 
working on related topics: the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Unlike in the 
case of the FAO, the EU is not member but only observer in IFAD and 
WFP, despite being a major financial contributor to both. Various member 
states led by the UK (in the second half of 2010) resisted the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty for the Commission to represent the 
EU on the grounds of its limited observer status. This illustrates why these 
status questions can hardly be evaded.   
Comment: The FAO model for EU representation pre-Lisbon is a seriously 
structured solution for the case of a complex organisation where both the EU and 
the member states are full members, and where the EU has a mix of exclusive and 
shared competences. However the detailed implications of the Lisbon Treaty are not 
yet fully worked out. The situation in IFAD and WFP sees the EU with a lesser 
observer status only and currently unresolved dispute over representational 
prerogatives, despite the fact that the EU is a major funder of these organisations.  
6.1.6  International Labour Organization (ILO) 
The EU is an observer at ILO, while all member states are members. EU-
ILO cooperation dates back to an agreement of 1958, establishing the 
modalities for cooperation and mutual technical assistance. At that time, no 
specific agreement was reached on the formal status of the EEC at the 
ILO.21 Cooperation has intensified gradually, in line with the development 
of EU competences and responsibilities. In 1961, a Permanent Contact 
Committee was set up, providing for meetings between the ILO Deputy 
Director-General and the European Commissioners for External Relations 
and Social Affairs, as well as officials. In 1989, the EEC was granted 
observer status at the ILO. By an exchange of letters, the parties agreed that 
the Commission would be regularly invited to attend the meetings of the 
Governing Body.22  
Comment: The ILO adopts conventions which set rules for employment, 
social policies and migration policies, and which bear directly on EU legislation in 
this field. On this basis membership along the lines of the FAO model would be 
                                                     
21 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/agreements/eec.htm 
22 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/agreements/eec3.htm 
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appropriate, but this would require amendment of the constitution of the ILO to 
permit the participation of REIOs. 
6.1.7 UNCTAD 
The EU is an observer at UNCTAD, which meets in plenary ministerial 
session once every four years, with its Trade and Development Board 
meeting at senior official level every 6 months. UNCTAD has seven 
thematic working groups and there the EU is able to participate as a 
virtually full participant.   
Comment: In view of its major competences in both trade and development 
fields, it is anomalous that the EU is not a member alongside the member states.   
6.1.8 UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
The EU has substantial operational dealings with the UNDP, both for 
coordination of development policies and projects on the ground, and with 
the Commission in quite a number of cases contracting the UNDP to 
execute its own projects. The member states are all members, and the EU an 
observer. The Executive Board is made up of 36 states, organised in 5 
rotating regional groups, of which the group “Western Europe and other 
States” has 12 places of which 6 are currently EU member states and 
otherwise includes Australia, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the 
US. There is also an Eastern Europe group that currently includes Russia, 
Serbia and Slovakia.  
Comment: In view of its operational dealings with UNDP, the EU should be 
member alongside the member states, which would first require recognition of a 
role for REIOs in the UNDP framework. In addition the constituency system is an 
obsolete relic of the cold war period with its division between Western and Eastern 
Europe (as is also the case with the whole UN system).  
6.1.9 Development cooperation 
Development cooperation is a shared competence, but of a special type 
sometimes called ‘parallel competences’ (TFEU, 4.4), according to which 
both there may be a common policy without prejudice to the right of the 
member states to conduct their own policies. In practice both the EU and 
the member states are executing large aid programmes.  
Cotonou Agreement. The flagship instrument for the EU’s development 
policy is the Cotonou Agreement concerning the relations between the EU 
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and 78 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The agreement was 
established in 2000 and runs to 2020 with revisions every five years. It 
replaced the previous five-year agreements called the Lomé Conventions, 
first negotiated in the 1970s. The negotiation round concerning the latest 
revision was concluded in March 2010. The contracting parties are the EU 
and the member states on the one hand and the ACP countries on the other.  
The Commission has thus far represented the EU and the member 
states in these negotiations relating to revisions of the Cotonou 
Agreements. This was also the case with the preceding Lomé Conventions. 
The Commission’s role in these negotiations is however not due to an 
exclusive competence to do so, but rather has primarily been a matter of 
tradition. 
 Who will represent the EU in the coming negotiations on Cotonou 
revisions, and further ahead in its successor is not etched in stone, and it is 
possible that the HR will take on this role wearing her Commission hat.   
From a financial perspective, Cotonou is almost exclusively about 
development. However, the agreement also includes important political 
aspects, such as the possibility to enter into consultations with ACP states 
in case of deterioration in the internal political environment. Furthermore 
the legal basis for the conclusion of these agreements is not the part of the 
Treaties having to do with development but the article for entering into 
association agreements. This also reflects the more contractual approach to 
development that supplanted the earlier emphasis on economic aid. An 
important part of Cotonou is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
which are essentially free trade agreements formulated as a part of an 
overarching development strategy. 
A peculiarity in this context is the European Development Fund 
(EDF), which is the main financial instrument of the Cotonou Agreement. 
While development policy has since long been a shared competence 
between the Community and the member states, the EDF itself is not part 
of the EU budget but is set up as an intergovernmental fund whose 
management is entrusted to the Commission. The relative contributions to 
the fund by the member states are connected to their history as colonial 
powers, with in particular France being one of the biggest donors. 
Attempts, by primarily the Commission, to make the EDF a part of the EU 
budget has so far been unsuccessful due to several factors. While a member 
state like France would have to contribute less, it would also lose influence 
over how the funds are used. Member states like the UK, Italy or newer 
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Central European members would on the other hand have to increase their 
contributions considerably. A ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF would also give 
the European Parliament a greater say in these issues.  
The frontier between development and foreign and security policy. A small 
but highly sensitive case has arisen over the European Commission’s 
contribution to an action of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) to limit the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons. The Commission argued that this was a matter of development 
policy and therefore in its competence, whereas the Council argued that it 
was a matter of security policy. The Commission took the case to the 
European Court of Justice, which ruled in 2008 in its favour. From the 
perspective of the Commission the ruling was an instance of the 
jurisprudence catching up with practical reality of the development 
programmes it administrated. For the Council and several of the member 
states, this was regarded as a virtual declaration of institutional war. 
With the new competences of the HR under the Lisbon Treaty, this 
distinction may be less important, but it illustrates how there may be 
demarcation issues between the HR and the Commission over who is to 
represent the Union. A general consequence of the Court ruling seems to be 
that a pragmatic and problem-oriented approach that generally 
characterises development programme financing has had to give way to a 
strict, and one could argue, slightly artificial separation between the policy 
goals of peace and security on the one hand and development on the other. 
This essentially means that in drafting proposals in the area of CFSP, the 
Council will be extremely careful to never mention the word 
“development” in describing the aims of the proposal.  
Comment: The EU’s institutional position is strongly established in the field 
of development policy, with the Commission as sole negotiator upon mandate of 
Council. There may be demarcation issues between the HR and Commission to be 
clarified.  
6.1.10 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Current preparations for negotiation of a global convention limiting the 
discharge of mercury into the environment is providing a test case for how 
the EU should be represented externally in areas of shared competences. In 
June 2010 there was the start of UNEP negotiations in Stockholm on a 
globally binding instrument on mercury for the years 2010-13. Within the 
EU the competence for environmental matters is shared between the Union 
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and the member states. Decisions over the mercury case could be a 
precedent for other instances of shared competence. The contracting parties 
in the mercury case will no doubt be both the EU and the memer states. 
However it was not clear who would negotiate.  
The Commission interpreted the Lisbon Treaty as requiring that it 
should be the sole EU negotiator on all issues in the UNEP negotiations 
over mercury. The Council contested this, and after lengthy discussions 
agreed to a compromise, namely to give the Commission the lead on all 
issues except for two (‘financing’ and ‘capacity building’), where the 
rotating Council Presidency would lead. However this Council 
compromise was then rejected by the Commission, claiming that the 
Council acted illegally, basing its case on Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which reads: “With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and 
other cases provided for in the Treaties, it [the Commission] shall ensure the 
Union's external representation.”The Commission subsequently withdrew its 
proposal for the mandate for the negotiations. The Council for its part 
challenged the Commission’s actions, saying that the Commission does not 
have a right to withdraw its mandate proposal once the Council took a 
decision. As a result there emerged the prospect of the case being taken to 
the European Court of Justice to decide the matter; either the Commission 
would take the Council to Court, or vice versa. In the meantime at the first 
session of the conference in Stockholm, the Commission had to declare that 
there was no EU position: a classic instance of inter-institutional wrangling 
spilling over into the international arena. 
Fortunately this impasse did not last and on 6 December 2010, the 
Council was able to take a decision in agreement with the Commission as 
follows:23 
(1) The Commission is hereby authorised to participate, on behalf of the 
Union, as regards matters falling within the Union's competence and in 
respect of which the Union has adopted rules, in the negotiations on a legally 
binding instrument on mercury, further to Decision 25/5 of the Governing 
Council of UNEP. 
                                                     
23 Council of the EU, Decision on the participation of the Union in negotiations on a 
legally binding instrument on mercury further to Decision 25/5 of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 16632/10, 6 
December 2010. 
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(2) The Commission shall conduct these negotiations on behalf of the Union, 
as regards matters falling within the Union's competence and in respect of 
which the Union has adopted rules, in consultation with a special committee 
of representatives of member states, and in accordance with the negotiating 
directives set out in the Addendum to this Decision. 
(3) To the extent that the subject matter of the agreement falls within the 
shared competence of the Union and of its member states, the Commission 
and the member states should cooperate closely during the negotiating 
process, with a view to aiming for unity in the international representation 
of the Union and its member states. 
This is useful specimen text, since it deals with the general issue of 
shared competences where in the given policy domain some elements per 
(1) are strictly of Union competence, and some other elements per (3) are a 
mix of Union and member states’ competences. In the former case the 
Commission is sole negotiator. In the latter case it remains to be seen who 
shall represent the member states, alongside the Commission or HR 
representing the Union. The member states are here entitled to choose who 
should represent them; it could be the Commission, or the Council 
Presidency, or one or more individual member states, but with a view to 
unity. In (2) the member states will support, steer and supervise the 
Commission through a special committee which is to be presided, as with 
all non-CFSP Council working groups, by the rotating Council Presidency. 
Comment: The current UNEP mercury negotiations have been a test case for 
clarifying how the EU should be represented in complex shared competences cases. 
After a phase of inter-institutional conflict between Council and Commission, there 
has emerged an outcome that looks workable and at least has the merit of removing 
such internal EU wrangling from the international stage.    
6.1.11 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) & 
Kyoto Protocol 
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are matters of shared 
competence, where both the EU and the member states are contracting 
parties. At the Copenhagen climate change summit of the UNFCCC in 
December 2009, the complexity of the representation of the EU and its 
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member states was widely criticised.24 In Copenhagen the EU was 
represented by the Troika (the rotating Council Presidency, accompanied 
by next rotating Presidency and the Commission with assistance by the 
Secretariat of the Council), with the rotating Presidency in the lead. In the 
Kyoto Protocol track negotiations, the lead negotiator was the Commission, 
while in the second track (‘Long-term Cooperative Actions’ - LCA), there 
was a team of negotiators under the leadership of the rotating Presidency.25 
With a view to the then forthcoming Cancún summit in December 
2010, the Council under the Spanish Presidency established a new team of 
negotiators for the LCA track consisting of UK (lead), Poland, France and 
Germany. In October 2010 more precise preparations for Cancùn at the 
level of COREPER (part 1) led the Belgian rotating Council Presidency, 
after substantial debates, to define the following arrangements:26 
• “the representatives of the Commission and of the Presidency, 
speaking on behalf of the EU and its 27 member states, would take 
the floor from behind the ‘EU’ nameplate”,  
• “internal coordination would be ensured by the Presidency” and 
• “the current practice in international conferences on climate change 
with a team of lead negotiators and supported by issue leaders and 
experts charged with the negotiation for the EU and its member states 
will continue to be the practice throughout the negotiations”. 
The notable innovation in these arrangements is for the hybrid EU 
representation to be put together behind the EU nameplate, rather than 
having the rotating Council Presidency speak from his/her national seat.  
                                                     
24 Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, Single Voice, single chair? How to re-organise the EU in 
international organisations under the Lisbon rule, CEPS Policy Brief No 207, CEPS, 
Brussels, March 2010.  
25 T. Delreux and K. Van den Brande, Taking the lead: informal division of labour in the 
EU’s external environmental policy-making, IIEB Working Paper No. 42, April 2010, 
University of Leuven (http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/wp/ 
IIEBWP042.pdf). 
26 Presidency non-paper of 20 October 2010, “Practical arrangements for external 
representation of the EU at the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
16) to the UNFCCC and the 6th session of the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP 6), Cancún”, 29 November to 10 December 2010. 
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Most criticised at Copenhagen was how the informal negotiations in 
restricted groups of major players developed. There were scenes of several 
member states leaders and Barroso milling around with Obama and other 
leaders, and finally the infamous ad hoc meeting between Obama and the 
group of developing countries which determined the final conference 
conclusion and communiqué without the presence of any EU 
representative. If Obama had wanted to be accompanied by just one EU 
representative at this meeting, he had a large menu of choice over who it 
should be. At Copenhagen the EU was not lacking in a position of 
substance, and actually was rather well prepared at the technical level, but 
its representation at the top political level was a confusing array of 
personalities. For Cancún the Mexican chair arranged for it to be at 
ministerial, not summit level, and the outcome was widely considered to be 
more positive than Copenhagen.  
Comment: While it is clear that both the EU and the member states will be 
contracting parties to any next UNFCCC agreements, the status quo remains 
complicated on the details of who negotiates for the EU.     
6.1.12 World Health Organization (WHO) 
The WHO is the only organisation included in this survey whose subject 
matter – public health – figures in the lowest rank of EU competences, 
where according to Article 6 (TFEU) the EU engages in actions that are only 
‘supplementary’ to national policies. While this reflects national 
responsibilities for public health care systems, the EU has significant 
responsibilities in this field, including the regulation of pharmaceuticals 
and their advertising, and health and safety standards. It also becomes 
involved internationally over policies to control global health threats and 
pandemics. The EU is an observer at WHO. The EU is prominently active in 
the WHO Euro Regional Committee, which holds an annual ministerial 
meeting, such as the one in Moscow in September 2010 where the EU 
Commissioner and his officials were active participants in various 
ministerial panels and working groups. EU coordination was organised 
under the transitional post-Lisbon ‘joint team’ approach, with official EU 
positions presented by the Belgian Council Presidency.  
Comment: While the EU’s status as observer is reasonable, the arrangements 
for it to represent its views in plenary WHO meetings is not yet in line with the 
Lisbon Treaty provisions. 
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6.1.13 World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Customs 
Organization (WCO) 
WTO. Due to its long established exclusive competences in the trade field, 
the WTO case is the most developed model of EU representation. The EU is 
a member of the WTO alongside the 27 member states. The WTO has a 
complex  governance structure, with a Ministerial Conference (not every 
year), a General Council meeting around 8 times a year in Geneva at 
ambassador/senior official level, four more specialised Councils meeting at 
senior official level, and several Committees, Working Groups and 
Working parties. The general rule is that only the EU speaks and 
negotiates, while the member states are or can also be present. Positions 
taken by the EU are prepared at meetings with the member states (in the 
‘Trade Policy Committee’) chaired by the rotating Council Presidency. As 
an exception to the general rule, member states ministers may speak briefly 
at the Ministerial Conferences.  
The EU Head of Delegation and staff in Geneva are key players in all 
the WTO fora. There will now be in fact two Delegations in Geneva, one for 
WTO and the other for UN affairs. This split will allow greater autonomy 
for the Commission trade policy circuit led by the responsible 
Commissioner from the foreign policy circuit presided by the HR.  
The WTO has in its founding act a ‘one country, one vote’ rule, but 
votes are never taken. The member states make the budgetary 
contributions, not the EU, so they do speak in the Budget Committee. 
Given the unwieldy 153 members, there is recurrent use of informal 
restricted groups, including the UN model of ‘Friends of the Chair’, in 
which the chairperson of the various committees invites around 5 to 8 main 
players, and the Commission will always be in these groups, while the 
member states will not be. Similarly the Director General convenes so-
called ‘Green Room’ meetings (named after his office décor) of main 
players in the course of negotiations processes, generally including the 
Commission without the member states.  
There used to be a super-restricted ‘Quad’ group consisting of the 
EU, US, Canada and Japan, at which the four ‘ministers’ (including only the 
Trade Commissioner for the EU) would meet about twice a year to try and 
steer global trade policy, but this has now stopped meeting because of its 
lack of representation of emerging powers. However no new steering 
group has emerged, given that the G7/8/20 do not get into trade policy 
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matters beyond vague declarations about continuing to pursue the Doha 
Round. 
While the EU’s arrangements at WTO are now well tried, they are 
nonetheless expensive in the extent to which the member states sit silently 
behind the Commission negotiators in the General Council, most of the 
main Committees and formal negotiating sessions. The Commission’s 
mandates are generally decided in Brussels at the Council, and for many 
meetings in Geneva it would seem possible to dispense with the high costs 
of the proceedings being observed by all or most member states, when one 
EU note-taker might suffice.   
Comment: Overall the EU’s presence in the WTO system seems to be stable 
and to be functioning reasonably smoothly, although the lack of an effective global 
steering group seems now to be a weakness in the system. The member states incur 
high and arguably excessive costs in being silent observers of the Commission at 
many WTO meetings.       
WCO. In June 2007, the WCO agreed to the request of the European 
Community to accede as full member. The decision grants to the EU rights 
and obligations on an interim basis akin to those enjoyed by WCO 
members. Full accession will be possible once an amendment to the 
relevant Convention allowing economic and customs unions to join is 
ratified by the 172 current members. The WCO works on issues such as 
harmonised trade nomenclature, customs valuation, rules of origin, 
harmonisation of customs procedures, etc. The EU was already a 
contracting party to several WCO Conventions. 
Comment: Full membership is pending. 
6.1.14 International Maritime Organization (IMO) and related 
agreements 
The EU’s presence in maritime organisations has become increasingly 
topical since 2006 when the Commission published a Green Paper seeking 
to develop an integrated maritime policy for the Union.27 The issue of the 
EU’s representation in the several international maritime organisations and 
conventions was the subject of a detailed study undertaken for the 
                                                     
27 European Commission, Green Paper - Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the 
Union: A European Vision of the Oceans and Seas, COM(20006) 275, 7 June 2006.  
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Commission at Leuven University.28 In the three examples that follow it 
will be noted that one sees the EC/EU represented correctly for its 
exclusive competence (ICCAT), whereas the other two instances are subject 
to anomalous treatment (IMO, IWC). In total there are 36 conventions and 
agencies concerned with maritime affairs, including fisheries and 
environmental matters (see Annex C). Of these the EU is party alone 
without the member states in 7 cases, while 19 see the presence of both the 
EU and member states, with 10 cases where the EU is only observer 
(including the IMO and IWC, detailed below).     
International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO is a 
specialised agency of the UN, with 168 members, entrusted with maritime 
standard-setting functions (conventions, codes, etc.). It can take binding 
decisions and is depositary for many international agreements on subjects 
such as maritime pollution, collisions at sea, liability for maritime claims, 
etc. In IMO matters the EU generally has shared competence with the 
member states, and the EU has generated a large amount of legislation 
directly based on IMO conventions and resolutions.  
However the EU has not been represented as such at the IMO and has 
not acceded to any of its Conventions. Since 1974 the Commission has had 
observer status. From the formal standpoint this is because the IMO 
Convention does not have a Regional Economic Integration Organisation 
(REIO) clause as in the case for example of the WTO, which would permit 
the EC/EU’s accession as member. Since this situation was deemed 
unsatisfactory the Commission addressed a recommendation to the 
Council to permit it to negotiate with the IMO adoption of a REIO clause in 
order to permit the EU’s full accession. However the Council has not acted 
on this, maybe because of blocking positions by member states with large 
maritime interests (voting weights in the IMO are by tonnage of national 
fleets). For the time being, EU positions are expressed by the rotating 
Council Presidency in the name of the member states and the Commission.  
International Whaling Commission (IWC). Here the EU has 
exclusive competence in general for conservation of biological resources 
under the sea, as explicitly confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. The IWC 
                                                     
28 Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Study for the Assessment of the EU’s 
Role in International Maritime Organizations, Final Report (J. Wouters, S. de Jong, A. 
Marx, P. de Man), April 2009. 
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Convention reserves membership for States, and so as in the case of the 
IMO the Commission is an observer. Again a Commission proposal for full 
accession to the IWC Convention, addressed to the Council in 1992, has not 
been agreed. In practice therefore the EU position has been expressed by 
the rotating Presidency, which is even more anomalous than the IMO case 
since this is an exclusive competence.   
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT). The conservation of tuna enters into an exclusive competence of 
the EC. The ICCAT Convention of 1966 was originally open only for States, 
but in 1984 a Protocol opened it to REIOs, and the EC’s accession was 
approved in 1986, and finally entered into force in 1997. The member states 
withdrew their membership as a result. The Commission speaks and votes 
on behalf of the EC, in accordance with positions agreed in the Council 
Working Group on External Fisheries Policy. EC delegations to ICCAT 
meetings are led by the Commission, accompanied by experts from the 
member states.  
Comment: These three examples reveal two cases (IMO and IWC) where the 
EU should be member but is only observer, which are anomalies given the 
importance of EU competences in these areas (even exclusive in the case of the 
IWC). On the other hand in the case of the ICCAT where the EU also has exclusive 
competence, the member states withdrew their membership after the EU became 
full member.  
6.1.15 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and financial market 
regulation 
The BIS is the club of leading central banks, which has rapidly extended its 
membership in recent years from a restricted trans-Atlantic to a global 
membership. It has 56 member central banks, including most EU member 
states and the European Central Bank. It has an executive board of 19 
members, of whom 6 are permanent members (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the UK and the US), with other elected members including the ECB, 
China, India and Brazil. The BIS has a leading role in formulating standards 
for banking regulations, such as the successive Basel I and II capital 
requirements standards. On 12 September 2010, a new Basel III was agreed, 
tripling the reserve capital requirements of banks in response to the recent 
financial crisis, after negotiations which were chaired by the President of 
the European Central Bank. The BIS’s role has been especially important for 
the EU, which legislates the mandatory implementation of the Basel 
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standards as the core of its financial sector regulatory policies. This was 
illustrated when the Commission announced on 13 September 2010 that it 
will propose in early 2011 legislation for the EU to implement Basel III. 
The BIS is also host to the new Financial Stability Board (FSB), which 
has been set up by G20 to oversee the adequacy of the regulation of 
financial markets world-wide after the 2008-09 crisis. The Commission as 
well as the ECB play full part in its work.  
The EU for its part has moved promptly in setting up a much 
enhanced common regulatory system, namely the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS), comprising a) the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), b) the European Banking Authority (EBA), c) the European 
Supervisory Authority (Securities and Markets), d) the European 
Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational pensions) and e) the 
Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities. The new 
structure was adopted in EU law on 22 September 2010.29 The system is 
authorised (in Article 18 of the regulation governing the EBA, reproduced 
in Box 5) to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements 
with the analogous supervisory authorities of third countries.  
Box 5. European Banking Authority - International relations, Article 18 
1. Without prejudice to the competences of the Union Institutions and member 
states, the Authority may develop contacts and enter into administrative 
arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the 
administrations of third countries. These arrangements shall not create legal 
obligations in respect of the Union and its member states, nor shall they prevent 
member states and their competent authorities from concluding bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements with third countries. 
2. The Authority shall assist in preparing equivalence decisions pertaining to 
supervisory regimes in third countries in accordance with the acts referred to in 
Article 1(2). 
3. In the report referred to in Article 28(4), the Authority shall set out the 
administrative arrangements agreed upon with international organisations or 
administrations in third countries and the assistance provided in preparing 
equivalence decisions. 
                                                     
29 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
establishing a European Banking Authority, 6 September 2010, Interinstitutional 
File: 2009/0142(COD)13070/1/10 REV 1. 
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These bodies are effectively EU agencies. They are mandated to 
represent the EU in external matters within their competence, for example 
liaising with US regulatory authorities. They do not have powers to take 
legally binding decisions, but they are entrusted to prepare decisions that 
will normally be taken by the Commission, for example in recognising the 
equivalence of the regulatory rules or decisions of third countries.   
Comment: More so than at the IMF, both the ECB and the member states are 
full participants at the BIS. Basel I, II and III standards have successively become 
the basis for EU legislation drawn up by the Commission and decided with the 
Council and Parliament in normal legislative procedure. New arrangements for 
financial market regulation at European and international levels are satisfactory 
from an EU institutional standpoint. The new set of EU regulatory bodies have 
been mandated immediately from the start to engage directly in cooperation with 
the authorities of third countries.  
6.1.16 Other economic organisations and regulatory agencies 
Here we signal a number of instances where EU representation is not in 
line with its competences. 
In the transport sector the civil aviation sector lags behind realities, as 
was shown to also be the case for the maritime sector.  
At the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 
Commission has to ask for observer status for each and every meeting, 
despite the major significance of EU law in civil aviation market matters, 
and in international negotiations such as with the US over an open skies 
agreement.   
At the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) the place of the 
EU has evolved positively alongside its growing competence in this area, 
and it is now regular observer and full participant in three expert 
committees, but EU positions there are still being presented by the rotating 
Presidency notwithstanding Article 17 (TEU) which would give this to the 
Commission.  
At the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) the EU has 
observer status, but as for WIPO, would be entitled to negotiate for the EU 
on at least part of its agenda. Similarly the Commission is observer at the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU). 
By contrast in the Internet Governance Forum, which is a multi-
stakeholder platform for non-binding deliberations on internet issues, the 
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Commission has an effective role. This is typical of the situation in new 
organisations where the role of EU (or Commission) can be more readily 
brought into line with functional realities than in older organisations where 
inertia and rigidity of statutes hinder this.  
Comment: Old organisations come to terms with growing EU competences 
only very slowly, and here the internal EU rules for who speaks for the EU in cases 
of shared competences as between the Commission and rotating Council Presidency 
(for non-CFSP matters) remain confused in practice.    
6.1.17 International courts 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was founded upon the inception of 
the UN, and all 192 UN member states are ipso facto parties to the Statute of 
the ICJ. It deliberates over disputes between states which have recognised 
its jurisdiction, and gives advisory opinions on legal questions upon 
request of the UNGA, UNSC or other authorised UN organs and 
specialised agencies. Its most recent action of relevance to the EU was the 
advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence handed down 
in July 2010. As principal organ of the UN, the ICJ has no governing 
assembly of its own. Until now the EU has been represented by the rotating 
Council Presidency. This does not preclude other member states making 
submissions of their own. However it should not be difficult in the future 
for the EU to represent itself directly since the Court or its President may 
invite “international organisations … likely to be able to supply 
information on the question” to make submissions (Article 66 of the ICJ 
Statute). However in contested cases the EU cannot itself act either as 
applicant or respondent, but only via some member states.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is far more recent, established 
pursuant to the Rome Statute of 1998, coming into force in 2002 after 
receiving sufficient ratifications. At present it has 114 state parties with 
another 25 that have signed but not ratified. The ICC is mandated to deal 
with cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In spite of 
the very large number of states having acceded (in Europe, Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa), China and India are not parties. Russia and the 
US, while having signed, have not ratified. The US signed under Clinton, 
but the first Bush administration then took a hostile position, with 
emphasis on the maintenance of immunity for its armed forces fighting 
abroad. The US started to cooperate with the ICC during the second half of 
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the 2000s, and has been playing a constructive role under Obama, but is 
highly unlikely to ratify in the near future.   
While all member states are parties to the Rome Statute, the EU has 
observer status at the ICC’s Assembly of the State Parties and the Review 
Conference, with no right to vote. The EU can make statements or 
declarations and was represented so far by the rotating Council Presidency 
(now presumably to be the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental 
Freedoms and Citizenship). The EU is committed to the ICC and to 
promoting the widespread ratification of the Rome Statute, adopting 
Common Positions on the ICC in 2001-03 and an Action Plan in 2004.30 
Further, the EU and ICC signed a Cooperation and Assistance Agreement 
in May 2006. In addition, the EU supports the ICC with public statements 
and declarations, also at the UN. The EU has also funded projects aimed at 
supporting the ICC’s work. The EU has adopted several Decisions to 
strengthen member state cooperation in the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes falling within the scope of the Rome Statute.31 Cooperation with 
the ICC in fighting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is a 
priority set out in the Stockholm Programme, the EU’s blueprint on JHA for 
2009-14.32 
 Comment: In view of the increasing importance of the EU’s cooperation 
with the ICC, its observer status could be enhanced, either in formal terms or at 
least throught a more active participation in the conferences of the Assembly of 
Parties. 
                                                     
30 Action Plan to follow up on the Common Position on the International Criminal 
Court (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf). 
31 Decision 2002/494/JHA, of 13 June 2002 (OJ L 167/1, 26.6.2002), setting up a 
European network of contact points in respect to persons responsible for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes; Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, of 
13 June 2002 (OJ L 190/1, 18.7.2002), on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between member states; and Decision 2003/335/JHA, of 8 
May 2003 (OJ L 118/12, 14.5.2003), concerning the investigation and prosecution of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
32 Council of the European Union, ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 5731/10, Brussels, 3 March 2010. 
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6.1.18 UNHCR (refugees), Human Rights Council, IOM (migration) 
The EU has substantial legal competences and operational relations vis-à-
vis the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC) as well as the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM). The EU has observer status at all three. The EU plays an 
active role in the proceedings of the UNGA Third Committee (Social, 
Humanitarian and Cultural) and the HRC, introducing proposals for 
resolutions and giving statements aiming to protect and promote human 
rights.33 
Refugees. The EU has observer status also at the UNHCR Executive 
Committee (ExCom), which has 79 members, of which 21 are EU member 
states. The ExCom is tasked with advising the High Commissioner, 
reviewing funds and programmes, authorising the High Commissioner to 
make appeals for funds, and approving proposed biennial budget targets. 
The subject matter of the ExCom’s work is either asylum policy, which 
since the Amsterdam Treaty has become a 1st pillar competence, or 
humanitarian aid, both of which are shared competences between the EU 
and the member states.  
The primary legal texts are the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, which define what the term ‘refugee’ means and outlines a 
refugee’s rights. A key provision, which has become part of customary 
international law, stipulates that refugees should not be returned to a 
country where they fear persecution (principle of non-refoulement). In 1999, 
the EU launched a process towards the creation of a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), based on the legislative harmonisation in the area 
of asylum and refugee protection. The completion of the CEAS remains a 
key policy objective for the EU under the Stockholm Programme,34 which 
foresees the EU’s accession to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
subject to a report from the Commission on the legal and practical 
consequences of its accession, expected in 2013.35 In the meantime the 
                                                     
33 See European Communities (2004), The Enlarging European Union at the United 
Nations – Making Multilateralism Matter, Brussels. 
34 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme - An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 5731/10, Brussels, 3 March 2010 
35 European Commission, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, 
COM (2010) 171 final, Brussels, 24.4.2010. 
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substantive protection of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol is 
guaranteed by the European Court of Justice for matters of asylum and 
immigration within the scope of EU law. 
While the EU has observer rights at the ExCom, the EU’s ability to 
exercise its competences in full is limited, since observers are for example 
unable to make proposals or participate in the negotiation of its conclusions 
on key policy questions. This inconsistency should be corrected in the 
short- to medium-run by the granting of full participant status.  
 Human rights. The UN has recently sought to reinforce its work in the 
human rights area, creating in 2006 the UN Human Rights Council, as 
successor to the Commission on Human Rights. The Council conducts a 
periodic universal review of the human rights record of all UN member 
states. The Council has 47 members, with the following geographical 
distribution: Africa 13, Asia 13, Eastern Europe 6, Latin America and 
Caribbean 8, and Western Europe and ‘other’ 7. Of two European 
groupings, 7 are currently from the EU member states. The Council is 
criticised for a debilitating politicisation of its actions. The EU has not been 
able to exercise leadership there, although the member states have in most 
cases been ‘speaking with one voice’ on the Council. As a minority group 
on the Council the EU has been caught between being isolated or opting for 
consensus-building with other states. The latter choice, which has been 
increasingly the EU’s preference, has meant a watering down of the content 
of EU-sponsored resolutions. 
Migration. The subject matter is a shared competence. The EU’s 
observer status at the IOM is very limited, and applies only to annual 
Council meetings, with no right to attend the Standing Committee on 
Programme and Finance. The issue of EU membership was sounded out 
informally in 2009, and not pursued in response to uncertainty whether 
there would be sufficient support to make the necessary change in the 
statutes.   
  
6.1.19 Arms control – conventions and organisations 
In 2003 the EU adopted a Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, which is the framework for a large number of actions 
concerning principally: 
• the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), 
• the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
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• the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
• the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). 
The EU is not a contracting party to these conventions, or member of 
the organisations, but has become a significant operational partner through 
the adoption of numerous common positions, joint actions and decisions 
under the CFSP. The most recent progress report on the WMD Strategy lists 
the 10 Common Positions, 20 Joint Actions (with budget support mostly in 
the range of €1 to €7 million each), and 14 Council Decisions or 
Regulations, and 21 Projects decisions and projects costing in total about 
€330 million. 
The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention is not supported by an 
international organisation to oversee and enforce treaty compliance. The 
States Parties therefore meet ad hoc, but with regularity, and in particular 
the periodic quinquennial ‘Review Conference’. There are also annual 
meetings at expert and political levels known as the inter-sessional process.  
At the 2006 Review Conference, EU officials were an integral part of 
the rotating Council Presidency delegation (Finland). The Common 
Position was presented by Finland on behalf of the EU. In addition, EU 
member states had prepared technical working papers, which were 
presented by the member state on behalf of the EU, and had a powerful 
impact. It became the practice for the Presidency to make a statement on 
behalf of the EU, with EU officials (Council and Commission) sitting with 
the Presidency delegation.  
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been one 
meeting of experts in August 2010 as part of the current inter-sessional 
programme. Belgium, as the current rotating Council Presidency, has 
adopted the principle of the Presidency Team, with emphasis on EU 
officials rather than on the Presidency. Thus, the EU representative in 
Geneva read an EU statement from the Belgian seat, while the summaries 
of the working papers were presented by an EU official from the benches 
reserved for observers. Belgium made no country statement on behalf of the 
EU. With respect to the forthcoming 2011 Review Conference, Belgium has 
placed the centre of gravity for the preparations with the Directorate ‘Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Issues’ within the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the future External Action Service. 
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
comprises all the State Parties to the CWC. It consists of three bodies: the 
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Conference of States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC) and the 
Technical Secretariat headquartered in The Hague. The Conference of the 
States Parties (CSP) is the highest decision-making body of the OPCW. The 
Executive Council (EC) is composed of 41 states parties, which rotate on a 
two-yearly basis, with membership distributed over geographical regions, 
with representation assured for a number of states with the most important 
national chemical industries. 
Presently, the EU has no representative to the OPCW, without even 
observer status. So far EU statements have been presented by the rotating 
Council Presidency (who however may not always be seated on the 
Executive Committee), with EU officials joining the Presidency delegation 
in order to participate in the meetings. How it will work post-Lisbon is not 
yet clear.  
Comment: The status quo arrangements for the EU’s presence in the WMD 
organisations or processes have lagged behind its increasing substantial activity in 
this field. Worse still, the post-Lisbon rules for the HR to replace the rotating 
Council Presidency will be frustrated unless the EU is granted at least an 
‘enhanced observer’ status in these organisations or processes.    
6.2 European and Euro-Atlantic multilateral organisations 
6.2.1 OECD and IEA 
The status of the EU in the OECD and its many committees and working 
parties is officially ‘observer’, but an agreement provides for the EU to be 
as if a member for most practical purposes alongside the member states. In 
the Trade and Agriculture Committee only the Commission speaks, but in 
all other committees the EU and the member states may intervene. The EU 
does not contribute to the budget. The case for full membership can be 
based on the substantial EU exclusive or shared competences in almost all 
of the OECD’s committees, and could be reinforced by recourse to the REIO 
principle as in the UN system.  
 While the EU’s status at the OECD is hardly an issue, there is still the 
separate question – as in many organisations – how the EU organises its 
coordination and representation. The work of the Belgian Presidency of the 
second half of 2010 to clarify the post-Lisbon regime is instructive here. In 
this as in other cases Belgium sought to manage the transition to the post-
Lisbon regime with a view to helping the HR and EU Delegations perform 
their new functions in spite of the fact that the EEAS had not yet been fully 
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established. In particular Belgium sought to confirm the withdrawal of the 
rotating Presidency from representing the EU, rather than fight a rearguard 
action to re-invent its role, which some other member states seem to favour. 
The details of the arrangements are given in Box 6. 
Box 6. EU Coordination and representation in the OECD, in implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty 
Coordination. The EU Delegation will organise and chair, with the support 
of the Belgian Permanent Delegation where appropriate, coordination 
meetings at the level of Ambassadors, deputies, committee level, or by issue. 
Meetings will be convened at the initiative of the EU Delegation or at the 
request of a member state or the Commission. These coordination meetings 
will aim at exchanging information and identifying common positions 
where possible and/or required. The Belgian Permanent Representation will 
assist the EU Delegation as far as needed in the preparation of EU positions. 
The monthly Ambassador’s luncheons will continue to be hosted by the EU 
Delegation and the member states on a rotation basis as agreed locally. 
Brief summary records will be made by the EU Delegation, with the support 
of the Belgian Permanent Delegation, for coordination meetings at 
Ambassadors and Deputies’ level. Similar summary records may be made 
for coordination meetings at committee and working party level, especially 
when the outcome is to be submitted to the Ambassadors.  
Representation. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Statements and Declarations by the European Union are no longer issued by 
the rotating Presidency, but under the authority of the High Representative. 
As a matter of principle the EU Delegation will speak for the EU on areas of 
exclusive and shared competences, when a common position has been 
reached. In case the Belgian Presidency is asked to speak on behalf of the 
European Union, it will do so on behalf of the High Representative.  
The EU Delegation will also speak on behalf of the member states on issues 
of national competence when requested to do so by the member states and 
upon a clear and agreed mandate given to the EU Delegation by the member 
states.  
Coordination is required, especially when international agreed instruments 
and recommendations are elaborated. 
Source: Extracts from Working arrangements between the EU Delegation and the 
Belgian Permanent Representation to the OECD, working document of 1 September 
2010. 
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At the IEA, which is co-located with the OECD, the Commission is 
again formally an observer, but with de facto full rights to participate as if a 
member.  
Comment: Upgrading the EU’s participation from observer to member 
(without a vote) would not make a significant difference in functional terms, but 
could be justified as part of a coherent policy to modernise the EU’s presence in 
international organisations. Post-Lisbon arrangements for how the EU coordinates 
and represents its positions have been worked out in some detail. 
6.2.2  Council of Europe, European Convention (and Court) for 
Human Rights 
The EU is observer at the Council of Europe (CoE), while all member states 
are members. The Commission does not contribute to the CoE budget 
directly, but is the largest contributor to joint operating programmes with 
the CoE. Under a MoU of May 2007 the EU and CoE agreed to enhanced 
cooperation and reinforced political dialogue, which is led by regular 
twice-yearly so-called Quadripartite meetings, with the EU represented by 
(so far) the rotating Council Presidency and the Commission, and the CoE 
by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General.  
An upgrade of the status of the EU at the CoE from observer to 
member would reflect the EU’s large responsibilities in the area of CoE 
competences, and the extensive operational cooperation that has developed 
in recent years. However there is a new and specific trigger point 
prompting reconsideration of the EU’s status there. This is because the 
Lisbon Treaty has decided that the EU shall accede to the European 
Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and 
therefore also become direct stakeholder in the work of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). This will mean that complaints against the EU 
within the ECtHR can be brought on the same conditions as those applying 
to complaints brought against member states, and the EU institutions will 
be liable to appear as respondents in the case of complaints lodged against 
them. In June 2010, the Commission received the mandate to negotiate an 
Accession Agreement with the CoE on behalf of the EU Justice Ministers.36 
                                                     
36 Council of the European Union, Council Decision authorising the Commission to 
negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European 
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Negotiations started in July 2010 and are ongoing, and involve many 
intricate legal issues over the interface between the jurisdictions of the EU 
and ECtHR, as well as the prospect of EU financial contributions to the 
costs of the Court. The European Court of Justice (i.e. the EU Court in 
Luxembourg) will have a continuous agenda of cases that raise issues of the 
respective competences of the two courts. Both the Committee of Ministers 
of the CoE and its Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) have responsibilities 
for the governance of the Convention and the Court, and all CoE member 
states are represented as members of these bodies.  
It is possible that the forthcoming accession to the ECHR will be 
followed by consideration of other elements that would further deepen EU-
CoE relations, for example accession of the EU to other CoE Conventions 
and expanded joint programmes. If the EU acceded as full member to the 
Committee of Ministers there would have to be a procedure for 
determining agenda items for which the member states were competent 
and therefore vote, and those involving EU competence on which it would 
vote (see the procedures at the FAO as an example).   
Comment: With the EU acceding to the ECHR, on top of the already 
substantial EU contributions to joint programmes with the CoE, there is a case for 
reform of the EU’s presence in the CoE. Logically this could go as far as the EU 
acceding to the Committee of Ministers with the HR alongside foreign ministers 
there, for Members of the European Parliament to accede to the PACE, and for the 
EU European Council to nominate a judge to the ECHR.   
6.2.3 OSCE 
So far the EU has been represented by the Commission as observer, with 
the rotating Council Presidency taking the lead as spokesperson and 
coordinator of member state positions in Vienna. Apparently the EU Head 
of delegation has in the first half of 2010 sat next to the rotating Presidency 
at the table of ambassadors’ meetings, but this is a transitional anomaly 
that will presumably end with that of the rotating Presidency’s role.  
At the Astana OSCE summit in December 2010, the protocol 
arrangements for the EU delegation to intervene (at the level of Van 
Rompuy) were pragmatic, notably by comparison with the unresolved 
                                                                                                                                       
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), 10569/10, Brussels, 2 June 2010. 
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problem at the UNGA. It was decided that the general order of intervention 
will be determined by the drawing of lots, and that the EU delegation “may 
take the floor immediately before or after the participating State holding the EU 
Presidency without setting a precedent and without altering the existing Rules of 
Procedure of the OSCE”.37  
OSCE ministers meet frequently in informal sessions called the ‘Corfu 
Process’, which was started to debate the Medvedev proposal for a 
European Security Treaty. The HR participates there freely given the 
informality. 
There is no formal core group at the OSCE. It has been suggested that 
the OSCE might create one in the style of the UNSC, with permanent places 
for major states and the EU. Such a reform seems desirable because of the 
unwieldy plenary meetings of 56 member states and need for a compact 
group capable of making decisions in emergencies (e.g. for cases like that of 
Kyrgyzstan in spring-summer 2010. An executive committee or steering 
group might consist of the EU, Russia and the US as permanent members, 
accompanied by the Troika of three rotating presidencies (past, current, 
next) which would also assure representation of smaller member states 
especially from non-EU countries. However it is extremely difficult to 
achieve consensus for formal reforms of this kind. The result is that other 
less institutionalised arrangements may develop. For example there is the 
Merkel-Medvedev proposal for a new EU-Russia bilateral security 
dialogue, involving the HR and Russian foreign ministers, which is 
currently under discussion. A variant on this could see a trialogue with the 
US joining in, which would be an interesting way to broaden the Russia-US 
‘reset’. Such developments would come close to a de facto OSCE steering 
group.  
Comment: While the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty in the foreign and 
security policy field make it now timely for the EU to be fully represented as 
member of the OSCE alongside the member states, there are more profound reforms 
needed for the OSCE to become more effective, includingthe  creation of a restricted 
steering group or executive committee in which the EU could have a seat, failing 
which less formal formats may emerge bypassing the OSCE. 
                                                     
37 OSCE, Decision No. 951, Agenda, Organizational Framework, Timetable and 
other Modalities of the OSCE Summit at Astana on 1 and 2 December 2010.  
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6.2.4 European Economic Area (EEA)  
According to the EEA Agreement, the EU should be represented in the EEA 
Council by the EU Council and the Commission. In practice, pre-Lisbon, 
the EU has been represented by a ‘troika’ of four: the current rotating 
Council Presidency, the Council Secretariat, the Commission (DG Relex) 
and the next rotating Presidency. While the EEA Council meetings are 
supposed to take place at ministerial level, it is rare for more than one 
principal (typically the Foreign Minister or Economics Minister of the 
rotating Presidency) to be present, with the others represented by state 
secretaries, deputy director-generals, etc.  Ministerial-level participation is 
however quite common during the informal political dialogue, which takes 
place just before the formal meetings of the EEA Council. 
At the November 2010 meeting of the EEA Council, the EU 
representation was led by the rotating Belgian Presidency, accompanied by 
the Commission. This was in line with the fact that the rotating Presidency  
continues to chair the EFTA Working Group of the Council, which means 
the EEA is being assimilated to the internal market affairs of the EU, rather 
than its external relations. Pre-Lisbon a high official of DG Relex was the 
lead EU representative, rather than the DGs responsible for internal market 
or trade.   
Comment: Post-Lisbon the EU’s representation in the EEA Council has 
continued to be led by the rotating Council Presidency, implicitly interpreting 
EEA affairs as internal rather than external business.  
6.2.5 EBRD 
This is so far a unique case where the EU is a double shareholder 
(Commission and European Investment Bank) on a par with the member 
states of the EU and other non-EU states. The Commission and the EIB 
have Executive Directors, while the smaller member states are organised in 
constituencies. The EU as a whole has a 64% majority on the board. 
Steering groups and committees are formed for specialised topics, where 
the EU will generally be strongly represented. The EU and the member 
states meet together as a caucus within the EBRD to coordinate and work 
out common positions.  
Comment: The status quo is satisfactory, largely reflecting the fact that the 
institution is relatively new and so has not inherited older and now politically 
obsolete structures.  
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6.2.6 Energy Charter Treaty 
This treaty, signed in 1994, was intended to bind the whole of the former 
Soviet Union, and especially Russia, into a legally binding regulatory space 
for the energy sector. The contracting parties included the EU itself and the 
whole of Europe plus Mongolia, with the US, Canada, and many oil-
producing countries as observers. However its attempt to agree a legally 
binding ‘transit protocol’ failed to win the acceptance of Russia, and in 2009 
Russia announced its withdrawal from the treaty as a whole. Institutionally 
the EU is a full party together with all member states, with the Commission 
generally representing the EU position in restricted preparatory meetings 
and plenary sessions. 
Comment: Institutionally the status quo is satisfactory, again because of its 
recent origins, but the organisation fails to meet its major objectives, given 
Russia’s withdrawal.  
6.2.7  Energy Community Treaty (for South-East Europe) 
Not to be confused with the Energy Charter Treaty, this Energy 
Community Treaty entered into force in July 2006 and initially brought 
together the EC, and since Lisbon the EU, and seven Balkan non-member 
states (including UNMIK for Kosovo). Its function is to extend the EU’s 
core energy acquis to these non-member states and thus widen the EU’s 
internal energy market. In December 2009 Moldova and Ukraine became 
further full contracting parties. There is a secretariat in Vienna, separate 
from the Commission. At meetings of the governing bodies the 
Commission alone speaks, while the member states are invited to 
participate in discussion (about 13 member states make use of this 
provision). 
Comment: Institutionally the status quo is satisfactory, again because of its 
recent origins, and the organisation progresses with more a compact geographical 
coverage than the Energy Charter.  
6.2.8  NATO 
Official relations between the EU and NATO were launched in 2001 in an 
exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU 
Presidency. This has subsequently developed into what is officially 
described as a ‘strategic partnership’. There are regular meetings at all 
levels: foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence 
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advisers, and between the NATO International Staff and the EU Council 
Secretariat and Military Staff. The EU HR is invited to all NATO ministerial 
meetings as participant with speaking rights; and the NATO Secretary 
General is invited to EU foreign and defence ministers’ meetings 
selectively, given their frequency, for agenda items of common interests. 
The NATO Secretary General and EU HR meet regularly, about once a 
month, accompanied by senior military staff. Permanent military liaison 
arrangements have been established: a NATO Permanent Liaison Team has 
been located with the EU Military Staff since 2005, and an EU Cell was set 
up at the NATO strategic command centre at SHAPE in 2006. A joint 
NATO-EU Declaration on the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy 
of 2002 reaffirmed the EU’s assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities 
and the principles of mutual consultation with due regard to the decision-
making autonomy of both parties.  
The ambassadors of NATO in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
of the EU in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) have occasional 
joint meetings, which are said to be rather dull affairs, attributable perhaps 
to the unwieldy format of over 50 ambassadors, or possibly because of the 
limited agendas (due at least in part to the Turkey-Cyprus hiatus – see 
further below).  
There is one pragmatic element of institutional fusion, in that many 
EU member states ‘double-hat’ their members of the EU and NATO 
Military Committees – i.e. the same senior military office serves both 
positions at the same time – which assures mutual transparency and 
information for operations such as the Somalia anti-piracy missions where 
both EU and NATO are active.  
Operational arrangements were deepened under the so-called ‘Berlin-
plus’ agreement of 2003, which provides for NATO-EU cooperation in 
crisis management operations, including support by NATO for EU-led 
operations and notably through access to NATO HQ facilities. These 
arrangements were first used in the cases of Macedonia and Bosnia where 
EU forces took over from NATO in 2003 and 2004 respectively. However 
the formal use of Berlin-plus arrangements seems limited now to Bosnia. 
The EU and NATO are also now working alongside each other in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan (where the EU runs rule of law missions alongside NATO’s 
military presence) and in anti-piracy operations in Somalia; but these are 
not framed within Berlin-plus (again due to the Turkey-Cyprus hiatus). 
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There are some particular blockages to this cooperation due to the 
hiatus between Turkey and the EU, with Cyprus as a complicating factor 
also. Turkey has objected to the effective downgrading of its status with the 
winding up of the WEU (to be completed legally by 2011) in which it was a 
virtually full participant, and the transfer of its functions to the EU, where 
its status is more restricted. In consequence Turkey blocks various 
cooperative actions between NATO and the EU, for example the request by 
the EU that NATO extend protection in Afghanistan to EU police personnel 
if need be. Given that Turkey has blocked this request, the EU must 
negotiate agreements bilaterally with NATO member states. It is generally 
agreed that ways must be found to lift this hiatus, but this has not yet been 
done. An example of a constructive initiative would be for the EU to invite 
Turkey to become formally associated with, or member of, the European 
Defence Agency. Then the absurd stand-off between Turkey and the EU in 
relation to NATO might be moderated.   
While there have been some useful developments in EU-NATO 
institutional relations, the operational content of the relationship is still 
limited. NATO’s Secretary General is speaking out in favour of "a true 
strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. …NATO 
and the EU are two of the world's most important institutions. They share 
21 members. They have complementary skills. And no other strategic 
partnership would offer so many benefits -- both operationally and 
financially."38 Concretely there are issues of coherence and coordination 
over the assignment of forces to NATO and the EU respectively, which 
exemplify the need for closer cooperation. There are overlapping 
assignments of force numbers to the EU’s ‘Headline Goals’ and NATO’s 
‘Defence Planning’, since the same troops can in theory appear under both 
headings. On the other hand, the EU Battle Groups and NATO Response 
Force have to be separately identified contingents.  
Apart from the Turkey-related problems, this sounds like it has the 
potential to become a quite rich relationship, but informal comments by 
officials suggest a less positive story, with commonplace remarks about 
“the two organisations living on different planets”, albeit about 5 km away 
                                                     
38 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Security in an Era of Budgetary Scarcity”, keynote 
speech at conference on NATO’s European Dimension, organised by the Security 
and Defence Agenda and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Brussels, 21 June 2010. 
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from each other. At the 18-19 November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, 
President Van Rompuy spoke on behalf of the EU at a working dinner of 
NATO leaders, reportedly saying that “the ability of our two organisations 
to shape our future security would be enormous if they worked together. It 
is time to break down the remaining walls between us”. Given that 
informal relationships in the small town of Brussels do not seem to develop 
easily, there is a case for making some more formal arrangements. The 
easiest to initiate would be for NATO and the EU to swap mutual observer 
relationships at the level of ambassadors in NATO’s North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) and the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). 
Comment: A principal issue for the EU and its member states is whether 
they will want at some stage to form an ‘EU caucus’ within NATO and so present 
more structured common positions on key policy issues. The US has so far been 
unenthusiastic about this, but this might change if the EU side shaped up more 
clearly. Much less difficult for the short run, the EU might have a permanent 
observer at the ambassador level (for example the EU PSC chairperson, ex-officio) 
on the North Atlantic Council, and this could be reciprocated with a NATO 
observer at the PSC.    
6.3 Semi-institutionalised summitry and diplomacy 
6.3.1 G7/8/20 
G7. With the admission of Russia to the G8, the G7 has become no more 
than an economic forum, in which the EU is represented by the President of 
the European Central Bank (EU delegation=1 person). France, Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom are represented by their Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors. The European Commission and the President 
of the eurozone (since its creation) are only occasionally invited to attend 
G7 meetings. G7 meetings are prepared on the EU side by the Eurogroup 
Working Group for matters related to eurozone competences, and the 
Economic and Financial Committee preparing other matters.  
G8. The EU is represented by the Presidents of the European Council 
and Commission at Summit level (EU delegation=2 people), alongside 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK. With the Lisbon Treaty now in force, 
Barroso and Van Rompuy both sit at the table, but only one speaks in the 
name of the EU depending on the issue. The EU sherpa is the sherpa of the 
President of the European Council, whereas the sous-sherpa is the sherpa 
of the President of the Commission.  
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Opinions apparently differ on whether the EU is a real ‘member’ of 
the G8 or not (for instance, the EU is sometimes mentioned on the G8 
website as a member, sometimes not), but in practice the EU enjoys the 
same ‘rights’ as any other G8 member in being invited to all meetings with 
the right to speak, but not the right to host or chair a summit. There is no 
EU coordination before G8 meetings. Non-G8 EU countries are not 
involved in the G8 process and are only kept informed. The Commission 
and the EU President receive no specific mandates to speak at the G8 on 
behalf of the EU, which means that they are free to speak about everything 
but cannot commit to anything.  
G20. In the original G20, the EU was represented by the President of 
the European Central Bank plus the ECOFIN Presidency (the President of 
the Eurogroup was not present), and the Commission only participated at a 
technical level in the delegation. France, Germany, Italy and the UK are 
represented by their Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. 
In the ‘new’ summit-level G20, established November 2008, member 
states are represented by their Heads of State and Government, while the 
EU is represented by both the European Council and Commission 
Presidents. Van Rompuy speaks on foreign policy and security matters, 
whereas Barroso speaks on areas of exclusive EU competence. In areas of 
shared competence, they decide on a case-by-case basis who will speak in 
the name of the EU. The official Canadian G20 Presidency website for the 
June 2010 meeting stated that the G20 consists of 19 states with the EU as 
20th full participant,39 and this has been repeated on the Korean official 
website too. Other participants, described in some documents as ‘Outreach 
Participants’,40 include the Netherlands and Spain, who have been invited 
to four successive summits.   
As the Lisbon Treaty does not mention the G7/8/20, there is no 
explicit ruling on how the EU should be represented. At the November 
2010 summit in Seoul, the EU was represented by Van Rompuy and 
                                                     
39 Five seats for the EU (France, Germany, Italy, UK, EU), 3 seats for Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 5 seats for Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea), 
1 from Africa (South Africa), 1 from the Arab world (Saudi Arabia), and Australia, 
Canada, Russia, Turkey and US.  
40 The Netherlands, Spain, Ethiopia, Malawi and Vietnam, and leadership of the 
Financial Stability Board, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank and WTO.     
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Barroso, without the Belgian rotating Council Presidency, although 
Belgium was still represented at the G20 finance ministers meeting in 
October 2010. At ministerial level, the EU is thus represented by the 
Commission, the ECB and the rotating Presidency (EU delegation at 
ministerial level = 3 people). 
As opposed to the G8, the EU makes more effort to coordinate its 
position ahead of the G20 summits, providing mandates for its 
representatives to negotiate in the name of the EU on selected issues. The 
Sherpa of the EU is the Sherpa of the Commission, whereas the sous-sherpa 
is the Sherpa of the President (in symmetry with G8: i.e. G8 is primarily 
political, hence predominance of the Council, while the G20 is primarily 
economic and financial, hence predominance of the Commission). 
The representation of the EU by two Presidents at the G20 summit 
level will be seen increasingly as an anomaly. An ad hoc solution would be 
for the two Presidents to reach an understanding for one or the other but 
not both to represent the EU on different occasions. In the long-run, maybe 
around 2020, there may build up arguments in favour of rationalising the 
EU’s leadership by combining the posts of Commission and European 
Council Presidents in one person. While this would be a major institutional 
reform that would only happen for profound political reasons going 
beyond matters of external representation, it should be noted that there is 
nothing in the Lisbon Treaty to prevent the European Council from taking 
such a decision without a need for treaty change.  
At the meetings of the G20 finance ministers, the Council has made 
more detailed arrangements, after considering legal opinions prepared by 
the legal services of the Council41 and Commission as to whether 
arrangements should be modified post-Lisbon. The Council decided to 
continue with the status quo, with the EU to be represented by the 
Commission, European Central Bank and the rotating Council Presidency. 
In particular France in its capacity as incoming G20 Presidency is inviting 
Hungary to the meetings in the first half of 2010. The justification for 
inviting the rotating Council Presidency merits explanation, since this 
position is not mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty, where Article 17.1 TEU in 
                                                     
41 Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, “The 
representation of the Union and its member States at the Group of Twenty”, 
16451/10, 17 November 2010.   
108 | STATUS QUO AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
particular only mentions the Commission and High Representative. 
However this article allows for exceptions provided elsewhere in the 
Treaties, as notably in Article 138 (TFEU), which deals with the 
representation of the eurozone in international meetings. In addition for 
areas where the member states are competent the Council may designate 
whomsoever it wishes to represent them, with the rotating Council 
Presidency one such possibility.   
Comment: Post-Lisbon, the situation at G8/20 summit level meetings may 
be considered satisfactory in a narrow sense for the EU institutions, since both Van 
Rompuy and Barroso are admitted. However for the future it is anomalous for the 
EU to have these two seats on top of four member states while the US and others 
have only one head of state or government. The EU should find one method or 
another of cutting its representation to one President. For G20 finance ministers 
meetings the EU representation will still include the rotating Council Presidency.  
6.3.2 Bilateral summits (strategic partnership cases) 
The EU-Russia summit of June 2010 made a clean break from pre- to post-
Lisbon regimes. The EU was represented there by Van Rompuy and 
Barroso, with Ashton and the Trade Commissioner, while the rotating 
Council Presidency was no longer present. The complete set of strategic 
partnership summits consists of the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, China, 
India, Japan, Brazil and India, with regular summits also with Pakistan and 
Ukraine, and with the possible addition of South Korea also mooted.   
It is notable that the Spanish rotating Presidency tried to host a US 
summit in the first half of 2010, which Obama declined to attend, citing 
other preoccupations. Given the confusion at that time over the transition 
to the post-Lisbon model, the US position was understandable. 
Comment: The post-Lisbon representation of the EU sees the disappearance 
of the rotating Council Presidency, but given the large number of bilateral 
summits, it remains to be seen whether the EU representation will always be as in 
the Russia example cited. To always have Van Rompuy and Barroso present, 
although in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, seems excessive when Russia is 
represented by Medvedev without Putin.  
6.3.3 European neighbourhood and other multilateral regional 
processes  
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy has developed since 
2003 primarily on the basis of bilateral actions plans negotiated between the 
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Commission and the six Eastern neighbours and ten Southern 
Mediterranean neighbours. This activity overlaps with the functioning of 
the pre-existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in the East, and 
Barcelona Process Association Agreements to the South; to which may be 
added now new Association Agreements that begin to be negotiated with 
the Eastern neighbours. The system is further complicated by the Union for 
the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership initiatives, to the point that it is 
best now to discuss East and South separately.   
Barcelona Process and Union for the Mediterranean. The addition of 
the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to the Barcelona Process and ENP, 
upon the initiative of President Sarkozy in 2008, led to a convoluted 
superimposition of initiatives. Originally an attempt to overarch the 
Barcelona Process by a new Union that would bring together just the 
littoral states of the Mediterranean and thus exclude Northern Europe, 
Sarkozy was forced to backtrack by Chancellor Merkel. When the project 
eventually took shape, it was endowed with a double presidency, initially 
France and Egypt. The South-Med presidency was set for a two-year 
period, but the North-Med presidency was given no clear time limit, in part 
because of the complications it would cause in relation to the innovations 
of the Lisbon Treaty, whose outcome was then in 2008 still uncertain. 
Sarkozy still remains UfM President after two years, with 2010 witnessing 
institutional confusion on an even grander scale. The Spanish rotating 
Presidency of the first half of 2010 proposed a UfM summit for June 2010 in 
Barcelona. Before the EU had time to work out the distribution of roles for 
this event as between the four presidents who could be involved – Sarkozy, 
Zapatero, Barroso and Van Rompuy – it was postponed until November 
because of political frictions with the South Med states over the Middle 
East. The November conference was also postponed. For the future the 
leadership of the UfM/Barcelona process might best be regularised, 
entrusting the EU chairmanship to Van Rompuy and HR Ashton according 
to the level of the meetings. The UfM has also been endowed with its own 
secretariat in Barcelona, with complex political bargaining having gone into 
the allocation of posts, leading to a Jordanian diplomat appointed Secretary 
General. Continuing work of the ENP in the South, and Cooperation 
Council meetings under the Association Agreements, will be done by the 
HR/EEAS, without the rotating Council Presidency. 
Comment: While the initial conception of the UfM would have meant 
disruption of the EU’s external policies on a grand scale, this has been largely 
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averted. Regularisation of the Presidency on the EU side remains to be sorted out, 
while the two successive postponements of the UfM summit makes for 
unfavourable comparisons with the Eastern Partnership. 
ENP/Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was 
initiated in 2009 following a Polish-Swedish proposal with a view to 
boosting the Eastern branch of the ENP. In practice the EaP has become a 
regional-multilateral supplement to the essentially bilateral workings of the 
ENP. Bilateral Cooperation Council meetings with the Eastern partner 
states will now be led on the EU side by the HR/EEAS, and negotiations of 
new Association Agreements will be led by the HR/EEAS in teamwork 
with relevant Commission DGs. The multilateral ministerial meetings of 
the Eastern Partnership will be done by the HR together with the 
responsible Commissioner. The rotating Presidency was in principle to be 
no longer active in the EaP, but the forthcoming Council Presidencies for 
2011, successively Hungary and Poland, have indicated that they are highly 
interested, with Hungary to host a summit meeting in May 2011.     
Comment: This was set to become a normal model case, post-Lisbon, but the 
rotating Council Presidencies of 2011 seek to make a comeback.  
Northern Dimension. This multilateral initiative was launched by 
Finland in 1998 and brought together Russia, Norway and Iceland with the 
EU27 in an effort to develop good regional cooperation with North-West 
Russia. The first years of the Northern Dimension saw clumsy ministerial 
meetings with all member states, many of whom had little interest in the 
body. In the second and current period, starting in 2007, the Northern 
Dimension project has been reshaped with just four ‘members’ – EU, 
Norway, Iceland and Russia – with the EU to be represented now at 
ministerial level by the HR or a deputy. But this representation is 
supplemented by a so-called ‘Open Troika’, where interested member 
states can participate.42 
Comment: The model for the Northern Dimension has developed in an 
interesting way, with the Nordic states taking the lead in rationalising its 
institutional features in a more efficient manner, cutting down on excessive 
participation of member states.    
                                                     
42 For a detailed account, see P. Aalto et al. (eds), The New Northern Dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, 2008. 
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Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Officially established in 1996, the first 
ASEM summit took place in Bangkok as an interregional forum consisting 
of the European Commission, the EU member states, the 13 members of the 
ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, Korea) regional grouping, and, as of 
2008, India, Mongolia, and Pakistan. By the 2010 meeting the participation 
has been further expanded to include Pakistan, India, Russia, Australia and 
New Zealand, making a total of 48. All parties are in principle present at 
the level of heads of state for the ASEM Summit, which is organised every 
other year (with other meetings on the margins, as well as ahead of the 
Summit) and hosted alternatively by the EU and Asia. There is no common 
EU position prepared for these meetings, although there are some 
consultations on the agenda, notably through the Asia-Oceania Working 
Party (COASI) in the Council. With 48 parties present, these are huge 
numbers of people present at what is essentially a quite loose conference 
process. Until 2010, the EU was represented by the Commission as full 
member (as was also the Secretariat of ASEAN). Belgium as rotating 
Council Presidency was in charge of organising the 2010 Summit on 3-4 
October, but agreed that Herman Van Rompuy would chair the meeting, 
flanked by President Barroso and the Belgian Prime Minister. These new 
arrangements have triggered some concern from the Asian side that this 
might lead to lowering the level of member state representation (“Europe 
does not equal the EU”), and that therefore this EU chairmanship should be 
no precedent for future ASEM summits.  
The EU has not been participating in the East Asia summit process, 
which includes India, China, Japan, Korea, the Asian states and Australia, 
as well as Russia and the US. There have been hesitations over the EU’s 
possible participation, initially on the EU side and subsequently on the side 
of ASEAN over whether the EU as a non-state party could join in.    
Comment: The new post-Lisbon changes in the representation of the EU 
create some concerns with the Asian partners in relation to the ASEM process, 
while the EU has been so far absent from the East Asia summit process.   
Latin America and Caribbean. The 6th EU-LAC Summit of Heads of 
State and Government took place in Madrid on 18 May 2010. In its margins, 
no less than six other bilateral mini-Summits were held with specific LAC 
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countries and sub-regions,43 which seems to have been a suitably 
economical use of time. The EU was represented at all these events by Van 
Rompuy, Barroso and (for the rotating Council Presidency) Zapatero. The 
rotating Presidency will no longer appear at these events in future.   
Comment: The post-Lisbon rules were not applied by the Spanish rotating 
Presidency in the first half of 2010, but should prevail in future.  
African Union. The 3rd EU-Africa Summit of Heads of State and 
Government took place in Libya in November 2010. The first Summit was 
held in Cairo in 2000 and the second Summit in 2007 under the Portuguese 
rotating Presidency. This second Summit led to the adoption of the Africa-
EU Strategic Partnership which sets the main framework for the 
relationship and plans among other things a Summit every three years. 
During Summits, in addition to the Heads of State and Government of 
African and European member states, the EU has so far been represented 
by the rotating Presidency, the President of the Commission and the 
Secretary General/High Representative. Switching to the post-Lisbon rules, 
in Libya the EU was represented by Van Rompuy, Barroso and 
Commissioner Piebalgs. Aside from the summits, there are other 
established dialogues at ministerial and at parliamentary level. 
Comment: The EU was represented at the November 2010 summit by the 
normal post-Lisbon model – with both Van Rompuy and Barroso in the lead.  
6.3.4 Conflict prevention/resolution 
Solana built up a set of 11 Special Representatives (SRs) for the conflict 
zones of the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, Afghanistan and 
Africa. The role of the SRs is due to be revised. Some may be merged and 
double-hatted with the Heads of Delegations as already is the case in 
Macedonia and Afghanistan. Others such as for Central Asia seem likely to 
be maintained.    
Israel-Palestine. Since 2002 the Quartet has assembled the US, the 
EU, Russia and the UN. The EU has so far been represented by a Special 
Representative and the Commission. A decade ago, the Special 
Representative was Ambassador Miguel Angel Moratinos, until recently 
                                                     
43 EU–Andean Community (CAN), Central America Summit, Caribbean Forum 
(CARIFORUM), EU-Chile Summit, EU-Mexico Summit and EU-Mercosur. 
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foreign minister of Spain, but the post is currently held by a lower-profile 
diplomat. The post should be filled by someone with high political stature.   
Bosnia. The quasi-protectorate regime under the Dayton Agreement 
and with the ‘Bonn powers’ has been led at the international level by the 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which brings together on the EU side 
most but not all member states as members or observers with the 
Commission and Council rotating Presidency, alongside the US, Russia, 
Turkey, Canada, etc. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), vested 
with the Bonn powers, is double–hatted with the EU Special 
Representative. The next step that is generally considered desirable, but 
subject to much political debate over the conditions for doing this, would 
be for the OHR to be scrapped, or at least de-linked from the EUSR, who 
might then be double-hatted with the EU Head of Delegation in Sarajevo. 
Kosovo. The EU has had an SR in Kosovo since 2007. From 2008, 
when Kosovo declared independence, this position has been double-hatted 
with that of International Civil Representative (ICO). In addition Kosovo 
sees the largest EU external operational mission, with the EULEX rule of 
law staffed with a target of 3,200 staff, of which 1,950 are Europeans. 
Macedonia. The conflict prevention mission has led to the Special 
Representative being double-hatted with the Head of Delegation in Skopje.  
South Caucasus. The region has three unresolved conflicts: Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However responsibility for 
pursuing resolution of the conflicts is diffused. For Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
search for a settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is headed since 
1992 by the OSCE-sponsored ‘Minsk Group’, effectively run by its three co-
chairs from Russia, the US and France (representing France, not the EU). 
For Georgia and its conflict with the secessionist provinces Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the lead group until the August 2008 war was the UN-
sponsored ‘Friends of the Secretary General’ group for Georgia, including 
France, Germany, the UK, Russia and the US (without EU representation). 
However after the August 2008 war, the centre of activity has been in the 
‘Geneva Process’ co-chaired by the OSCE, the UN and the EU. The EU is 
here represented by Ambassador Pierre Morel, who is also Special 
Representative for Central Asia, and was brought in by President Sarkozy 
in implementation of the French/EU 6 point peace plan that ended the war. 
The EU has since 2003 had a Special Representative for the region as a 
whole, with the post held since 2006 by a Swedish diplomat, but his 
position sits uneasily alongside the other special representatives 
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mentioned. This situation should be rationalised, with a single EU SR for 
the whole of the Caucasus and all of the conflicts.  
Moldova-Transnistria. In 2005, the EU joined as an observer, 
together with the US, a pre-existing mediation process now called the ‘5+2’, 
which brings together the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia 
and Ukraine, along with the EU and the US. Activation of this mediation 
mechanism has been blocked by Russia since 2006, but it may be re-
activated in the foreseeable future. There has been an EUSR responsible for 
Moldova since 2005, but this position could be combined in the future with 
that of an enhanced EU Delegation in Chisinau. Another possible formula 
calls for combining the position with a Caucasus EUSR, thus having one 
person to deal with all of the unresolved conflicts of the former Soviet area. 
Central Asia. This post of Special Representative was created in 2005 
and was enhanced in importance with the adoption by the EU in 2007 of its 
Central Asia Strategy. The special justification of this position lies in the 
fact that the EU has so far been very incompletely represented by 
Delegations in the region, and so the Special Representative functions as a 
roving ambassador for the EU.44 
Afghanistan. Since January 2010 of there is a double-hatted SR and 
Head of Delegation in Kabul.   
Comment: With the EEAS coming into service, the role of the SR is being 
reviewed, without decisions yet known. This review is indeed pertinent. The 
upgrading of EU Delegations may facilitate in some cases further double-hatting of 
the SR with the Heads of Delegation. On the other hand, double-hatting of SRs 
with international roles (as in Bosnia, Kosovo) should be temporary only, since it 
risks creating conflicts of interest.  
                                                     
44 For a detailed review see M. Emerson et al., Into EurAsia – Monitoring the EU’s 
Central Asia Strategy, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2010. 
 | 115 
GLOSSARY 
ASEM Asia-Europe Meetings 
BIS   Bank for International Settlements 
DG  Directorate General 
EaP  Eastern Partnership 
ECHR  European Convention for Human Rights  
ECtHR  European Court for Human Rights  
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EEA   European Economic Area  
EEAS European External Action Service 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
EUSR EU Special Representative 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization  
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and                  
Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICO   International Civil Representative (Kosovo)  
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFI  International Financial Institutions 
ILO   International Labour Organization  
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IMO   International Maritime Organization  
IOM   International Organization for Migration  
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
LAC  Latin American and Caribbean 
MS   Member state(s) of the EU 
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NATO North Atlantic treaty Organization 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OHR  Office of the High Representative (Bosnia) 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PIC  Peace Implementation Council (Bosnia) 
TEU   Treaty on European Union  
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
UfM  Union for the Mediterranean 
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP  UN Development Programme  
UNEP  UN Environment Programme  
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  
UNHCR  UN High Commission for Refugees  
UNGA  UN General Assembly 
UNSC  UN Security Council 
UPU  Universal Postal Union 
WCO  World Customs Organization  
WFP  World Food Programme 
WHO World Health Organization 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO  World Trade Organization  
 | 117  
ANNEXES  
Annex A. Overview of EU Participation in the UN System 
UNGA General Assembly Observer  
 
UNGA dependent programmes and funds  
UNCTAD (trade/develop.) Observer 
ENEP (environment)  Observer  
UNICEF (children)  Observer  
UNDP (development)  Observer  
UNFPA (population)  Observer  
UNHCR (refugees)  Observer, request for full participant 
UNRWA (refugees)  Observer  
UNCITRAL (trade law ) Observer  
 
ECOSOC    Observer 
ECOSOC Commissions  
CHR (human rights)  Observer  
CND (narcotics)   Observer  
CCPCJ (crime)   Observer  
CSD (sustain. develop. ) Full participant 
CSW (women)   Observer  
CPD (population/develop.) Observer  
CSOD (social develop.) Observer  
Statistical Commission  Observer  
 
ECOSOC Regional Commissions 
ECA (Africa)   Observer subject to invitation 
ECE (Europe)   Observer subject to invitation 
ECLAC (Lat Amer/Carib) Observer subject to invitation 
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ESCAP (Asia/Pac)  Observer subject to invitation 
ESCWA (West Asia)  Observer subject to invitation 
UNFF (forests)   Observer 
 
UN specialised agencies 
ILO     Observer 
FAO     Member 
UNESCO    Observer 
WHO      Observer 
ICAO civil aviation  Observer subject to invitation 
IMO     Permanent observer 
WIPO    Observer, full participant in some committees 
IFAO     Observer in Gov, Council but not Ex. Com.  
IBRD     none 
IDA     none 
IFC     none 
MIGA    none 
IMF     ECB invited to Ex. Board selectively 
IAEA    Observer 
Codex Alimentarius  Member 
ISA (seabed authority)  Member 
 
UN Conferences  
UNCED (sustainable dev.) Full participant 
WSSD (sustainable dev.) Full participant 
Small islands, 1994   Observer 
Small islands, 2005  Full participant 
UNCTAD (trade/dev.) Observer 
UNCLDC (least developed) Full participant 
CFD (financing)   Full participant 
WCDR (disaster reduction) Observer, de facto full participant 
WCHR (human rights)  Observer 
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WCRRDX (xenophobia) Full participant 
WCW (women)   Full participant 
UNHS (habitats)   Observer 
ICPD (population/dev ) Full participant 
WCMRY (youth)   Observer subject to invitation 
WSSD (social develop. ) Full participant 
WAA (ageing)   Observer 
WFS (food)    Member 
UNCICC (criminal court) Observer 
UNCPCTO (crime)  Observer 
UNCTOC (crime )  Observer 
UNCITSALW (small arms) Full participant 
NPT (nuclear non-prolif.) Observer agency status 
UNCLOS (fish stocks)  Member 
CCCD (desertification)  Member 
UNCCC (climate change) Member 
UNISPACE (outer space) Observer 
WSIS (information soc. ) Full participant 
 
UN Conventions 
UNFSA (fish stocks)  Full member 
UNCCC (climate change) Full member 
UNCND (narcotics)  Full member 
UNCTOC (crime )  Full member 
UN LINER (conferences) Full member 
UNCLOS (law of sea) Full member 
UNCC (corruption)  Full member 
UNCCD (desertification) Full member 
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Annex B. International Organisations and Conventions in which 
the EU Participates fully by virtue of a Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation (REIO) or Regional Integration 
Organisation (RIO) clause 
 
Industrial Technical 
Regulations for wheeled vehicles 1997, 2000 
European pharmacopeia (Council of Europe), 1994 
Maintenance operations, 2009 
International nickel study group, 1991 
International tin study group, 1991 
 
Agriculture & Food  
Common fund for commodities, 1990 
Jute Study Group, 2002 
FAO, 1991 
Food aid convention, 1999 
Grains trade convention, 1996 
Olive oil & table olives agreement, 2005 
International cocoa agreement, 2001 
International coffee agreement, 2001, 2007 
International sugar agreement, 1992 
International tropical timber agreement, 2007 
WHO tobacco control convention, 2004 
 
Fisheries 
Fisheries Commission for Mediterranean, 1998 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, 1995 
Highly migratory fish stocks, 1998 
Small cetaceans in Baltic & North Seas, 1945 
Fishing vessels on high seas, 1996 
Salmon in North Atlantic (NASCO), 1982 
Inter-American tropical tuna, 2005 
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Northeast Atlantic fisheries (NEAFC), 1981  
Migratory fish in west &central Pacific, 2005 
Conservation Atlantic tuna (ICCAT), 1986 
South Indian Ocean fisheries, 2006 
 
Environment 
African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds, 2006 
Dolphin Conservation Programme, 1999 
Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) , 1994, 1998 
Transboundary hazardous waste, Basle,1993 
Biosafety, biological diversity, Cartagena, 2002 
Marine environment north-east Atlantic, 1998 
Protection against Mediterrannean pollution, Barcelona, 1997 
Justice in environmental matters, 2005 
Convention on biological diversity, 1993 
Protection of river Danube, 1997 
Long range trans-boundary air pollution, 1981 
Desertification in Africa, 1998 
Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR), 1981 
Migratory wild animals (Bonn), 1982 
Transboundary watercourses and lakes, 1995 
Marine environment of Baltic Sea (Helsinki), 1994 
UN Convention on Climate Change, 1994 
Kyoto Protocol, 2002 
Heavy metals and transboundary air pollution, 2001 
Pollutant release & transfer registers, 2006 
Nitrogen oxides, transboundary air pollution, 1993 
Monitoring transmission of air pollutants, 1986 
Reduction of sulphur emissions, 1998 
Hazardous chemicals in international trade, 2003 
Persistent organic pollutants (Stockholm), 2006 
Protection of ozone layer, 1988 
122 | ANNEXES 
 
Transport & customs 
Rules of international air carriage, 2001 
Containers in international transport, 1995 
Mobile equipment on aircraft, 2009 
Temporary import of comm. road vehicles, 1994 
Temporary import of private road vehicles, 1994 
Harmonisation frontier control of goods, 1984 
 
Energy 
Energy Charter Treaty, 1994 
Energy Charter – environmental aspects, 1994 
Radioactive waste management, 2005 
 
Justice and home affairs 
Choice of court agreement, 2009 
Temporary admission convention (Istanbul), 1993 
Trafficking of firearms, ammunition 2100 
Smuggling of migrants, 2006 
Trafficking of women & children, 2006 
UN Convention against corruption, 2008 
 
Social policy 
Rights of person with disabilities, 2010 
 
Culture 
Protection diversity of cultural expressions, 2006 
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Annex C. Overview of EU Participation in International Maritime 
Organizations  
 
Contracting party / full member (EC only)  
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)  
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)  
South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO) 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
 
Contracting party / full member (EC + member states)   
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context (EIA) 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (OSPAR)  
Helsinki Commission for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area (HELCOM)  
Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
(BARCOM)  
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA)  
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)  
 International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC)  
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(CMS)  
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  
124 | ANNEXES 
 
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme 
(AIDCP)  
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal  
Rotterdam Convention on … Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade 
Bonn Agreement on Action Plan to combat illegal and accidental pollution 
of the Greater North Sea 
Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (TBEIA)  
UN Convention of Illicit Traffic Narcotic Drugs  
UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime  
 
Full participant  
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 
 
Observer status for European Commission 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR)  
Cartagena Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine 
Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  
Bucharest Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution  
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT82) 
International Whaling Commission (IWC)  
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES)  
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC830 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)  
 
Source: Derived from Wouters, op. cit. 
 
I  
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Annex D. Voting Weights on the Board of the IMF 
EU % on total Non-EU % on total 
Germany 5.87 United States 16.74 
United Kingdom 4.85 Japan 6.01 
France 4.85 China 3.65 
Italy 3.19 Canada 2.88 
Netherlands 2.34 Russia 2.69 
Belgium 2.08 India 1.88 
Spain 1.38 Switzerland 1.57 
Sweden 1.09 Australia 1.47 
Austria 0.85 Mexico 1.43 
Denmark 0.75 Brazil 1.38 
Poland 0.63 Korea 1.33 
Finland 0.58 Argentina 0.96 
Hungary 0.48 Indonesia 0.95 
Romania 0.48 South Africa 0.85 
Portugal 0.40 Nigeria 0.80 
Ireland 0.39 Norway 0.76 
Greece 0.38 Iran 0.69 
Czech Republic 0.38 Malaysia 0.68 
Bulgaria 0.30 Turkey 0.55 
Slovak Republic 0.17 Libya 0.52 
Luxembourg 0.14 Thailand 0.50 
Slovenia 0.12 Pakistan 0.48 
Lithuania 0.08 Egypt 0.44 
Latvia 0.07 Singapore 0.40 
Cyprus 0.07   
Malta 0.06   
Estonia 0.04   
    
Eurozone 16 22.87   
Total EU27 32.02 Total non-EU 67.98 
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Annex E. Voting Weights on the Board of the World Bank, before 
and after 2010 Reform 
EU % before reform 
% after 
reform 
 
Non-EU 
% before 
reform 
% after 
reform 
Germany 4.48 4.00 United States 16.36 15.85 
France 4.30 3.75 Japan 7.85 6.84 
United Kingdom 4.30 3.75 Canada 2.78 2.43 
Italy 2.78 2.64 China 2.78 4.42 
Netherlands 2.21 1.92 India 2.78 2.91 
Belgium 1.80 1.57 Russian Federation 2.78 2.77 
Spain 1.74 1.85 Saudi Arabia 2.78 2.77 
Sweden 0.94 0.85 Brazil 2.07 2.24 
Denmark 0.85 0.76 Switzerland 1.66 1.46 
Austria 0.70 0.63 Australia 1.52 1.33 
Poland 0.69 0.73 Iran 1.48 1.47 
Finland 0.54 0.50 Venezuela 1.27 1.11 
Hungary 0.51 0.47 Mexico 1.18 1.68 
Czech Republic 0.40 0.36 Argentina 1.12 1.12 
Portugal 0.35 0.34 Korea 0.99 1.57 
Bulgaria 0.34 0.30 Indonesia 0.94 0.98 
Ireland 0.34 0.35 South Africa 0.85 0.76 
Romania 0.26 0.31 Kuwait 0.83 0.83 
Slovak Republic 0.21 0.20 Turkey 0.53 1.08 
Greece 0.12 0.33    
Luxembourg 0.12 0.12    
Cyprus 0.11 0.11    
Lithuania 0.11 0.11    
Latvia 0.10 0.10    
Slovenia 0.09 0.10    
Malta 0.08 0.09    
Estonia 0.07 0.08    
EU27 28.54 26.32 Total non-EU 71.46 73.68 
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Annex F. Constituencies on the Boards of the IMF and World Bank 
Director (alternate) EU Other 
Belgium (Austria) Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Turkey 
Netherlands (Ukraine) Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Netherlands, Romania 
Armenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Israel 
Spain (Mexico) Spain Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, Bolivia   
Italy (Greece – IMF) 
(Portugal –WB) 
Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal,  
Albania, San Marino, 
Timor-Leste 
Canada (Ireland – IMF) 
(Barbados – WB) 
Ireland  Canada, Caribbean 
Islands 
Denmark (Norway) – 
IMF  
Sweden (Denmark) – WB 
Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Sweden 
Iceland, Norway 
Switzerland (Poland)  Poland Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Serbia, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Notes: There are 6 permanent directors for France, Germany, UK, China, Russia and Saudi 
Arabia, without constituency attachments. 
Eurozone states are in bold, and are present in 5 constituencies, in addition to the 2 
permanent directors for France and Germany.  
Two constituencies mix EU and non-European states – those led by Spain and Canada. 
In addition there are 9 entirely non-European constituencies currently led by directors from 
Thailand, Korea, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Iran, Brazil, Argentina, India and Rwanda. 
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Annex G. Shareholdings in the EBRD (capital subscribed in € mil.) 
EU Non-EU 
France  1,704 United States  2,000 
Germany  1,704 Japan  1,704 
Italy  1,704 Russia  800 
United Kingdom  1,704 Canada  680 
Spain  680 Switzerland  456 
Netherlands  496 Turkey  230 
Austria  456 Australia  200 
Belgium  456 Korea, Republic of  200 
Sweden  456 Ukraine  160 
Poland  256 Israel  130 
Finland 250 Serbia 94 
Norway  250 Croatia  73 
Denmark  240 Kazakhstan  46 
Czech Republic  171 Uzbekistan  42 
Bulgaria  158 Belarus  40 
Hungary  158 Bosnia and Herzegovina  34 
Greece  130 Mexico  30 
Romania  96 Albania  20 
Slovak Republic  85 Azerbaijan  20 
Portugal  84 Egypt  20 
Ireland  60 Georgia  20 
Slovenia  42 Iceland  20 
Luxembourg  40 Kyrgyz Republic  20 
Cyprus  20 Moldova  20 
Estonia  20 Tajikistan  20 
Latvia  20 FYR Macedonia  14 
Lithuania  20 Armenia  10 
Malta  2 Morocco  10 
European Community  600 New Zealand  10 
Euro. Investment Bank  600 Liechtenstein  4 
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  Montenegro  4 
  Mongolia  2 
  Turkmenistan  2 
Total EU27 12,660  Total non-EU 7,133 
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Annex H. Constituencies on the Board of the EBRD 
Director EU Other 
Austria Austria, Malta, Cyprus Israel, Kazakhstan, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina 
Italy Italy  
Portugal, Greece Portugal, Greece  
France  France  
Australia  Australia, Korea, New 
Zeeland, Egypt 
Switzerland  Switzerland, Turkey, 
Liechtenstein, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyz Rep., Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Montenegro 
EIB   
Sweden Sweden, Estonia Iceland, 
Japan  Japan 
United States  United States 
Canada  Canada, Morocco 
Denmark Denmark, Ireland, 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Finland Finland, Latvia Norway 
Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Belarus 
 Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Belarus 
EU   
Spain Spain Mexico 
Ukraine Romania Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia 
United Kingdom United Kingdom  
Germany Germany  
Belgium Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia 
 
Bulgaria Bulgaria, Poland Albania 
Czech Rep Czech Rep, Hungary, 
Slovak Rep. 
Croatia 
Netherlands Netherlands Mongolia 
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Annex I. Extracts from the Lisbon Treaty 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Article 216 
1. The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third 
countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or 
where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred 
to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is 
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. 
2. Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its member states. 
Article 217 (ex Article 310 TEC) 
The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or 
international organisations agreements establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure. 
Article 218 (ex Article 300 TEC) 
1. Without prejudice to the specific provisions laid down in Article 
207, agreements between the Union and third countries or international 
organisations shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the 
following procedure. 
2. The Council shall authorise the opening of negotiations, adopt 
negotiating directives, authorise the signing of agreements and conclude 
them. 
3. The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy where the agreement envisaged relates 
exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy, shall 
submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision 
authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of 
the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of 
the Union's negotiating team. 
4. The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate 
a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be 
conducted. 
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5. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision 
authorising the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional 
application before entry into force. 
6. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision 
concluding the agreement. Except where agreements relate exclusively to 
the common foreign and security policy, the Council shall adopt the 
decision concluding the agreement: 
(a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the 
following cases: 
(i) association agreements; 
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by 
organising cooperation 
procedures; 
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the 
Union; 
(v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure 
where consent by the European Parliament is required. 
The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent 
situation, agree upon a time-limit for consent. 
(b) after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. The 
European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the 
Council may set depending on the urgency of the matter. In the absence of 
an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act. 
7. When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of 
derogation from paragraphs 5, 6 and 9, authorise the negotiator to approve 
on the Union's behalf modifications to the agreement where it provides for 
them to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set up by the 
agreement. The Council may attach specific conditions to such 
authorisation. 
8. The Council shall act by a qualified majority throughout the 
procedure. 
However, it shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field 
for which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act as well as 
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for association agreements and the agreements referred to in Article 212 
with the States which are candidates for accession. The Council shall also 
act unanimously for the agreement on accession of the Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; the decision concluding this agreement shall enter 
into force after it has been approved by the member states in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements. 
9. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall 
adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement and establishing 
the positions to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up by an 
agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, 
with the exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional 
framework of the agreement. 
10. The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully 
informed at all stages of the procedure. 
11. A member state, the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether 
an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion 
of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force 
unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised. 
Article 219 (ex Article 111(1) to (3) and (5) TEC) 
1. By way of derogation from Article 218, the Council, either on a 
recommendation from the European Central Bank or on a recommendation 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Central Bank, in 
an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price 
stability, may conclude formal agreements on an exchange-rate system for 
the euro in relation to the currencies of third States. The Council shall act 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament and in accordance 
with the procedure provided for in paragraph 3. The Council may, either 
on a recommendation from the European Central Bank or on a 
recommendation from the Commission, and after consulting the European 
Central Bank, in an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the 
objective of price stability, adopt, adjust or abandon the central rates of the 
euro within the exchange-rate system. The President of the Council shall 
inform the European Parliament of the adoption, adjustment or 
abandonment of the euro central rates. 
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2. In the absence of an exchange-rate system in relation to one or 
more currencies of third States as referred to in paragraph 1, the Council, 
either on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Central Bank or on a recommendation from the European 
Central Bank, may formulate general orientations for exchange-rate policy 
in relation to these currencies. These general orientations shall be without 
prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability. 
3. By way of derogation from Article 218, where agreements 
concerning monetary or foreign exchange regime matters need to be 
negotiated by the Union with one or more third States or international 
organisations, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Central Bank, shall decide the 
arrangements for the negotiation and for the conclusion of such 
agreements. These arrangements shall ensure that the Union expresses a 
single position. The Commission shall be fully associated with the 
negotiations. 
4. Without prejudice to Union competence and Union agreements as 
regards economic and monetary union, member states may negotiate in 
international bodies and conclude international agreements. 
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Annex J. The Common Visa Application Centre in Moldova 
The CVAC is located on the premises of the Hungarian Embassy in 
Chisinau.It is currently used by 12 EU states of the Schengen area: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden. 
The CVAC accepts applications for transit, airport transit and short-
stay visas (A and C type Schengen visas) of up to 90 days for the 
participating countries. The Centre processes the visas for these countries 
in conformity with the general Schengen practice. The treatment and the 
decision on the application is taken by the member state responsible. 
The applications are collected in the Centre (scanning of passports 
and pictures) and sent at least once a week to the processing consulates 
located elsewhere. Besides the hard copy of the application and the 
supporting documents, a reusable smart card with the basic data of the 
applicant and the application is attached to each application. The smart 
card contains the photo of the applicant and later the fingerprints as well. 
The idea was born in order to avoid obliging all member states 
having to install the necessary equipment for enrolling biometric identifiers 
in every consular office. The CVAC at the Hungarian Consulate in 
Chisinau was set up following a Commission Proposal in May 2006 for a 
regulation on setting up a legal framework for the organisation of member 
states’ consular offices to enhance consular cooperation. Moldova was 
identified as one of the most relevant countries for a pilot project as the 
accession of Romania created a new situation. Only a very small number of 
member states were represented in Chisinau and Romania had introduced 
the visa obligation for Moldovan citizens upon its EU accession. The Centre 
was officially opened on 25 April 2007, following the signature of a 
Hungary-Moldova memorandum of understanding and of bilateral 
agreements with the participating EU member states. It initially issued 
visas for six EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia 
and Hungary), and was later expanded to 12.   
Sources: Andrei Avram and Dietmar Müller, “Moldova’s border with Romania: 
challenges and perspectives after Romania’s accession to the European Union”, 
South-East Europe Review, 3/2008, pp. 399-429 and European Commission, 
“Opening of a ‘Common Visa Application Centre’ in Moldova”, 25 April 2006 
(http://www.cac.md). 
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Annex K. Statement by the E3+3 with the support of the EU High 
Representative following the adoption, 9 June 2010, of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1929 on the Iranian nuclear programme 
The following statement was agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, with 
the support of the High Representative of the European Union: 
"We, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, would like to take this opportunity 
to reaffirm our determination and commitment to seek an early negotiated 
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. 
The adoption of UNSCR 1929, while reflecting the international 
community's concern about the Iranian nuclear programme and 
reconfirming the need for Iran to comply with the UN Security Council and 
IAEA Board of Governors requirements, keeps the door open for continued 
engagement between E3+3 and Iran. 
The aim of our efforts is to achieve a comprehensive and long-term 
settlement which would restore international confidence in the peaceful 
nature of Iran's nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate 
rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy. We are resolute in continuing 
our work for this purpose. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic 
efforts in this regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey 
on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor. 
We reaffirm our June 2008 proposals, which remain valid, as 
confirmed by resolution 1929. We believe these proposals provide a sound 
basis for future negotiations. We are prepared to continue dialogue and 
interaction with Iran in the context of implementing the understandings 
reached during the Geneva meeting of 1 October 2009. We have asked 
Baroness Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, to pursue this with Dr. Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National 
Security Council at the earliest opportunity. 
We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond 
positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations.” 
[Emphasis added] 
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Annex L. Draft Resolution A/64/L67 of the UN General Assembly – 
Participation of the European Union in the work of the UN 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the role and authority of the General Assembly as a 
principal organ of the United Nations and the importance of its 
effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its functions under the UN Charter, 
Recognising, further, that the current interdependent international 
environment requires the strengthening of the multilateral system in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and 
then principles of international law,  
Acknowledging that, when an organisation for regional integration 
develops common external policies and establishes permanent structures 
for their conduct and representation, the General Assembly may benefit 
from the effective participation in its deliberations of that organisation’s 
external representatives speaking on behalf of the organisation and its 
member states, without prejudice to the ability of each organisation to 
define the modalities of its external representation,  
Recalling the long standing relations between the European Union 
and the United Nations, 
Noting the entry into force on 1 December 2009 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, through which the European Union has made changes to its 
institutional system, in particular as regards its external representation, 
Noting that in the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union reaffirms 
inter alia its commitment to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter and to the promotion of multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations,     
Noting also that under the Treaty of Lisbon, the member states of the 
European Union have entrusted the external representation of the 
European Union, with regard to the exercise of the competences of the 
European Union provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, to the following 
institutional representatives: the President of the European Council; the 
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy; and the European Commission and European Union 
Delegations, 
Noting that the representatives of the European Union referred to 
above have assumed the role, previously performed by the representatives 
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of the member state holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, of acting on behalf of the European Union at the UN in 
the exercise of the competences conferred by its member states, 
Recalling that, by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has 
replaced the European Community, as notified to the Secretary-General of 
the United nations by a letter dated 30 November 2009 
Noting that the European Union is a party to many instruments 
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, is a member of several 
United Nations specialised agencies and is a full participant in several 
United Nations bodies, 
Noting that the European Union retains observer status in the General 
Assembly 
1. Decides that the representatives of the European Union for the 
purpose of participating effectively in the sessions and work of the General 
Assembly, including in the general debate, and its committees and working 
groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the 
auspices of the Assembly, as well as in United Nations conferences, and in 
order to present positions of the European Union, shall be invited to speak 
in a timely manner, similar to the established practice for representatives of 
major groups, without prejudice to the intergovernmental nature of the 
United Nations, shall be permitted to circulate documents, to make 
proposals and submit amendments, the right to raise points of order, but 
not to challenge decisions of the presiding officer, and to exercise the right 
of reply, and be afforded seating arrangements which are adequate for the 
exercise of the aforementioned actions; the European Union shall not have 
the right to vote or to put forward candidates in the General Assembly; 
2. Decides that when a regional organisation representing member 
states has reached a level of integration that enables that organisation to 
speak with one voice, the General assembly my adopt modalities, in the 
spirit of this resolution, for the participation in its deliberations of that 
organisation’s external representatives speaking on behalf of the 
organisation and its member states;  
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take any measures necessary to 
ensure the implementation of this decision. 
Note: this includes amendments to the prior text tabled by the European Union on 
13 September 2010.  
 | 139  
Annex M. UN General Assembly Voting on Motion to Adjourn the Debate on Participation of the 
EU in the UN, 13 September 2010 
Region Yes No Abstain 
Africa Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Côte D’Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Equatorial- 
Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Seychelles 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Democratic 
Republic 
of Congo 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Americas Antigua 
Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Cuba 
Dominica  
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Nicaragua 
St Lucia  
St Kitts-
Nevis 
St Vincent-
Gren 
Suriname 
Trinidad- 
Tobago 
Venezuela 
Bahamas 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
United States 
Uruguay 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Canada 
Dominican-Rep. 
Honduras 
Asia China 
DPR Korea 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
Kazakhstan 
Rep. of Korea 
Japan 
Timór Leste 
Uzbekistan 
Armenia 
Bhutan 
Brunei 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
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Region Yes No Abstain 
Europe Russian Federation Albania 
Andorra 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bosnia and 
  Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
FYROM 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Monaco 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Moldova 
Romania 
San Marino 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
UK 
Belarus 
Middle East Bahrain 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Yemen 
Israel 
Jordan 
  UA Emirates 
Oman 
Oceania Fiji 
Marshall  Islands 
Micronesia 
Nauru 
Palau 
Solomon Islands 
Papua New Guinea 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
  Australia 
New Zealand 
Samoa 
Total  76 71 26 
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Annex N. Staffing in the Foreign Services of the EU and the MSa 
 Number 
of 
missions b 
Number 
of staff, c 
own 
nationals 
Number of 
staff, 
locally 
employed  
Total 
staff 
Staff per 
capita 
(1 per head 
of capita) 
Population 
millions 
Germany 227 6,900 5,300 12,200 6,705 81.8 
France 278 6,754 5,087 11,841 5,464 64.7 
UK 226 4,863 8,792 13,655 4,540 62.0 
Italy d 238  4,754 2,785 7,539 7,998 60.3 
Spain  208 4,428 2,197 6,625 6,928 45.9 
Belgium 128 1,943 1,418 3,361 3,213 10.8 
Netherlands  137 3,016 1,512 4,528 3,666 16.6 
Luxembourg 35 .. .. .. .. 0.5 
Austria 100 1,280 654 1,934 4,343 8.4 
Denmark  119 1,450  1,233 2,683 2,050 5.5 
Sweden 100 1,260 1,250 2,510 3,705 9.3 
Finland  97 1,567 1,179 2,746 1,966 5.4 
Ireland 75 1,100 300 1,400 3,214 4.5 
Portugal 132 812 1,581 2,393 4,430 10.6 
Greece 91 .. .. .. .. 11.3 
Malta 30 343 137 480 833 0.4 
Cyprus  42 251 314 565 1,416 0.8 
Poland  137 2,868 917 3,785 10,092 38.2 
Czech Rep.  124 2,203 710 2,733 3,842 10.5 
Slovakia  89 630 283 913 5,915 5.4 
Hungary  102 1,766 673 2,439 4,100 10.0 
Slovenia  46 641 260 901 2,220 2.0 
Estonia 42 593 110 703 1,849 1.3 
Latvia 55 513 79 592 3,716 2.2 
Lithuania 59 554 270 824 4,005 3.3 
Bulgaria  111 1,480 330 1,810 4,199 7.6 
Romania  136 2,052 - 2,052 10,478 21.5 
EU 27 total  3,164 55,441 38,471 93,912 5,335 501 
EEAS 136 1.643 2.077 3,720 134,677 501 
Commission        
Aidco - 1,020 - 1,020   
ECHO - 259 - 259   
Developmen - 205 - 205   
Trade - 574 - 574   
Total  - 3,701 - 5,778 86,708 501 
US 265 21,872 6,010 27,882 11,125 310,2 
a Source: Foreign ministry websites and correspondence with national mfa officials. “..” signifies that 
data have not been available to us, but the totals for EU27 include estimates for these countries. 
b ‘Missions’ include embassies, missions, permanent representations, consulates and general consulates. 
c ‘Number of staff’ only includes permanent, full-time employees. 
d Includes staff at the Italian cultural institutes. 
e This includes that part of DG Development that is not being moved into EEAS.     
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Annex O. Budget Expenditure on Diplomacy of the EU and 
Member States a 
 Budget, millions Budget per capita Population, millions 
Germany €873 €10.67 81.8 
France €878 €13.57 64.7 
UK €635 €10.24 62.0 
Italy b €991 €16.43 60.3 
Spain  €475 €10.35 45.9 
Belgium €211 €19.54 10.8 
Netherlands  €502 €30.24 16.6 
Luxembourg .. .. 0.5 
Austria €215 €25.60 8.4 
Denmark  €253 €46.00 5.5 
Sweden €320 €34.41 9.3 
Finland  €202 €37.41 5.4 
Ireland €168 €37.33 4.5 
Portugal €195 €18.40 10.6 
Greece .. .. 11.3 
Malta €23 €57.50 0.4 
Cyprus  €62 €77.50 0.8 
Poland  €383 €10.03 38.2 
Czech Rep.  €284  €27.05 10.5 
Slovakia  €78 €14.44 5.4 
Hungary  €91 €9.10 10.0 
Slovenia  €73 €36.50 2.0 
Estonia €23 €17.70 1.3 
Latvia €35 €15.91 2.2 
Lithuania €48 €14.55 3.3 
Bulgaria  €91 €11.97 7.6 
Romania  €130 €6.05 21.5 
EU 27 total c €7,529 €15.03 501 
EEAS €476 €0.95 501 
US €8,359 €26.95 310.2 
a Source: Foreign Ministry websites and correspondence with national officials. Expenditure for the most 
recent year on the administration of the foreign service at home in the capital and in embassies abroad. 
This includes all running expenditures (salaries, rent, office expenses, representational allowances, 
infrastructural expenses, telecoms, cultural programmes, etc); i.e. all expenditures, but excluding major 
operational programmes such as humanitarian and development aid, cultural programmes and trade 
promotion.   
b Includes costs of the Italian cultural institutes. 
c Total includes estimated data (indicated with) for several countries.  
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Annex P. Aid (ODA) Expenditures of the EU and Member States and Administering Departments 
 Total gross 
ODA  
( € millions)  
Aid administration 
expenditure 
( € millions) a 
Executing department Number of staff 
in executing 
department b 
Germany 9,436 .. BMZ – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
GTZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit 
KfW – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
 
France 9,790  66 
 
220 
Directorate General for Int’l Cooperation and Development, 
MFA (annual project expenditure)  
Agence Française de Développement  
1,236 
 
1,042 
UK 9,061 199 DFID - Department for International Development 1,600 
Italy 2,610 .. Italian Development Cooperation Programme, MFA  
Spain  5,175 .. Spanish Agency for Int’l Development Cooperation, MFA 1,246 
Belgium 2,048 3,6 Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs,  Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation 
 
65 
Netherlands  5,060 231 Ministry of Development Cooperation, MFA  213 
Luxembourg 317   
8 
Development Coop. and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA 
Lux-Development 
 
109 
Austria 902 12 Austrian Development Cooperation, MFA .. 
Denmark  2,213 118 Danish International Development Agency, MFA  .. 
Sweden 3,580 100 Swedish Int’l Development Agency, MFA 773 
Finland  1,012 13 Department for Int’l Development Cooperation, MFA 135 
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Sources: OECD/DAC for all OECD member states, http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/17/9/44981892.pdf; for non-OECD countries UN and Eurostat sources. 
a Cost data in this column are not included in the figures in the preceding table on MFA costs.  
b Number of staff does not include locally recruited employees. 
c Including 2/3 of DG Development, the other 1/3 being transferred to EEAS. 
Ireland 787 32 Irish Aid, DFA .. 
Portugal 399 7.6 Inst. Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento, MFA 154 
Greece 478 .. Hellenic Aid, MFA .. 
Malta 11 .. Overseas Development Policy, MFA 5 
Cyprus  27 .. Cyprus Aid, MFA  5 
Poland  270 .. Polish Aid, MFA  72 
Czech Rep.  176 .. CZDA – Czech Development Agency, MFA .. 
Slovakia  58 0.5 Slovak Aid, MFA 13 
Hungary  91 0.3 Int’l Development Cooperation Department,  MFA 12 
Slovenia  52 .. Int’l Development Coop. and Humanitarian Assistance, MFA .. 
Estonia 15 .. Estonian Development Cooperation, MFA 10 
Latvia 16 .. Development Cooperation MFA 5 
Lithuania 37 .. Development Coop. and Democracy Promotion Dept., MFA 18 
Bulgaria  13 .. Development Cooperation,  MFA .. 
Romania  102 .. Development Assistance Division, MFA 7 
EU27 total 53,736    
EC 12,092 221 AidCo, ECHO, Development DG c 1,484 
EU grand total 65,776    
US 22,576  USAID – U.S. Agency for Int’l Development  
